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ABSTRACT 
 
Elementarily, at least within the business environment, any discussions regarding an 
economic activity posit international trade and investment to be connected. Even to 
the discerning economist, businessman or policy maker, transfer of goods from one 
point to the other, provisions of services and direct investment ought to, rationally, be 
covered in one and the same agreement. However, this has not been possible under 
international law despite evident historical reasons approving such. International law 
manages trade and investment independently of each other. The separation of trade 
and investment has both historical and economic undertones that eventually led to the 
development of bifurcation in the legal regimes that regulate them. Though some 
commentators argued that the objectives of the two regimes are different, reality 
dictates otherwise, as both are seen to be ultimately deeply concerned with efficiency 
and the liberalization of economic activities; as such the investor and/or trader are not 
oblivious of the protections provided by the regimes of international trade and 
international investment law. So should the chicken come home to roost? The 
principle of non-discrimination, which offers the relative substantive standards of 
treatment, is at the heart of international economic law and is present in both regimes 
but has, at the same time, been interpreted and applied incoherently and inconsistently 
in both, significantly more in investment law than in trade law. As such, this thesis 
introduces the concept of sustainable development as a legal concept. The main idea 
is to see whether both investment treaty and trade tribunals can use it as an intellectual 
lens to interpret the non-discrimination standards in both regimes, aiming for their 
future convergence. The thesis traced the evolution of the concept, its scope and 
application. Flowing from the theme of the discussion, the main findings reached are 
that by employing the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the 
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concept of sustainable development can serve as a suitable interpretive tool for 
international courts and tribunals.   
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Chapter One 
Legal Convergence/Interpretation of the Regimes of International 
Economic Law: Arguing a Sustainable Development Pathway 
1.0 Background  
It is elementary that within the business environment, any discussions concerning an 
economic activity posit international trade and investment to be linked.1 Even to the 
discerning economist, businessman or policy maker, transfer of goods from one point 
to the other, provision of services and direct investment ought to, rationally, be 
covered in one and the same agreement, but this has not been possible. International 
businesses use goods or services when they trade and capital when they invest. 
Companies, as representatives of these businesses, participate in trade as a means of 
making their investments available and they also invest with a view to promoting and 
diversifying their trade, making trade and investment bound together in a symbiotic 
relationship. The separation of trade and investment has both historical and economic 
undertones, which eventually led to the development of bifurcation in the legal 
regimes that regulate them.2 International law manages trade and investment 
independently of each other. 
Today, the foreign investment regime consists of over 3,324 treaties agreed upon 
between States, out of which 2,958 are Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and 367 
are other treaties with investment provisions.3 Developed, capital exporting states 
                                                
1 At the WTO 1996 Ministerial Conference, the Director General stated “ Indeed in today’s economy, 
2 Tomer Broude, ‘Investment and Trade: The “Lottie and Lisa” of International Economic Law?’ 
(2011) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1957686 accessed 30 October 2016. 
3 Investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org accessed 10 April 2017. 
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conclude International Investment Agreements (IIAs) mainly for the protection of 
foreign investment.4  
International trade, on the other hand, is regulated multilaterally through the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) covering wide ranging issues from trade in goods, trade in 
services, trade-related investment measures and trade-related intellectual property 
rights and over 320 preferential agreements with some having investment chapters in 
them.5 The WTO’s 164 members6 assume responsibility/commitments to each other 
for the development of international trade rules and the free flow of trade.7 Even 
though the WTO did not address foreign investment directly in any detail in any of its 
provisions, some of these provisions are related to investment.8 Trade regulation is 
macro, interested in access to market and trading opportunities while the investment 
regime is micro, concern with investment drive and protection of investments made 
by individuals and companies. However, governments, in policy formulation, taking 
into cognizance the fact that those operating in the business environment do not put 
trade and investment into different compartments, usually plan economic policies and 
development measures with both schemes in mind.9 
 
From the beginning, IIAs’ main focus was the protection of investments. Initially, 
these agreements were between the rich, developed countries and the poor, 
developing countries. The developed, capital-exporting states began the move for 
                                                
4 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (CUP 2010) 173. 
5 See UNCTAD (n 3). 
6 See <http:/www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> accessed 4th November 2016. 
7 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation – WTO (April 15 1994) LT/UR/A Preamble 
<http://docsonline.wto.org> 
8 For example see GATS Art.3, Commercial Presence. 
9 See generally Debra S. Steger, ‘International Trade and Investment: Towards a Common Regime’, 
(Social Science Research Network 2013) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID No 1140518 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2240518> accessed 30 November 2016 
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investment treaties as a response to the New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
canvassed by the developing, investment recipient states.10  
 
Generally, the multilateral nature of the WTO, its highly technical and sophisticated 
body of rules, a more settled jurisprudence governing trade, its Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) and an Appeal Panel to review its Panels’ decisions and ensure 
predictability, put it a step ahead of investment law with its bilateralism problem, 
legitimacy deficiency, incoherence, inconsistency and often shallow reasoning 
accompanying arbitral awards. 
 
The laudable attempts to have a multilateral body of rules to regulate investment at 
the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, (OECD) and the 
WTO, failed. Leading OECD countries, the EU and Canada, submitted a proposal at 
the first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996 for the creation of a 
Possible Multilateral Framework on Investment (PMFI) replicated upon the MAI 
under the umbrella of the WTO.11 The OECD countries idea was the creation of an 
encyclopedic, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT-type MAI that will 
surpass the one under the WTO Agreements on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMS) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).12 The failure of 
this attempt, as Weiss argued, was the opposition mounted by the developing 
countries that viewed it as akin to a usurpation of their “regulatory sovereignty”.13 In 
order to save the situation however, a compromise was worked out and a Working 
Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment (WGTI) was created in the 
                                                
10 M. Sornarajah (n 4). 
11 For full access to these documents, see <http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai> accessed 1 December 2016. 
12 Friedl Weiss, ‘Trade and Investment’ in Muchlinski, Ortino and Schreuer (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 182. 
13 Friedl Weiss. 
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WTO to review the issues and make recommendations for the need of a multilateral 
framework on investment within the WTO.14 Not much was achieved from the 
outcome, just as the other attempts at the fourth and fifth Ministerial Conferences 
could also not produce any agreement on the issue.15 
 
The WTO rules govern trade while customary international law; bilateral investment 
treaties and other investment treaties generally determine investment law.16 It is 
noteworthy however that the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), which is a multilateral 
sectoral treaty, contain both trade and investment chapters. While trade agreements 
are concluded and applied between states through the instrumentality of sanctions, 
under investment treaties, companies can sue host states directly and claim damages. 
The consequences flowing from these differences for international economic law can 
be better imagined. 
 
However, the pertinent point here is that despite these fundamental differences, both 
the WTO and international investment law regimes majorly have provisions for 
similar standards of treatment for the protection of foreign investors and traders. The 
non-discrimination principle, for example, as a common denominator in both regimes, 
is embedded under National Treatment, Most Favoured Nation and Fair and Equitable 
treatment standards. The interpretation of these treaties is the main focus of this 
                                                
14 Friedl Weiss. See also the decision of the Ministerial Conference of December 1996, 
WT/WGTI/1/Rev.1. 
15 Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, Doha, November 2001 and Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, 
Cancun, September 2003. Though the Doha Ministerial Declaration provided for the launch of 
negotiations on trade and investment, (this happened after the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference at 
Cancun). 
16 August Reinisch, Recent Developments in International Investment Law (Cours Et Travaux No.12, 
Institut Des Hautes Etudes Internationales De Paris 2009) 5, 23. 
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thesis. The concept of sustainable development is introduced as a possible interpretive 
tool for the analysis of the international investment law and international trade law. 
1.1 Research Problem 
The existing bifurcation of the legal regimes that regulate international trade and 
international investment law is attributable to the general fragmentation of 
international law. 
 
Fragmentation of international law simply points to the increasing specialization in 
the different fields of international law and the possibility of conflict occurring 
between the different specialties.17 Potential conflict(s) between different legal norms 
or principles may be unavoidable since the principles applicable in one may not 
necessarily be applicable in the other.18 Under international law, legal norms are said 
to interact in two different ways. First, in a ‘complimentary’ way when the norms 
accumulate and is possible to apply them together and the second, in a ‘conflicting’ 
way when the two norms are in breach of each other.19  
 
International Economic Law is not bereft of the fragmentation in international law. 
Interestingly, the fragmentation occurring in international economic law seems to 
have a surprising twist. Despite the evident and far-reaching developments and 
ensuing conflicts in international investment law, it is the more settled jurisprudence 
                                                
17 Caroline Henckels, ‘Overcoming Jurisdictional Isolationism at the WTO-FTA Nexus: A Potential 
Approach for the WTO’ (2008) 19 EJIL 571-599, 571. 
18 Caroline Henckels. 
19 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: how WTO Law relates to other 
Rules of International Law (CUP, Cambridge 2003) 161, 165. 
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of the WTO that has elicited the attention of discussants on the fragmentation of 
international law.20  
 
As stated earlier, unlike what is obtained under international trade (in goods and 
services) international investment law is not settled and there is no any multilateral 
rule that regulates it despite the several attempts mentioned above.21 This, however, 
did not stop the development and even proliferation of regional treaties on investment 
and foreign trade agreements FTAs with chapters in them on investment.22 These 
chapters on investment are usually couched in the language of a BIT, incorporating 
issues like the aim of the agreement, the definition of investment, standards of 
treatment and procedures and remedies for the settlement of disputes that may ensue 
therein. As to whether IIAs have crystallized to reflect customary international law, 
there are two arguments. First, is that the evident and substantive differences between 
IIAs provisions made it a lex specialis as between the parties to the agreement rather 
than customary international law.23 The second is that IIAs indeed mirror or are likely 
to crystallize into principles of customary international law.24 In such a situation, a 
tribunal is likely to use the provisions in one IIA to fill an existing gap in another IIA 
that is being tested before it. 
 
Historically, foreign property and investors have been protected and where 
expropriated, they have been compensated under the principles of customary 
                                                
20 Anne van Aaken, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: The Case of International Investment 
Protection’ <http://ssrn.com/abstract1097529> 1, accessed 3rd July 2016. 
21 P.  Sauvé, ‘Multilateral Rules on Investment: Is Forward Movement Possible?’ (2006) 9 JIEL, 325, 
326; M. Sornarajah (n 4); Anne van Aaken (n 20) 4. 
22 UNCTAD, International Investment Rule-Making: Stocktaking, Challenges and the Way Forward 
(United Nations Publications, Switzerland 2008) 41. 
23 M. Sornarajah (n 4) 177, 234. 
24 UNCTAD (n 22) 7. 
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international law commonly found in the ‘Minimum Standard of Treatment’ (MST).25 
BITs, as treaties of international law, have standards of treatment that protect both 
private persons and international corporations. The most important amongst these 
standards of treatment are National Treatment (NT) Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) 
and Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET). Under NT, contracting parties grant to 
foreign investors treatment no less favourable than that granted to their own nationals; 
while MFN requires a treatment for foreign investors no less favourable than that 
granted to another foreign investor or third party investor as is otherwise called.26 The 
FET is found in almost all bilateral and other investment treaties; for example Article 
II (2) of the BIT between Argentina and the United States states: ‘Investment shall at 
all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment’.27 
 
Investment disputes are usually resolved by arbitration with private persons or firms 
bringing their claims against host states before an impartial international forum that 
can award damages against the host State and the award is enforceable against the 
host State. For any dispute emerging out of the operation or the interpretation of the 
provisions of any treaty, most of the IIAs usually resort to the jurisdiction of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)28 tribunals. 
 
The WTO Agreements on Investment 
                                                
25 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (Oxford University Press. 2011) 467. For more 
extensive discussion on the expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle of non-discrimination as 
embedded in the Minimum Standards, also see A.F.M Maniruzzaman, ‘Expropriation of Alien Property 
and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in International Law of Foreign Investment: An Overview’ 
(1998-1999) 8 J. Transnat I. L & Pol’y 57.  
26 M. Sornarajah (n 4) 201, 202. 
27 Article II (2), Argentina-USA BIT. 
28 Popularly called the Washington Convention; The International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes was established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of other States. It has been ratified by at least 151 countries; see 
www.icsid.worldbank.org. Accessed 30 June 2015. 
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As stated above, there is not any substantive WTO agreement on foreign 
investment.29 All the attempts to include investment as a subject in the build up to the 
WTO failed though some rules that are applicable to investment were incorporated 
during the Uruguay Round.30 A brief look at some of the areas covered is significant 
here, as reference will be made to these areas in the subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
 
 
GATS – The General Agreement on Trade in Services31  
The GATS depict an important relationship with investment. In the first place, by 
including the third mode of services supply, “commercial presence”32 that constitutes 
a significant part of foreign direct investment (FDI), it can be said to regulate foreign 
investment.33 Secondly, it covers all the service sectors that in turn constitute a 
significant part of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).34 Thirdly, the GATS ‘specific 
commitment’ shows that the standards of treatment like the NT and MFN can only 
apply to such sectors agreed upon by the parties and as such market access is 
restricted to sectors not listed by each country.35 
 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures - TRIMS36 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures – TRIMS postulate a careful 
connection between trade and investment; it discusses only trade-restrictive and trade-
                                                
29 UNCTAD (n 22) 17 
30 M. Sornarajah, (n 4) 229; See also S. Lester, et. al, World Trade Law: Text, Materials and 
Commentary (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 67 
31 General Agreement on Trade in Services – GATS (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1B <http//: 
docsonline.wto.org>.  
32 GATS, Arts 1:2 (c), XXV111 (d). 
33 B. Hoekman and M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System – WTO and 
Beyond (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009).  
34 Hoekman and Kostecki 
35 M. Sornarajah (n 4) 264. 
36 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures – TRIMS (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-IA 
http://docsonline.wto.org. 
 9 
distorting effects of investment measures only but failed to address issues such as 
transfer of technology, domestic employment and incentives. 
 
Though the agreement omits to define what the term trade-related investment measure 
(TRIMS) entails, it can be deduced from the WTO jurisprudence that characterizing 
an ‘investment measure’ is fact driven and will essentially depend on the effect of 
such measure on the investment itself.37 The TRIMS however include the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) exceptions that guarantee the rights of 
member countries to apply necessary measures in order to protect public morals, 
human, animal or plant life.38 Developing countries further enjoy the right to special 
and deferential treatment in the case of balance-of-payment problems that can 
negatively impact on the drive for foreign investment.39 
 
The main role of the TRIMS40 is the prohibition of any trade-related investment 
measures in the form of quantitative restrictions41 or violation of the principle of 
national treatment.42 
 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights - TRIPS43 
International Investment Agreement’s definition necessarily includes intellectual 
property rights (IPR)44 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
                                                
37 TRIMS (n 36), See also WTO – Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry – 
Report of the Panel (23 July 1998) WT/DS 54,59,64/R (14.73) 
38 TRIMS (n 36) Art.3 
39 TRIMS (n 36) Art.4 
40 TRIMS (n 36) Art.2.1 
41 See the Multilateral General Agreement on Trade in Goods – GATT (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A 
<http://docsonline.wto.org>, Art.XI 
42 GATT Art.III 
43 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – TRIPS (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1C 
<http://docsonline.wto.org> 
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Property Rights (TRIPS) is directly linked to FDI.45 The TRIPS is furthermore 
important here as it contains crosscutting provisions on NT, MFN, FET and 
exhaustion.46 
 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding - DSU47 
The WTO, as a self-contained legal regime, include the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes popularly called the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU), open and applicable to all members.48 
 
Any dispute arising out of any agreement concluded under the WTO must be settled 
via the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.49 Dispute settlement under the DSU 
involves five stages – consultations50, request for a panel51, panel at work52, adoption 
decision or appeal53 and implementation.54 The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
establishes the panel and the panel’s report may be reviewed by the WTO Appellate 
Body (AB) while the implementation of the recommendation of the WTO Panel/AB 
decisions usually require the removal of the inconsistent measure, and where there is 
a failure of compliance, then the complaining party can ask for compensation.55 
 
                                                                                                                                      
44 See for example Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the 
Government of the Russian Federation concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (adopted at Copenhagen on 4 November 1993), Art.1.1, 2009, UNTS 450, Art.1. 
45 TRIPS (n 43)  
46 TRIPS (n 43) Arts.3, 4 and 6. 
47 WTO - DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (15 
April 1994) LT/UR/A2 http://docsonline.wto.org , accessed 10 March 2016. 
48 DSU 
49 B.Hoekman (n 33) 87 
50 DSU (n 47) Art.3.7 
51 DSU (n 47) Art.4.11 
52 DSU (n 47) Art. 10, Art.13 
53 DSU (n 47) Art.17.3 
54 DSU (n 47) Art.21.3 
55 S.Lester (n 30) 153-234 for a detailed analysis of the DSU stages. 
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The principle of non-discrimination embodied in NT, FET and MFN is relevant and 
applicable to both fields of international economic law – international investment law 
and international trade law considering the economic rationale in both fields.56 Non-
discrimination is a right that has been originally recognised under customary 
international law and treaty practice.57  
 
One of the effects of the fragmentation of international law is clearly seen within 
international investment law in the contradicting arbitral awards’ definition and 
interpretation of the non-discrimination principle applicable to NT, FET and MFN. 
The effects of fragmentation are also visible in the investment-related trade rules 
embodied in the WTO System as it relates to the non-discrimination principle 
embedded in NT and MFN. The fragmentation occurring in these fields is, 
regrettably, without any systematic coordination. It is the effect of this and the need 
for the harmonisation of the interpretation of the non-discrimination principle 
evidence in these standards that will be the main focus of this thesis. Though the 
principle of non-discrimination as covered by the relative protection standards is said 
to be the focus, this is simply geared towards the greater goal of using it as a basis to 
show how sustainable development can use it for the convergence of the regimes of 
trade and investment. This is because of the understanding that harmony in 
interpretation can lead to greater convergence. 
 
It is against this background that the main research question is raised thus: 
‘How can Sustainable Development be used to achieve Legal Convergence 
between International Trade Law and International Investment Law?’  
                                                
56 Nicolas F. Diebold, ‘Standards of Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law’ (2011) ICQL 
60, 831, 832. 
57 A.F.M Maniruzzaman, (n 25). 
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In an attempt to answer the above, the following questions further appear as 
follow: 
         - How can Sustainable Development help in reducing the inconsistent 
interpretation in these fields of international economic law? 
         - How can the Principle of Systemic Integration under the provisions of 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties VCLT be used to 
integrate Sustainable Development in the Interpretation of Treaty Provisions in the 
Regimes of International Investment Law and International Trade Law?  
1.2 Research Methodology 
This thesis will use the qualitative research methodology approach. It will adopt the 
doctrinal method. In different parts of the thesis, this will necessitate the use of either 
or a combination of the following: 
1. Comparative legal analysis to compare the definition and interpretation of 
treaties generally using the non-discrimination principles of NT, MFN and 
FET in particular from certain bodies of international law generally and more 
particularly under international investment law and under the law of the WTO. 
This is with a view to seeing how different courts and tribunals define and 
interpret the standards involved and the resultant contradiction in the various 
interpretations. 
 
2. Deductive legal reasoning; here, the principle of systemic integration in Art. 
31(3) (c) of the VCLT will be analysed to see whether it can be used to invoke 
sustainable development as a cure of the fragmentation existing in these two 
contending regimes of international economic law. 
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In using the above methodologies, the thesis will, doctrinally, use content analysis of 
issues and the philosophical undertones underpinning the two fields in order to 
analyse data from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data will be from 
relevant case law and arbitral awards (especially those that invoke sustainable 
development concerns) in the decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 
WTO, the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), investment 
arbitration tribunals of the ICSID and NAFTA and some national courts decisions, 
especially of the US and Canada supreme courts. Further to this, the research will use 
secondary sources such as journal articles, textbooks, international legal instruments, 
investment and trade regulations, periodicals, annual reports of the ICSID, NAFTA, 
WTO, UNCTAD etc. and other relevant internet sources. 
 
The use of primary data is obviously for the purpose of sifting out applicable laws and 
judicial pronouncements on the main theme of the research. This is with a view to 
seeing whether there is any harmony in the interpretation of the non-discrimination 
principle by these judicial bodies. The use of secondary data is to reflect and critique, 
where relevant, how some academic writers analyse the entire issues central to the 
research and then marshal the arguments within the applicable legal provisions. 
1.3 Review of Similar Research Studies 
Enormous literature exists on the principle of non-discrimination as is embedded in 
national treatment, most-favoured-nation and fair and equitable treatment even as it is 
applied in both international trade and international investment law. However, of all 
the existing book chapters and journal articles, none has advocated for the doctrine of 
legal convergence and sustainable development interpretation as a possible integration 
principle that can be used to bring the two legal regimes together. This review will 
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use well-researched and sound academic contributions in order to provide an 
analytical and critical study on the subject matter of the thesis. The topic cut across a 
range of other areas such as the fragmentation of international law and the doctrine of 
legal convergence – simplified introductory remarks on these areas are also provided. 
 
This introductory fusion of the literature will adopt the ‘integrated approach’. From 
the name, it will integrate scholarly contributions of academic writers in the body of 
the thesis by revisiting, in some detail, all the works cited in this review. This thesis 
will look into the possibilities of the integration of the regimes of international trade 
and international investment law into one regime under international economic law. 
The literatures reviewed in this thesis do not in any way exhaust all the discourse as 
other literature will eventually develop as this interesting area of research progresses.  
The following review is an analysis of the major works that have examined non-
discrimination standards of national treatment, fair and equitable treatment and most-
favoured-nation in both trade and investment regimes generally, and then the 
available works that reviewed the development and application of the concept of 
sustainable development in the applicable regimes. The review will place the thesis in 
the context of the literature with a view to sharing the relevance of this research and 
the future need of further research in the area. 
 
At the commencement of this thesis, the academic sphere was enriched by the 
publication of five important works that have either a direct or substantial bearing on 
the direction of this thesis. Almost all the publications generally focused on the 
relationship between investment and trade, future prospects of investment law and 
policy, the interpretation of international investment law and the interplay between 
 15 
WTO litigation and international investment arbitration. This is hardly surprising in 
view of the topicality and the continuous discussion of the fragmentation occurring in 
international law. These publications essentially strengthen this thesis’ position that 
the continuous bifurcation of the legal regimes of international trade and investment 
law merit detailed, further study. However, there are considerable differences and 
overall focus between the present thesis and these publications. All the publications 
asked different though sometimes-relative research questions to the ones to be 
explored in this thesis. As the review of the monographs and some of the articles 
contained in other books will show, this thesis profound an argument that has not 
been previously examined in any literature. 
 
Iona Tudor’s monograph undertook a comparative approach in identifying the scope 
and meaning of the FET. She argued that the principle is a lex specialis that is 
constituted by the treaty in question, so in applying the FET, particular attention must 
be paid to the wordings of the relevant treaty provision depicting the FET. She 
concluded by showing the need for striking a balance between law and fact to 
determine a breach of the FET standard.58  
 
Paparinskis’ approach was normative. He studied the role, relationship and content of 
the FET and the international minimum standard through the application of the 
classical or customary and the modern or treaty concepts. He concluded that the 
international human rights could serve as an effective method that can be used to fill 
the gaps between the two concepts.59  
                                                
58 Iona Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign 
Investment, Oxford Monographs in International Law (OUP 2008). 
59 Martin Paparinskis, The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment, Oxford 
Monographs in International Law (OUP 2012). 
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The Conceptual approach, as used by Klager to study the doctrinal foundations and 
impact of the FET in the context of the international legal system, seems to be a better 
approach. The article rejected the FET customary character, arguing that it is yet to 
undergo the transformation necessary to qualify it as a conventional norm and suggest 
the integration of the arguments in other sub-systems of international law into 
international investment law.60 This thesis will suggest ways of bringing about 
cohesion between the regimes of international trade and international investment law 
using the principle of non-discrimination through the application of sustainable 
development.   
 
FET in the context of NAFTA Article 1105 was the focus of Patrick Dumberry’s 
book as he argued that the construction and interpretation under NAFTA Article 1105 
differ considerably from the FET provisions in majority of BITs. He concluded that 
NAFTA Article 1105 recognised only the prohibition of arbitrary conduct, denial of 
justice and the obligation of due process as stand-alone elements of the FET. This 
thesis will revisit NAFTA interpretation of all the protection standards in suggesting 
convergence between trade and investment regime.61  
 
Todd Weiler’s book was essentially an incisive historical approach to the discussion 
of the standards. He argued that as fundamental norms in international investment 
                                                
60 Roland Klager, Fair and Equitable Treatment in international Investment Law, Cambridge Studies 
in International and Comparative Law (CUP 2011). 
61 Patrick Dumberry, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, A Guide to NAFTA Case Law on 
Article 1105 (Kluwer International 2013). 
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law, the nature and importance of these standards could only be understood through 
an in-depth historical analysis.62 
 
National Treatment, Most-Favoured-Nation and Fair and Equitable Treatment as 
concepts connoting the principle of Non-Discrimination have also been written on as 
stand alone or in relation to each other or with other standards. Among prominent 
investment law writers that have extensively written on the interpretation of these 
standards are Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Andrew Newcombe, Andrea 
Bjorklund, August Reinisch, Todd Weiler, Thomas Wâlde, AFM Maniruzzaman, 
Jurgen Kurtz and Stephan Schill.63 In reviewing all the standards, Dolzer put forward 
the argument that though some differences exist in the treaty wordings, they are 
almost always identically couched. He further observed that despite the similarities in 
the NT provisions, the awards are littered with many inconsistencies in its 
interpretation.64 This is a problem this research seeks to address by suggesting not 
only coherence in the interpretation of standards but also a form of convergence 
between the two regimes, hence the need for the concept of sustainable development 
                                                
62 Todd Weiler, The Interpretation of International Investment Law: Equality, Discrimination and 
Minimum Standards of Treatment in Historical Context (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2013). 
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Discrimination and Minimum Standards of Treatment in Historical Context (Martinus Nijhoff 
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Governance and Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space?, Lord Mustill International Arbitration 
Conference, St. John College 2004; Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and Regulatory 
Taking in International Law 50 ICLQ 81, (2001); AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘Expropriation of Alien 
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Overview’, J. Transnat L. & Pol’y (1998); Jurgen Kurtz, ‘The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in 
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Jurisprudence, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press,  
2009), Nicolas F. Diebold, Non-Discrimination in International Trade in Services, ‘Likeness’ in 
WTO/GATS (CUP, 2010, 2013); Freya Baetens (ed), Investment Law within International law: 
Integrationist Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
64 Dolzer & Schreuer (n 63). 
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as a suitable legal framework to help achieve this. Christoph Schreuer emphasized the 
impact investment arbitration has had on the way these protection standards are 
applied. In summing up the interrelationship between the standards, he posits the FET 
to be the most promising, all encompassing standard. His argument about the NT 
standard is that despite its independent nature, it has connections to other standards 
while the MFN’s main strength is the extent to which it is employed to import other 
standards not provided for in a particular treaty.65 
 
Bjorklund’s article suggests that the inconsistency in the interpretation of the non-
discrimination principle has consistently made it difficult for arbitrators to canvass 
any relevant, prior decision even on a persuasive ground, something that could aid the 
development of what is presently referred to as jurisprudence constanté.66 This 
problem in turn will result in incoherence and inconsistency in international 
investment law. Writing in the same vein, Reinisch used NT to point out the lack of 
coherence in international investment law and concluded that the problem is sure to 
diminish the appeal of investment arbitration and the confidence claimants and 
respondents have in the system.67 
 
Maniruzzaman looked at the principle of non-discrimination from the background of 
foreign investment and firmly put the argument across that each of the standards, NT, 
FET and MFN is an integral part of the principle. The article’s conclusion was more 
forward looking by contending that since the principle has no sweeping application, it 
must be appreciated in the context of its application in the hope for the development 
                                                
65 Schreuer (n 63). 
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of a future Multilateral Agreement on Investment.68 This thesis will build on this 
approach to suggest sustainable development as a future framework for a future 
Multilateral Agreement to cover both Trade and Investment. 
 
Jurgen Kurtz approached the interpretation of the national treatment provision from 
the perspective of its connectivity to protectionism and canvassed the argument that a 
more positive approach in the interpretation of national treatment in investment 
treaties is to put forward the obligation as a constraint against protectionism.69 
From the GATT/WTO angle, the works of Verhoosel70, Huerta-Goldman71 and Joost 
Pauwelyn72 remain instructive and need a fresh look here. 
 
Basically, this research was primarily triggered by the continuous bifurcation of the 
legal regimes governing international economic law and the inconsistency in the 
interpretation of the above standards by arbitral tribunals and most importantly by 
some existing works. Debra Steger argued that convergence in the face of economic 
reality and policy sense is impractical since only States can support such kind of 
harmonization.73 Tomer Broude’s own argument was the unjustifiable bifurcation of 
the trade and investment institutional regulatory family despite the strong, practical 
linkage between the two. Though this is an interesting argument that is similar to the 
position of this thesis, his thesis is, however, mainly concerned with subsidies 
                                                
68 AFM Maniruzzaman, (n 63). 
69 Jurgen Kurtz (n 63). 
70 Gaeten Verhoosel, ‘The Use of Investor-State Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment Treaties to 
Seek Relief for Breaches of WTO Law’ (2003), 6 Journal of International Economic Law 493. 
71 Huerta-Goldman JA, Romanetti A and Stirnimann FX (eds), WTO Litigation, Investment Arbitration, 
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73 Debra P. Steger, International Trade and Investment: Towards a Common Regime? (Social Science 
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regulation though it did called for a halt in the separation of trade and investment 
today.74  
Kurtz brought forward the argument strongly that it is the continuous misuse of WTO 
law that contributed highly to the inconsistency in the investment law jurisprudence. 
Though he criticized the wrong way WTO law was transposed in resolving 
investment disputes, this thesis will analyse the jurisprudences with a view to 
suggesting how investment law learning from the WTO’s application of the VCLT in 
the interpretation of the non-discrimination principle and the invocation of the 
concept of sustainable development therein can achieve harmony.75 
 
The standards of investment protection, especially national treatment, most-favoured-
nation and fair and equitable standard have all elicited comparative studies within the 
WTO either by scholars of international trade law or those of international investment 
law. The references of international investment arbitration to the WTO jurisprudence 
seem to provide the stimulus for these comparative studies. Walde observed that 
despite evident differences there is an increasing proximity and as such reason for 
partial convergence between the WTO and international investment treaties. His 
article informed this thesis by showing that there is a basis of comparative study 
between non-discrimination standards in investment treaty and the WTO in particular 
and the regimes of trade and investment in general.76  
 
                                                
74 Tomer Broude, Investment and Trade: the “Lottie and Lisa” of International Economic Law? (2011) 
8 Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1875 (accessed 10 April 2014). 
75 Jurgen Kurtz, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration (n 58). 
76 Thomas Walde, Comments on the Discipline of National Treatment: Boosting Good Governance and 
Intruding into Domestic Regulatory Space? (n.58). 
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In another article by Verhoosel, a more direct argument was postulated that some 
relevant provisions of the WTO could possibly allow customary international law 
standards of treatment to be applied to investment arbitration cases. Alternatively, he 
argued, pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
the application of WTO principles, as interpretive tool in disputes relating to BITs is 
something realizable. This thesis will expand on this idea with a view to seeing how 
Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the principle of Systemic Integration can be applied to 
invoke sustainable development in the interpretation of these relative standards of 
treatment. Furthermore, it will explore how to use the VCLT and the doctrine of legal 
convergence in transposing the WTO exceptions into investment arbitration so as to 
strength the argument for a more harmonious interpretation of the applicable 
standards that will assist in the future convergence of the two contending regimes. 
 
Mary Footer’s article traced the nexus between trade and investment law using the 
‘Living Apart Together’ or ‘LAT’ context, this is akin to ‘being married but living 
apart’ and feeling the pain. The article agued that the challenge lies not in the 
possibility of having a multilateral instrument covering the two regimes but in the 
extent to which the interaction between the regimes is leading to greater convergence 
or divergence in their rule-making and dispute settlement systems.77 In another article, 
Footer examined trade and investment regimes by contextualizing them historically. 
Her review of the effect of intra-firm investment on trade patterns, the interaction of 
IIA and WTO law concluded that though on the face of the principle of non-
discrimination, MFN and exceptive clauses they appear to unite the legal principles 
underpinning FDI and international trade, the fundamental rules governing them are 
                                                
77 Mary Footer, ‘International Investment and Trade: the Relationship that Never Went Away’ in Freya 
Baetens, (n 63). 
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not necessarily the same in their evolution and application.78 Though the article dealt 
with the interaction between trade and investment, it only took a holistic approach, it 
did not look at the interaction of the principle of non-discrimination under national 
treatment, most-favoured-nation and fair and equitable treatment from a sustainable 
development perspective, something this thesis will do. DiMascio and Pauwelyn’s 
article traced the common roots of the WTO and investment law regimes and the 
possibility of a positive interaction between them.79   
 
It is observed that direct, in-depth studies dedicated to comparing international 
investment law and international trade/WTO law in the context of the principle of 
non-discrimination are quiet meager that is until very recently, while studying the 
regimes through the lens of sustainable development virtually non-existent. As seen in 
the above literatures, studies comparing the two regimes as a pair are available. 
Literatures comparing the investment regime and the WTO, the WTO with EU or 
investment law with HR as pairs are also available.80    
 
Studying them as a pair, Anastasios Gourgourinis has made a direct connection of the 
use of the same minimum standards of treatment protecting foreign traders/investors 
by the WTO multilateral trade regime and international investment law. He argued for 
a triangular normative relationship regarding the administration of domestic 
regulation between the customary rule as lex generalis and the provisions of the trade 
and investment regimes as leges speciales. He concluded that investors can foresee 
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success on a FET claim if their country has earlier succeeded on similar claim at the 
WTO and vice versa.81 
 
Much later during the write-up stage of this thesis there emerged three fundamental 
pieces of work that have impacted profoundly on the overall theme. Jurgen Kurtz’s 
The WTO and International Investment Law, Converging Systems expertly advocated 
for the convergence of trade and investment law by undertaking both a descriptive 
and analytical approach supported by empirical evidence.82 Also using an 
interdisciplinary approach, the author looked at the legal, economic and sociological 
factors that he argued seem to be pushing the two pillars of economic law together. 
Jurgen agreed that the regimes shared treaty standards and narrowed his discussion 
majorly to national treatment only, postulating that investment tribunals in their 
interpretation of similar standards therein could draw on the jurisprudence of the 
WTO, though he criticised how the WTO jurisprudence in this area is applied in 
investment arbitration. Overall, though the main theme the book dwelled a lot on was 
what investment law could generally learn from trade law, it cannot be missed that the 
book set out to provide basis for the reform of the two systems. It seems to do this by 
critically dealing with the intricate issue of how the evident conflict between the 
liberalization of trade and the regulation of investment for public purposes can be 
tackled. Among all the important works reviewed so far, this book has one of the 
strongest bearings and impacted strongly on the issues discussed in this thesis. Suffice 
it to say, both the methodologies used and the perspectives taken are different. Jurgen 
Kurtz, of all the treatment standards, only applied the national treatment in his 
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discourse and interpretation of this standard was not really his most important thesis. 
In this work, the three most important investment protection standards were all 
applied, as the focus is on the quest for a harmonious interpretation of these standards 
across the two regimes, hence the employment of the provisions of Article 31(3) (c) to 
invoke the concept of sustainable development in that regard. 
 
Away from the substantive analysis of the standards of treatment that are in focus in 
this thesis, the interpretative tools used also merit some discussion. A take on the 
doctrine of legal convergence, the provisions of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the 
concept of sustainable development is needed here. The doctrine of legal convergence 
seems to be sparsely recognised and applied in legal discourse. Mads Andenas and 
Eirik Bjorge’s A Farewell to Fragmentation83 is seen as a welcome addition to this 
sparsely covered area of legal analysis. Even though the authors recognised the 
existence of fragmentation as an existential threat to international law, they argued 
that this has been countered by the relative/evident convergence going on in various 
disciplines of international law. It is the conclusion of the work that international 
tribunals always find ways to adapt to the existence of fragmentation by accounting 
for each other through the interaction of emerging fields in international law, a 
position this thesis did not seem to agree with when it comes to investment treaty 
arbitration. Various cases drawn from international tribunals were reviewed to show 
how convergence is happening.  
 
Antonio Platsas article viewed the doctrine of legal convergence as a firm, verifiable 
tool that can aid the positive harmonisation of contending legal regimes, reunification 
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of interpretive discrepancies and ensure certainty in the law.84 In chapter two, a 
detailed discussion of the concept of legal convergence is undertaken and the 
elements therein tested in the analysis in chapters five and six, especially in chapter 
six that makes a case for convergence. 
 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration were applied 
as tools of treaty interpretation. The rules governing treaty interpretation are different 
from the typical rules domestic courts apply when interpreting other municipal legal 
instruments, documents or legislations. As such, a look at the rules governing the 
interpretation of treaties is necessary. In this regard, a good starting point seems to be 
Richard Gardiner’s celebrated book on treaty interpretation.85 Gardiner’s book is a 
general introduction to treaty interpretation though he did that through a detailed 
systematic analysis of the constituent elements of the Vienna rules. Through a 
contextual/theoretical approach and critical case analysis that developed out of the 
Convention, the author has presented an overall guide on how treaties are interpreted. 
The book is placed within the context of the debates of the International Law 
Commission and the Vienna Conference. The analysis of the application of the VCLT 
to both investment and the WTO treaties drew from this authority.  
 
More importantly however, among all the provisions of the Vienna Convention, it is 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT more than any other, which has elicited critical 
academic commentary.86 Campbell McLachlan’s article is celebrated and highly cited 
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as a critical discourse on the provisions of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the principle of 
Systemic Integration. His lucid arguments draw on the constituent norms in the article 
and the way these were applied by various tribunals and concluded with a pragmatic 
insight on the future application of systemic integration. He argued that Article 
31(3)(c), as a reflection of the principle of systemic integration, ‘seeks to avert 
apparent conflict of norms, and to achieve instead, through interpretation, the 
harmonisation of rules of international law’.87 In chapter two on the framework of 
analysis and in the synthesis in chapter six, this is what the thesis has demonstrated.  
 
Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration is the title of 
Merkouris book in which he provided a fresh, detailed and quite compelling 
understanding of this critical interpretive provision. Applying excerpts from Plato’s 
Allegory of the Cave as contained in the Republic, he undertook a deconstruction of 
the article using the Vienna rules and presented what should be ‘the place and 
function of Article 31(3)(c) within both the interpretative process of the VCLT and 
the system of international law as a whole’.88 In the three answers he reached in his 
conclusion, this thesis drew from all especially the third, that ‘Article 31(3)(c) is just 
one of the tools that allow the judge to start from a blurry vision of what a norm is, 
and reach judicial conviction of how the norm is to be understood in the light of other 
norms, …to go from uncertainty to judicial certainty’.89  
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The discussion of the principle of non-discrimination in the twin pillars of 
international economic law, the fields of trade and investment, benefitted from 
another later contribution.90 The book undertook an analysis of the non-discrimination 
principle through a critique of the way tribunals have applied the notion of regulatory 
purpose in order to see whether or not discrimination has occurred. The authors 
proposed a new meaning of regulatory purpose that can be used by the tribunals to 
develop applicable test for deciphering unlawful discrimination. The applicable test 
developed in the book used systematic and structured analysis to show how regulatory 
purpose should and should not be used in implementing non-discrimination standards. 
 
While the analytical framework of the thesis uses legal convergence using the 
provisions of Article 31(3)(c) in chapter two, the conceptual framework uses 
sustainable development in chapter five. In coming to terms with the challenges 
facing the investment law regime today, an edited book with expert articles was added 
to the literature in this field.91 The book explored alternative shifts away from the long 
held view of investment law being mainly concerned with the protection of the 
economic interests of investors and their investment to recent developments in the 
field as being influenced by the UNCTAD framework for the reform of investment 
treaties. This is well suited within the context of the thesis in the sense that the articles 
mainly directed the paradigm shift to the concept of sustainable development. The 
perspectives ranged from a call for the reconciliation of investment protection and 
sustainable development, sustainable development initiatives in the negotiation of 
new generation IIAs and the lessons international investment law can learn from trade 
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law’s sustainable development provisions. It is Katharina Berner’s article that is most 
relevant to our discussion as it calls for an interpretative U-turn in reconciling 
investment protection and sustainable development. Berner argued that if faithfully 
applied, the provisions of Articles 31-33 VCLT could serve as feasible substitute that 
will assist in the accommodation of investment protection and sustainable 
development in a treaty. Using the principle of systemic integration and the provisions 
of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, the thesis will show the VCLT can be applied to employ 
sustainable development in the interpretation of not only investment but also trade 
treaties. 
As Judge Weeramantry posit ‘the concept of sustainable development is one of those 
forward-looking legal concepts on which the future of the human family very heavily 
depends’.92 This observation is contained in the latest addition to the emerging 
literature in this area – the area of sustainable development. The collection of expert 
articles is to shift the discussion of the existing literature from decisions of courts and 
tribunals that are tilted to addressing sustainable development ‘within the ‘silo’ of one 
pillar of sustainable development, be it economic, environmental or human rights’ to 
one that balances and integrate all these areas through the activation of the New Delhi 
Principles of Sustainable Development.93 The book explored the interpretation and 
application of the international law principles on sustainable development by 
international and regional courts, tribunals and other dispute settlement bodies and 
highlighted how these judicial bodies applied the seven New Delhi Principles of 
Sustainable Development. All these were done to show how, globally, the justice 
system is spearheading the drive towards sustainable justice by ‘imagination and 
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intuition’ in rendering decisions in matters swarming with sustainable development 
concerns. The book has five sections and thirty five articles and the thesis will, in 
chapter six especially, draw from some of the analysis and cases considered in 
showing that the concept of sustainable development can indeed serve as a veritable 
intellectual/interpretative lens that can be applied by jurists not only in the 
interpretation of treaties generally but also specifically in harmoniously interpreting 
the principle of non-discrimination in the regimes of international economic law so as 
to assist in achieving convergence in the two fields.     
All the above body of works reviewed provides a glimpse into the relationship 
between existing literature and this research. This thesis will be situated within the 
above and other existing literature and contribute to the scholarship with its in-depth 
study on the negative effects of the bifurcation of the regimes of international law, 
which is necessitating the need for convergence between the regimes of international 
investment law and that of international trade law. This, it is hoped, will be achieved 
by showing how the concept of sustainable development can serve as an interpretative 
lens for the interpretation of both investment and trade treaties, employing the 
principle of non-discrimination in trade and investment law, as exist today.  
1.4 Significance of the Research  
This research seeks to provide suggestions for the convergence of the trade and 
investment regimes through the process of a harmonious interpretative framework of 
the principle of non-discrimination as embedded in national treatment, most-
favoured-nation and fair and equitable treatment in investment/trade under the 
umbrella of international economic law. Sustainable development is the conceptual 
framework the thesis suggests can be used to achieve this feat.  
 30 
1.5 Contribution of the Research 
The contribution of this research is in its innovative approach in explaining the 
possible harmonisation/convergence of international trade and international 
investment law as a single regime based on the underlying rationalities of the two 
regimes. This was done using the sustainable development negotiation, drafting and 
interpretation of treaties and treaty standards in investment/trade protection standards. 
 
The research, at the end, provided legal clarification of all the pertinent norms 
involved and the way they operate in the proposed convergence framework. Due to 
the existing inconsistencies in the interpretation of the norms, a new interpretation of 
the existing normative content of the pertinent norms and the usefulness of such in the 
wider area of international economic law is also suggested.  
 
The suggested framework will bring about cohesion between international trade and 
international investment using the concept of sustainable development. The probable 
impact of the development of cohesion among erstwhile conflicting regimes is in the 
way it will facilitate regulatory coherence, trade and investment liberalization, 
increased productivity and economic activity, reduction in no-tariff barriers and 
increased global income especially in the face of the ambitious US-EU Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Brexit. This cohesion will also point the 
way forward for the possible development of a multilateral investment and trade 
agreement to substitute the WTO in the future. The investment horizon is already ripe 
for this novel approach as can be seen in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
agreement, the ongoing discussion in the US-EU Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
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Agreement (TTIP), the OECD countries approaches and the recent Yukos arbitral 
award delivered based on the Energy Charter Treaty94. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
 The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one, which is the introductory 
chapter, provides the general background of the research, identified the research 
problems and research questions the thesis set out to answer, the scope of the research 
and its significance and the methodology the thesis applies. The chapter further 
provides a detailed review of similar research studies in the area and other associated 
areas so as to situate the research within the context of similar literature analysed. In 
reviewing the literature, the chapter introduces both the analytical and conceptual 
framework of the thesis. 
Chapter two examines the doctrine of legal convergence and the principle of systemic 
integration under the provisions of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention of the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT). The chapter traces the origin and development of the 
doctrine and its application by international courts and tribunals. For the VCLT, the 
chapter identifies the elements of the Convention in order to assess its suitability in 
invoking sustainable development when interpreting investment/trade treaties and 
protection standards. 
Chapters three and four cover the non-discrimination standards of treatment – NT, 
MFN and FET. Chapter three examines the principle of non-discrimination as covered 
by the protection standards in international investment law. The aim of the chapter is 
to establish a foundation for giving an insight into the way investment tribunals 
formulate, interpret and apply these treaty protection standards in investor-State 
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disputes. On the other hand, chapter four, devoted to the WTO, traces how the Panels 
and the Appellate Board use sustainable development in the application of the Vienna 
Convention in the interpretation of the WTO treaty and the NT and MFN non-
discrimination protection standards. The WTO jurisprudence and decisions are 
reviewed so as to distill relevant elements in the interpretation of the standards so as 
to see if these can serve as learning curves for the investment regime. 
Chapter five concerns the substantive application of the concept of sustainable 
development. The chapter first traces the evolution of sustainable development from 
its origin as an environmental law concept to its present acceptance as customary 
international law with emphasis on its invocation in the decisions of international 
courts and tribunals. The decisions from these courts provide investment treaty and 
trade tribunals with a veritable tool that will assist in understanding the problems 
beleaguering the coherent interpretation of the non-discrimination principle in trade 
and investment. 
Chapter six of the thesis assembles the justifications for the convergence of the 
regimes of trade and investment. It assembles these justifications based on the lessons 
learnt from the discussions in chapters three, four and five. The chapter shows how 
sustainable development can be employed in the design of new BITs and provides 
examples from new BITs already designed in such way. The chapter further explains 
the need for convergence of the regimes due to the commonality of their legal terrains 
and shared history; this is in addition to other justifications for convergence of the 
regimes like movement of actors from one regime to the other rendering decisions, 
arbitrators reasoning in rendering their awards and the regimes jurisdictional overlap. 
The conclusion in the chapter is that there are several justifications for the 
 33 
convergence of the regimes of trade and investment and the concept of sustainable 
development remains at the forefront of this convergence thesis. 
Chapter seven, which is the concluding chapter, provides a summary of the preceding 
chapters and conclusions from the findings in the research. The chapter also points to 
some recommendations for further research.      
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Chapter Two 
The Framework for Analysis - The Doctrine of Legal Convergence 
and the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
 
2.0 Introduction 
The framework chapter for analysis is designed to introduce two important tools, the 
doctrine of legal convergence and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
These two tools will be used as the framework of analysis in answering the research 
questions that were raised in chapter one.  
2.1 The Doctrine of Legal Convergence 
Though not exhaustively explored and developed academically, the doctrine of legal 
convergence has however achieved some level of appreciation and application in the 
combined jurisprudences of the ICJ, the ECJ, the WTO and NAFTA and even in other 
lesser-developed regional economic law instruments. The application of the principle 
in the mentioned bodies and organisations could provide a basis for the exploration of 
the idea of the ultimate harmonisation of the non-discrimination standards applicable 
to the fields of international trade law and international investment law.  
 
As a theory, ‘convergence implies the increasing adoption by all governance systems 
throughout the world of a common set of institutions and practices, portrayed as an 
ideal rational/legal system…’1 In its simple, legal connotation, or as a legal doctrine, 
                                                
1 Thomas Clarke, ‘The Continuing Diversity of Corporate Governance: Theories of Convergence and 
Variety’, Ephemera Theory & Politics in Organisation, Vol.16 (1): 19-52, 2.  
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convergence is generally viewed as the coming together of two contending legal 
systems.2 Viewed in this context, the doctrine can serve as a veritable tool for a 
constructive harmonisation of legal principles, the reconciliation of inconsistency in 
interpretation, provision of greater clarity and certainty in the law and the shaping of 
future legal policy in both trade and investment regimes. In order to achieve all the 
above, the chapter will first trace the origin of the doctrine of legal convergence. 
Secondly, it will examine the evidence of the existence of the doctrine, and thirdly it 
will analyse the application of the doctrine by various judicial bodies and 
organisations. The fundamental reasoning reached in the chapter is the proposition 
that legal convergence is an effective mechanism that can be used in bringing together 
the two contending legal regimes of trade and investment using the sustainable 
development interpretation, for example using the non-discrimination principle as a 
common denominator.  
 
The idea here, as will be shown in the subsequent chapters, is not one for the full 
convergence or seamless fusion of the two regimes as one. This may prove to be a 
futile exercise for several reasons. For example, in the last two decades, a 
considerable number of WTO members (prominently among developing states), have 
shown their aversion to the inclusion of foreign investment as an all-inclusive 
negotiating item at both the 1996 Singapore and 2003 Cancun ministerial meetings.3 
This position is a pointer to the fact that building convergence entirely on complete 
borrowing from the WTO will necessarily fail, no matter how tempting that 
jurisprudence looks.  
                                                
2 See generally, Antonios E. Platsas, ‘The Idea of Legal Convergence and International Economic 
Law’. See also Platsas (Ph.D Thesis on the Idea of Legal Convergence, 1997, University of Ireland). 
3 Jurgen Kurtz, ‘Developing Countries and Their Engagement in the World Trade Organisation: An 
Assessment of the Cancun Ministerial’ Melbourne Journal of International Law, 5(1), 2007, 248-263. 
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Evidently, states do not seem to have the political appetite for a bold treaty reform 
needed to ensconce hard, systemic unification of the regimes of trade and 
investment.4 Even the Uruguay round that led to the formation of the WTO 
experienced some ideological horse-trading concerning the role of the States and of 
the markets.5 Furthermore, despite the strong bond between them, even the members 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) could not 
agree on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment.6  
2. 2 An Overview of the Doctrine 
As an answer to the increasing fragmentation of international law, the idea of 
convergence seems to be gaining increased attention. Tracing the origin of 
convergence has not been easy as different theses point to varying origins of the 
doctrine.  
 
Academically, one favoured view has been that the idea of legal convergence 
originated from Cicero’s terse call for “no different laws in Athens and in Rome”7. 
Other arguments have been that the idea is traceable to Socrates but Antonios Platas 
maintained that the philosophical origin of the idea of legal convergence indeed goes 
back to both Socrates and Plato, and especially to Plato’s theory for the postulation of 
universals.8 Plato’s theory for the postulation of universals argued that it is in the 
nature of man to present and further accept the plural as singular, and this 
                                                
4 Jurgen Kurtz, The WTO and International Investment Law: Converging Systems, International Trade 
and Economic Law Series, (CUP 2016) 23. 
5 P. Yu, ‘TRIPS and Its Discontents’ Marquette Intellectual Law Review 369, (2006) 10. 
6 Peter Muchlinski, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?’, 
The International Lawyer 1033, (2000) 34.  
7 Cicero, De Repiblica, III, xxii, 33, as quoted by Antonios E. Platas (n.2). 
8 Antonios E. Platas (n.2), see also Plato’s Rep. 596a wherein he stated: ‘We are in the habit of posting 
a single form for each plurality of things to which we give the same name’.  
 37 
fundamentally mean that in substance, all leads to one as opposed to many.9 Thus, by 
a way of correlation to law, Plato’s theory of seeing the one as opposed to the many 
as something inherently built in human thinking and behavior can be used, by way of 
analogy, to lend credence to the argument against the continuance of divergent legal 
regimes or even divergent legal systems. 
 
It is contended that though fragmentation has been accepted and prominently 
discussed as a major threat to international law, the idea of convergence has not been 
so explored and advanced.10 However, as fragmentation continues to pose a serious 
threat to the unity and coherence of international law, convergence is equally 
receiving continuous attention within international legal scholarship more than the 
opposing claims to independence and uniqueness of varying legal regimes.11  
 
Even though the idea of legal convergence has not been actively canvassed through 
rigorous scholarship, nevertheless, it is gaining currency in the current reassertion of 
the role of the International Court of Justice and in State practice12, the workings and 
practices of the European Union, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and, most importantly, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and many other, though lesser, regional economic law 
arrangements. It is then argued that the effectiveness of international law to assert 
itself as a generalist discipline lays in how it is able to manage divergent legal regimes 
by ensuring that these regimes take account of each other and address any existing 
                                                
9 Plato. 
10 Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge, ‘Introduction: From Fragmentation to Convergence in International 
Law’ in A Farewell to Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in International Law, Mads 
Andenas and Eirik Bjorge (eds), (CUP 2015) 1. 
11 Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge, (n.10) 2. 
12 Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge, (n.10) 2. 
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conflict. Convergence and or harmonisation of relevant, similar regimes seem the way 
to go at present.  
 
The idea of legal convergence seem more relevant now than ever before due to the 
increasing, widespread and unique developments in the internationalisation and 
transnationalisation of law.13 A Treaty concluded by two States can be the subject of 
interpretation by an international arbitral panel and the WTO Panel or Appellate Body 
can hear a trade dispute, the decision rendered can resonate beyond the borders of the 
disputants and have effect on similar disputes before other tribunals or panels. 
 
It is maintained that even within the same legal regime, any expression of conflicting 
legal views usually lead to the refinement and restatement of the correct position of 
the law based on sounder and more refined principle/argument, whilst dispensing with 
confusing, irrational and less coherent ones.14 The idea of legal convergence is one 
whose movement is not plainly referenced from the understanding of the jurists any 
more than it is indebted to the external construct of international law but rather that of 
logic.15 
 
The idea of common sense logic is as convincing in its currency as that of law. 
Practically, the logic behind legal doctrines is to encourage the determination of 
overlapping of legal regimes thereby giving endorsement for the refinement and 
convergence of these regimes. This clearly shows that logic stands as an authoritative 
beginning that guide the planning of law and legal convergence. This idea clearly 
                                                
13 Ole Spiermann, ‘Twentieth Century Internationalism in Law’, 18 Eur. J. Int’I L, (2007) 785, 788. 
14 Alexander W. Street SC, ‘The Art of Legal Convergence’, UNSW Litigation Master Class 26 March 
2013, 4. 
15 Alexander W. Street SC. 
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supports the argument for the regimes of international trade and international 
investment law to go back to their root and converge. 
 
It has been argued that the predominant authority behind the push for legal 
convergence has been the quest for existence and interdependent economic costs and 
benefits.16These economic thoughts are the guiding light behind the unification of the 
laws of international trade and international investment law. As such, this support the 
theory that there are identical benefits that flow from harmonisation of divergent 
international economic laws so as to facilitate trade and investment. 
 
International law has been at the forefront in the quest for legal convergence. Varying 
fields of public international law are experiencing tensions and conflicts as they strive 
to establish a balance of the competing stakeholder interests in these fields. The 
relevant positions of the State, foreign traders and foreign investors readily come to 
mind and this has strengthened the desirability for common or uniform interpretation 
of major international instruments. Thus international law set out to be the 
fundamental driver of the idea of legal convergence by the dissipation of common 
standards and the resultant application of uniform interpretation of applicable laws. 
 
At the world stage, and before various dispute settlement bodies, both international 
trade law and international investment law on the one hand and public international 
law seem to overlap. Each of these fields also has played important role in very many 
other areas of law. For example in the field of international trade, the regime has 
profound impact in such areas like intellectual property law, taxation, derivatives, 
                                                
16 Alexander W. Street SC (n.14). 
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investment law, competition law and anti-trust law. The same apply to international 
investment law. It is emphasized that all these legal areas overlap and interact on the 
world stage. As such, it is the idea of legal convergence that all these fields need to 
fuse together based on their relevance to one another, this is with a view to having 
uniform laws that will promote free trade, protect investment and integrate both 
regimes for increased productivity.  
2.3 Why Legal Convergence? The Fragmentation and Divergence of 
International Law 
A clear, in-depth and focused application of the concept of legal convergence cannot 
be fully appreciated without going back to what necessitated the development of the 
concept. It is arguable that the continuous fragmentation of international law through 
the emergence of autonomous and specialized regimes has continued to pose a threat 
to international law itself as a legal system. 
 
Over half a century ago, Wilfred Jenks provided the context within which 
fragmentation developed.17 The first phenomenon was the evident lack of established 
legislative body in the world that Jenks explained thus: 
 
            “…law-making treaties are tending to develop in a number of historical, functional and 
regional groups which are separate from each other and whose mutual relationships are in some 
respects analogous to those of separate systems of municipal law.”18 
 
                                                
17 Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682, 2006, 10. 
18 C. Wilfred. Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, BYBIL Vol.30, (1953) 403 as quoted by 
Koskenniemi, (n.17) 10. 
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Jenks argument remains true today just like it was fifty years ago. The second 
phenomenon, linked directly to the law, was stated thus: 
 
            “One of the most serious sources of conflict between law-making treaties is the important 
development of the law governing the revision of multilateral instruments and defining the legal effects 
of revision.”19 
 
The above can be attested to not only by the number of multilateral treaties concluded 
by States but also by the many other formal regulatory regimes. Public international 
law is so fragmented by the emergence of specialized, autonomous regimes in wide-
ranging fields like “human rights law”, “environmental law”, “trade law” and even 
“investment law”, each with its own general body of rules, institutions and some even 
with their own internal dispute settlement mechanisms. Most of these specialized and 
relatively autonomous rules or regimes work in isolation of other contiguous regimes 
and institutions within the larger body of the principles and practices of international 
law.20 The resultant effects of these are the gradual erosion of the principles of general 
international law, inconsistency in interpretation, conflicts between rules, conflicting 
jurisprudence, forum shopping, incoherence, divergent institutional practices and 
eroding legal security.  
 
Other publicists see the issue as merely a technical one, which is a result of the 
increasing legal activity across disciplines, and are convinced the problem can be 
resolved simply by cooperation.21 Practically, this assumption is over simplifying the 
issue and will not address the problem. As the International Law Commission 
                                                
19 C. Wilfred. Jenks, (n.18). 
20 Martti Koskenniemi, (n.17) 11. 
21 ‘“Symposium: The Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piercing the Puzzle”’, New York Journal 
of International Law and Politics, Vol. 31 (1999) 679-993. 
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reasoned in its critique of fragmentation, the development of ‘self-contained regimes’ 
is posing serious problems to the coherence in international law.22 It seems to be the 
case that these specialized, self-contained regimes did not come into existence by 
accident rather as an answer to emerging technical and functional requirements.23 An 
example of this will show that “Trade law”, for example, evolves as a mechanism to 
manage international economic relations.24 And as such, it becomes imperative to 
resort to the application of certain developed techniques in the resolution of tension 
and conflicts in these regimes – in this case, trade and investment regimes. 
 
The end of the Second World War saw states agreeing to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1947 in order to liberalize barriers to foreign trade and also to treaty 
protections for foreign investments. Despite their coming into existence around the 
same time and their shared attributes, these two regimes of international economic 
law have developed distinctly, with their differences sometimes seen to outweigh 
their similarities.25 For example, while the WTO uses the default state-to-state dispute 
settlement system, the investment regime augment that by allowing foreign investors 
of a signatory home state the legal standing to challenge a breach of relevant aspects 
of the treaty in question. On the other hand also, there seems to be a fundamental 
sociological divide among actors and or practitioners spread throughout both fields. 
While the Appellate Body’s objective application of the WTO treaty members’ 
agreement helped in no small measure in the coherence and integrity of the trade law 
jurisprudence, its equivalent, that could have avouch for a correct interpretation of 
                                                
22 As explained by Koskenniemi, see Martti Koskenniemi, (n.17) 14. 
23 Martti Koskenniemi, (n.17) 14. 
24 Martti Koskenniemi, (n.17) 14. 
25 Jurgen Kurtz, (n.4) 1. 
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investment treaties, is almost completely absent in the investor-state arbitration 
system.26 
 
As is central to this argument, the divergence between these two contending systems 
has led to deeply fractured and disturbing pathologies, with poor interpretative 
methods in investment arbitration, which in turn has led to the inconsistencies in 
arbitral awards. Further to these disturbing pathologies, Jurgen Kurtz moved the 
narrative by canvassing a new opinion that this problem of inconsistency in 
methodology and results stand different from that of incoherence.27 
 
Jurgen Kurtz, in postulating what he called ‘five convergence factors’, argued that the 
two regimes could not continue in the present divergent ways despite the gaping 
disconnection in their treaty texts, jurisprudence, methodologies and stakeholder 
perception.28 These convergence factors29 are worth reproducing and explained here 
to show how the argument for harmonisation of the two regimes is gaining steam, and 
most importantly to set the phase and show how this thesis will canvass and forge a 
different pathway from Jürgen’s position. 
 
First, the two systems evidently share common legal terrain. Trade and investment 
share common legal terrain despite the seeming airtight separation of the two systems. 
Foreign investment in the services sector is regulated extensively within the WTO 
against the vital role of that sector as a proportion of global foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows. The two regimes incorporate a number of shared micro norms notably 
                                                
26 Jurgen Kurtz, (n.4) 5. 
27 Jurgen Kurtz (n.4) 6. 
28 Jurgen Kurtz (n.4) 11. 
29 Jurgen Kurtz (n.4) 10 – 20 for an exhaustive analysis of these factors.  
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their restrictions against state discrimination in the form of both national and most-
favoured-nation treatment. Both trade and investment regimes inherently assure 
competitive opportunity between foreign and domestic goods, services and investors. 
A more interesting dimension this first convergence factor is taking is the way States 
are becoming more engaged in managing likely conflicts between investment treaty 
norms and WTO law. In fact, they have moved further to review their commitments 
by inserting flexibilities for State regulation in relation to foreign investors and their 
investments, and, interestingly, they do this by drawing on the WTO model to guide 
their reform efforts. In many modern FTA’s, full WTO exceptions are simply 
incorporated into investment chapters by reference.30 
 
Second is the jurisdictional connection between the two regimes. There are times a 
measure can fall within the jurisdictional competence of both regimes and even 
adjudicated concurrently. This jurisdictional interrelationship is evident in the 
Softwood Lumber dispute between the United States and Canada, which triggered 
both WTO and NAFTA claims.31 The complicated ‘soft drinks’ dispute between 
Mexico and the United States had triggered national treatment claims both by the US 
as a State party in the WTO32 and by a scope of US investors under NAFTA Chapter 
1133. It should be noted that the fact that these proceedings have been completed does 
not stop the possibility of overlapping litigation or parallel proceedings. 
 
                                                
30 Jurgen Kurtz (n.4) 12, see also Australia-ASEAN-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, 27 February 
2009, Ch.15, Art.1 (2). 
31 Softwood Lumber Case (United States v. Canada).  
32 Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body 
(WT/DS308/AB/R, 6 March 2006); Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages, Report 
of the Panel (WT/DS308/R, 7 October 2005). 
33 Archer Daniels Midland Co. and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. Mexico, Award (ICSID, 
12 November 2007); Corn Products International, Inc. v. Mexico, Decision on Responsibility (ICSID, 
15 January 2008); Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, Award (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/05/2, 18 
September 2009). 
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Third, the likelihood of the above parallel proceedings is simply informed by both 
economic logic and reality with clear example in the inter-dependence of cross-border 
trade and foreign investment. 
 
The fourth is the cross-fertilization of the jurisprudence of the two regimes especially 
their dispute settlement systems. For over two decades now, the two regimes have 
advanced dispute settlement systems with adjudicators now drawing on jurisprudence 
from one system when constructing readings on treaty obligations in the other. For 
example, it is evident the problematic transplant on the use of WTO law in investment 
arbitration – with arbitrators borrowing substantially from WTO jurisprudence 
especially when defining readings on national treatment in investment law.34 Though 
the growing phenomenon of cross-fertilization of method and substance flow largely 
from the more established WTO law to investor-state arbitration, the WTO Appellate 
Board has also cited an investor-state arbitral award.35 
 
The fifth convergence factor explored by Jurgen Kurtz is the movement of actors 
across the two fields. The more settled jurisprudence of the WTO law is presently 
being diffused to elements of investment treaty law by the deliberate choice of 
specific and identifiable judges. A good example is the Continental Award where the 
award draws extensively from the WTO law, not only that, the fact that even the 
president of the tribunal was a WTO Appellate Board member.36 The combined effect 
                                                
34 Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Ecuador, Final Award (UNCITRAL, 1 July 2004), 
paras 174-176, Methanex Corp. v. US, Final Award, Pt. IV, Ch.B, paras 28-30. 
35 For example United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, Report 
of the Appellate Body (WT/DS344/AB/R, 30 April 2008), para. 160, n.313. 
36 Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, Award (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, 5 September 
2008). 
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of these two factors in the Continental Award is sure to be reflected in many future 
arbitral awards. 
 
Even though the argument for convergence advocated by Jürgen’s work rhyme with 
this thesis, his solution for the future engagement between the fields of international 
trade and international investment law was to create research models that he termed 
the double helix metaphor. This thesis takes a different position and attempt to fill in 
the gaps as shown in the subsequent chapters. His model fell short of engaging the 
most fundamental convergent point in international economic law as the basis of 
analysis, which is the principle of non-discrimination. Though he agreed with the 
shared history between the two field, he neglected, and in certain areas even 
completely refused the economic rationale that binds them together, hence falling 
short of seeing reason in the idea of firm convergence or harmonisation of the 
principles of the two regimes to be one, and most importantly sustainable 
development was never his thesis. This thesis is using the principle of non-
discrimination as a convergent point because economic law is centrally about non-
discrimination. The principle of non-discrimination maintains its superiority over any 
other standard and the principle’s permeability throughout all other standards has 
never been in contention. 
2.4 Functions and Application of Legal Convergence by International Judicial 
Bodies and Organisations 
In different texts, legal convergence and harmonisation have often been used 
interchangeably. The increased fragmentation of international law evident in the 
diversity of legal regimes and specialist fields solidify the argument for coherence and 
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integration of relevant regimes.37 Convergence functions primarily to deal with 
fragmentation of international law generally, and its future seems positive in view of 
the reassertion of the doctrine by the International Court of Justice.38The reassertion 
of the doctrine has gone a long way in ensuring that not only the methodology but 
also the principles of international law are changing with tacit support of the ICJ, 
treaty bodies and other relevant tribunals.39  
 
Further to the reassertion of the doctrine by the ICJ, convergence is also gaining 
momentum in the way State practice is changing with governments’ increasing 
support using both national and international medium. The jurisprudence of the 
highest domestic courts are becoming more adaptive of and giving effect to 
international law.40  
a. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
According to Judge Christopher Greenwood, it was the proliferation of various courts 
and tribunals that animated the fear of the fragmentation of international law.41 The 
ICJ has been supplemented by many other tribunals like the ITLOS, ad hoc criminal 
tribunals or courts for Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, 
Lebanon, the DSU of the WTO and other regional human rights tribunals, all busy 
with settling various cases or arbitrations between States or between States and 
investors. The above courts and tribunals, established under no any judicial or quasi-
judicial hierarchy, have the chance of interpreting and applying the rules of 
international law in their decisions in contradiction of the rules and jurisprudence of 
                                                
37 Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge, (n.10) 12. 
38 Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge, (n.10) 3. The position of the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations will further give lots of credibility to the doctrine. 
39 Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge (n.10) 2 
40 Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge (n.10) 2. 
41 Christopher Greenwood, ‘Unity and Diversity in International Law’, in Mads Andenas and Eirik 
Bjorge (n.10) 46. 
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many other courts and tribunals, making fragmentation of international law a more 
serious concern.42 
 
The progressive move towards convergence through the cross-fertilisation of 
jurisprudence has made the above fears to wither away based on the consistency and 
coherence in the approach of the ICJ and other arbitral tribunals in their judgments 
and awards and the extensive reference of these judicial and quasi-judicial bodies to 
the jurisprudence of many other relevant courts and tribunals.43 In the Bay of 
Bengal44 case, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, ITLOS, based its 
2012 judgment on the compelling jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice 
by drawing heavily from it. A more convincing argument for convergence related to 
the Bay of Bengal case was when the International Court of Justice, while deciding 
the case of Nicaragua v. Columbia45 in turn also relied on the reasoning of the 
tribunal in Bay of Bengal thereby enhancing the development of a coherent body of 
law and practice.46 
 
In the recent and well known Diallo47 case, the International Court of Justice was, 
among others, to determine the amount of compensation to be given to the Republic 
of Guinea by the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the latter’s treatment of a 
Guinean national. The court, in a judgment that points to the increasing convergence 
                                                
42 Christopher Greenwood (n.41). 
43 Christopher Greenwood (n.41) 47. 
44 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), ICJ, Judgment 
of 14 March 2012.  
45 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), I.C.J Reports 2012. 
46 Christopher Greenwood (n.41) 47. 
47 Ahmadu Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. the Democratic Republic of Congo), Compensation Judgment, I.C.J 
Reports 2012, 324. 
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of international law, drew both from the jurisprudence and experience of the Iran-U.S 
Claims Tribunal and other human rights tribunals.48 
 
What is seen in the above examples did not only represent convergence or 
harmonisation of contending legal regimes per se but more of the assertion of the 
drive towards the unity of international law from within. More of this will be seen in 
the following discussion of other courts and tribunals. Most definitely the 
convergence thesis this research is mainly focused on is that between the trade and 
investment disciplines in the quest for coherence in the interpretation of the treaties 
applicable in the two regimes. Chapters five and six of the thesis will bring out the 
position clearly. Coherence, certainty and consistency from within are necessary 
corollaries to convergence between contending regimes generally and among relevant 
standards applicable to the regimes. 
 
b. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Among all international economic law regimes, the WTO seems to be the most 
advanced in the promotion of legal convergence of regimes especially in the areas of 
subsidies and countervailing measures by offering liberal economic principles to 
which all the WTO Members must adhere.49 From the construction of the WTO 
Agreement, it is evident that all the rules of the organisation are applicable to all the 
                                                
48 Though a relatively short judgment, however, it did invoked the practice of the European Court of 
Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee, ITLOS, the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights, the UN Compensation Commission, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and the award in the Lusitania 
claims. 
49 Antonios E. Platsas (n.2) 7. 
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Members with no room for reservation.50 This is also another form of convergence 
from within.  
 
As Asif Qureshi and Andreas Zeigler showed, the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement provided the platform for legal 
convergence among all WTO members in three different ways: first, for a WTO 
country to fulfill its undertaken obligations under the TRIPS, all its national 
legislation has to be brought into effect; secondly each WTO member is required to 
provide the same level of protection to nationals of other WTO member countries as it 
would provide its own nationals in relation to intellectual property rights and thirdly, 
a WTO member is to provide the most-favoured-nation treatment to all other WTO 
members in relation to the same matter.51 
  
The TRIPS Agreement was reached under the WTO as a boundary between the 
international trade law and the coverage of intellectual property rights.52 The TRIPS 
Agreement is so extensive covering such aspects of intellectual property law such as 
copyright53, trademarks54, geographical indications55, industrial designs56, patents57,  
undisclosed information matters58 and anti-competitive licences in contractual 
licences.59 The TRIPS Agreement under the WTO framework, for it to operate in any 
domestic laws, necessarily require extensive legal amendments, thereby changing the 
                                                
50 Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (3rd edn. 2005) 642. 
51 Asif H. Qureshi & Andreas R. Ziegler, International Economic Law (2d edn.2007), 339-340 
52 Asif H. Qureshi & Andreas R. Zeigler, 338-339. 
53 Arts. 9-14 TRIPS 
54 Arts. 15-21 TRIPS 
55 Arts. 22-24 TRIPS 
56 Arts. 25-26 TRIPS 
57 Arts. 27-38 TRIPS 
58 Art. 39 TRIPS  
59 Art. 40 TRIPS 
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nature of international economic law.60 The WTO also contain a highly developed 
system for the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.61 
 
The WTO is seen as a compelling example of how legal economic systems promote 
legal internationalism and convergence of different and differing legal systems.62 Its 
multilateral nature, the investment chapter therein, extensive jurisprudence and 
sophisticated dispute settlement mechanism that has its in-built appeal system have 
made the WTO to serve as a beacon of hope for the convergence of otherwise 
divergent legal regimes. The International Monetary Fund is another important sector 
of international economic law that promotes internationalism and convergence on 
quite a large scale. 
 
As will be explained in the next sub-topic, the development of regional economic 
blocks has had a profound impact on the legal convergence progressively seen in the 
entire trade law sphere. 
 
c. The European Community/European Union 
The European Union is an international organisation whose principal business is the 
bringing together of some legal areas of the Union – convergence of legal systems. As 
an international economic organisation, the EU is “rooted in the rule of law under the 
auspices of the European Court of Justice”.63 It is evident that all the member States 
of the Union must have satisfied all the relevant requirements before accession and 
the most important was aligning their domestic laws and regulations in all respective 
                                                
60 Antonios E. Platsas (n.2) 7. 
61 Asif H. Qureshi & Andreas R. Zeigler (n.51) 339. 
62 Antonios E. Platsas (n.2) 8. 
63 Ole Spiermann, (n.13) 785, 787. 
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areas, with that of the Union.64 It is noted, however, that any member State can 
negotiate an opt-out following a laid down procedure, a good example can be seen in 
how the United Kingdom and the Republic of Denmark negotiated an opt-out from 
the single currency of the Union.  
 
The EU originally started as an economic law experiment before transforming into a 
successful political economic union, which shows convergent economic law has 
triumphed.65 The economic integration of the countries that today make the European 
Union effectively commenced with the 1989 liberation of capital flow throughout all 
member States.66 The monetary union achieved in 1992 finally paved the way for the 
single currency that materialized in 1999. 
 
It would have sufficed to exemplify the unity and convergence of international law or 
specifically international economic law within the EU by reference to the EC 
Directives, especially EC Directive 93/13/EEC and EC Directive 99/44/EC. However, 
it seems there is a more compelling argument for convergence of international 
economic law within the EU than what the EC Directives covered67. Furthermore, the 
ongoing negotiation between the EU and the US on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership TTIP, though still in its fluid form, is a firm testament to the 
                                                
64 Presently, the EU comprises of 28 Member States (As this moment the U.K is discussing its exit as a 
fallout of the Brexit) and each of these must have satisfied all the legal requirements covered in thirty-
five legal chapters before accession. For all the chapters, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_th
e_eu/negotiations_croatia_turkey/index_en.htm#3, accessed 20 March 2017.  
65 Antonios E. Platsas (n.2) 4. 
66 See Tony Cleaver, Understanding the World Economy (3d ed. 2007) 111. 
67 It is noted that the EC Directives have been the subject of attack by some academics as, contrary to 
our perspective, producing divergence rather than convergence, for example, EC Directive 93/13/EEC.  
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convergence-taking place not only within the EU but also in international economic 
law generally.68 
 
Many other regional economic arrangements are encouraging convergence of 
economic laws just like the European Union has done, though to a lesser extent than 
the older, more developed harmonisation coming from the EU. Good examples can be 
seen in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Association of South East Asian 
States (ASEAN), the African Union (AU) and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. The success of the EU’s convergence of its economic law regimes and its 
overall integration led these other regional blocks to aspire to converge their 
economic laws.69  
 
Having seen the development and application of the doctrine of legal convergence in 
varying fields of international law and its efficacy in the convergence of two systems 
both within and without, the question now will be how can sustainable development 
be applied as an interpretive tool with the aim of  bringing the regimes of trade and 
investment together. The Vienna Convention popularly referred to, as the Canon of 
treaty interpretation, will be used to make the case that the Convention has enough in 
its provisions that will allow for its application in the convergence of the two legal 
regimes.  
                                                
68 The TTIP/TTP represent examples of convergence developing in the area, though they are also seen 
as reactionary regimes developed by these countries currently facing a lot of debate due to varying 
factors facing these seeming partners. 
69 Tony Clever, (n.66) 121. 
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2.5 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – A Deconstruction 
Any discussion involving the understanding and application of the VCLT ought to 
logically start from its text and a comprehensive discussion of the ordinary meaning 
of the wordings of that text. These will be done with a view to seeing whether the 
VCLT can provide the much-needed answer to interpretation of non-discrimination 
standards in investment treaties. Even before the start of the discussion of the text of 
the VCLT and a review of the meaning of the words used in its formulation, it is 
tempting to go back in time and locate the root of this canon of treaty interpretation. 
The excruciating argument developing over the suitability of the use of the VCLT by 
investment tribunals in the interpretation of the standards of treatment made it a 
compelling reason to reach far back into history to posit its relevance and possible 
effectiveness as an interpretive tool. The Convention itself refrain from emphatically 
siding with any of the ideological arguments on the interpretation of treaties, though it 
is resolute in its anchoring on the objective of the treaty rather than on the intention of 
the parties.70 
 
Historically, the works of two foremost intellectuals have always served as good 
reference points in this regard. Both Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vettel’s seminal 
works serve as important roots to the provisions of Article 31(3) (c) VCLT and 
formed the foundation on which existing debate on the rules applicable to Article 
31(3) (c) are based.71 Hugo Grotius made reference to the choice of the law of nations 
as a rule of interpretation when he stated that:72 
                                                
70 Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 54, No.2 (2005) 291. 
71 Panos Merkouris, Article 31(3) (c) VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration, Normative 
Shadows in Plato’s Case, (Brill Nijhoff 2015) 16. 
72 Hugo Grotius (Clement Barksdale tr. and annot.), De jure belli ac pacis (The Illustrious Hugo 
Grotius of the Law of Warre and Peace with Annotations. III Parts and Memorials of the Author’s Life 
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        I shall not, however, admit the rule…that the contracts of kings and peoples ought to be 
interpreted according to Roman law so far as possible, unless it is apparent that among certain peoples 
the body of civil law has been received as the law of nations in respect to the matters which concern the 
law of nations. 
 
Emmerich de Vattel, on the other hand, while providing an antidote to any speech that 
is given in an unclear and ambiguous manner, stated in his famous treatise The Law of 
Nations that:73 
 
     We ought to interpret his obscure or vague expressions, in such a manner, that they may agree with 
those terms that are clear and without ambiguity, which he has used elsewhere, either in the same 
treaty, or in some other of the like kind. 
 
The above is simply a summary of the historical reach of the VCLT. The relevance of 
the Vienna rules to the interpretative approach suggested in chapter six makes it 
necessary to assemble the entire elements of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the general rule of interpretation here. This is to be followed by some detailed 
discussions of the most fundamental aspects. The elements are reproduced here:  
 
Article 31 – General Rule of Interpretation  
 
1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
                                                                                                                                      
and Death) (London: printed by T. Warren, for William Lee), Book II, Chapter XVI, para. XXXI, as 
quoted in Panos Merkouris. 
73 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles on the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct 
and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (London: G.G.J. and J. Robinson, 1793), Book II, Chapter XVII, 
para. 284, as quoted in Panos Merkouris, (n.71) 16. 
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2) The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the 
text, including its preamble and annexes:  
a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion 
with the conclusion of the treaty; 
b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion 
of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3) There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
or the application of its provisions; 
b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in relations between the parties. 
 
Article 31(3) (c), which is a customary international law provision74, now codifies 
what is referred to as the principle of systemic integration. 
A good first step is a deconstruction of the entire elements constituting Article 
31VCLT before narrowing down on Article 31(3)(c), which is the main article that 
will be the focus of application under the analysis in chapter six. 
 
Even though this is a deconstruction of the elements constituting Article 31 only, it is 
unarguable that in the face of any dispute requiring engaging the rules, it is the entire 
Vienna rules that are applied in the interpretation of the treaty relevant to the dispute 
not portions of it.75 The content of Article 31 is referred to in the singular, ‘general 
                                                
74 The position of Article 31 & 32 as customary international law has been affirmed by various 
international adjudicating bodies – Oil Platforms (Preliminary Objections) (Islamic Republic of Iran v. 
United States of America), judgment of 12 December 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep. 803, para. 23 (hereinafter 
Oil Platforms (Preliminary Objections); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between 
Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment of 15 February 1995, [1995] ICJ Rep, 6, para. 33 
(hereinafter Qatar v. Bahrain); Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO, Appellate Body Report 
adopted on 1 November 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R&WT/DSU/AB/R, Section D. 
75 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, Oxford University Press, (2008) 141. 
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rule’ in order to guard against applying particular rules of treaty interpretation 
separate from each other.76 Having established the above caveat, attention is now 
turned to the constituent elements of the Article 31(1) in our attempt to unravel the 
real meaning of terms before proceeding to Article 31 (3) (c) which is the main article 
that will be applied in this framework and in the synthesis coming up in chapter six.  
As such, the elements in 31 (1), ‘a treaty’, ‘good faith’, ‘ordinary meaning of terms’, 
‘context’ and ‘object and purpose’, will be briefly discussed here. 
 
1. A ‘Treaty’ – In interpreting the term ‘treaty’, recourse must be had to its ‘special’ 
meaning as adduced to by the provisions of the Vienna Convention itself in its 
definition provision. Article 2 VCLT states: 
 
                ‘Treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation… 
 
 
The constituent parts of the definition are international agreements, between States 
and governed by international law. The need to give a special meaning to the term 
‘treaty’, if the parties so intend, is giving heed to the requirements of the provisions of 
Article 31(4). An important point to be made here is that though it is generally agreed 
that Articles 31-33 are customary international law and the definition of treaties 
covered by the VCLT are also within the customary law definition of a treaty, the 
customary law definition is more expansive than that assumed under the 
                                                
76 Richard Gardiner, 142. 
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Convention.77 Thus the meaning of treaty under customary law will necessarily 
involve agreements regulated by international law and involve states and international 
organisations. As such, Gardiner argued that where a tribunal is convinced that an 
instrument qualifies as a treaty, nothing stops it from applying the customary rules of 
treaty interpretation laid down under the Vienna rules.78 Of course the qualification 
becomes necessary to show that not all instruments that nation-states agreed possess 
the attributes of treaties. 
 
In considering the general rule, the context, interpretation, position, and effect of the 
treaty relative to its terms become important issues to dissect. To do these, the general 
rule started by pointing to a distinction between the treaty and its terms as a way of 
showing the way in which the word ‘treaty’ is generally used there. From the general 
rule, it is discernable that in the interpretation of any treaty, the exercise necessarily 
begins with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in question, such meaning 
being controlled by the context in which the terms appeared, and the object and 
purpose of the treaty usually help to clarify the technique of treaty interpretation.79 
However, reference to the ‘terms of the treaty’ itself creates doubt as to what terms 
are in contention here. Is the reference to the terms of the treaty directed at what the 
parties to the treaty have agreed or to the content of the treaty itself?80 A reading of 
the context of the treaty will point to the latter.81 From the context, the terms refer to 
the provisions of the treaty itself not the agreement reached by the parties. This is a 
                                                
77 Richard Gardiner, (n.75) 143. 
78 Richard Gardiner, (n.75) 143. 
79 Richard Gardiner, (n.75) 144. 
80 This formed part of the ILC’s debate on ‘whether interpretation should be by reference to the text 
itself or to the intention of the parties’, see Mr. de Luna [1964] Yearbook of the ILC, vol. 1, 276, para. 
16. 
81 Richard Gardiner, (n.75) 144. 
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point to come back to in the analysis in chapter five because of its implication on the 
interpretation of one treaty relative to the others.  
 
It is clear that the ILC’s work on the interpretation of treaties points to the fact that 
though it is the treaty text that evidence the agreement of the parties, the whole of the 
treaty must be read and due regard given to its object and purpose, it is not enough to 
simply undertake an inquiry into the ordinary meaning of the words in controversy.82 
However, in the interpretation of treaty, though outstanding problems remain when 
dealing with the interpretation of the provisions of the treaty in question, but the most 
difficult issue has been the effect of lack of silence on a treaty. The importance of 
absent terms or silence cannot be over-emphasised, as it is a constant in the search of 
the ordinary meaning of a term in treaty interpretation. What assumption will be made 
where a treaty has not clearly provided for terms governing a particular matter will 
necessarily depend on the nature of the treaty itself and the effect of the constituent 
elements of the Vienna rules on that particular treaty. Another room for assumption is 
where the treaty in question has a select list of items covered by the treaty, does it 
necessarily means anything not covered or that cannot come within the contemplation 
of the list is out? Can the principle in ejusdem generis be of any significance here? 
Due its flexibility, it maybe possible that the ejusdem generis principle may allow for 
the accommodation of such items that were left out of the list. 
 
As difficult as the above assumptions seem, a more complicated issue seems to be 
where the treaty in question has given permission for a particular thing but leaves it 
                                                
82 Importantly see ILC 2016 Report, Ch. VI, A/71/10, on subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties wherein the report considers both evolutive and 
systemic methods of interpretation of treaties, available online at legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2016, see also 
Richard Gardiner, (n.75) 145. 
 60 
uncertain if an arbitrator has the discretion to conclude that other matters similar to 
the ones permitted will be subject to future treaty or are simply not covered by the 
treaty in question and as such the parties are free to progress as they desire. Gardiner 
concluded here that everything would have to go back to the nature of the treaty 
itself.83  
 
Having seen how the term treaty is constructed in Article 31(1), it is now important to 
look at how good faith is constructed under the same sub-section and relative to the 
treaty. The term good faith is generally seen as a limiting factor indicating the extent 
of the application of terms into treaty.84 
 
2. ‘Good Faith’ – The principle of good faith is, without doubt, fundamental to both 
contractual agreements and treaties. This can be seen in the way courts and 
tribunals made direct reference to it in their decisions and awards. The views 
expressed in various judicial decisions and awards varied depending on the legal 
system under which they are expressed.85 Modern interpretation rules are 
basically an expansion of the idea that all agreements must be interpreted in good 
faith.86 Nonetheless, it has not been easy to identify any specific role or 
application of the principle of good faith, a problem that may be associated with 
its subjective nature. Furthermore, despite its appearance as a moral principle, its 
application has generated a lot of inconsistent views; eliciting doubt about the 
                                                
83 Richard Gardiner, (n.75) 145-146.  
84 Richard Gardiner, (n.75) 147,  
85 See generally R Zimmerman and S Whittaker, Good Faith in European Contract Law (CUP, 
Cambridge 2000). 
86 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the 
Interpretation of Treaties’, (1949) XXVI BYBIL 48 at 56. 
 61 
very essence of the concept and the uncertainty of its application.87 Further to this 
subjective nature is also the difficulty in justifying whether an arbitral tribunal 
has reached its interpretation of a treaty in bad faith. Arbitral awards and 
judgments, no doubt, have also referred to good faith in validating references to 
discovering the intention of the parties.  
 
The principle of good faith, as expressed at the beginning of the rules, differs from 
other elements of the Vienna rules because it applies to the entire treaty rather than to 
individual words or phrases as contained within the particular treaty under 
consideration. So “…the content of the concept of good faith is more of a contextual 
nature than the concept itself [is] understood in the abstract sense”.88 Despite the fact 
that determining the precise content of the principle of good faith remains elusive, it 
does contain the principle of ‘effectiveness’89 a principle that is readily applicable to 
particular terms as they appear in a treaty. This principle of effectiveness is depicted 
in the Latin maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat, which support an interpretation 
that fulfills the aims of the treaty being interpreted through advancing the objects and 
purpose of the treaty. 
 
Alluring to its role as a general rule of treaty interpretation, the ILC, in its 
commentary of the draft articles, posits that the entire maxim is encapsulated in the 
provisions of article 31(1). The ILC state thus: 
                                                
87 Lorena Carjaval-Arenas and AFM Maniruzzaman, ‘Cooperation as Philosophical Foundation of 
Good Faith in International Business-Contracting - A View Through the Prism of Transnational Law’ 
(2012) Oxford U Comparative L Forum 1 @ ouclf.iuscomp.org, http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/cooperation-
as-philosophical-foundation-of-good-faith-international-business-contracting-a-view-through-the-
prism-of-transnational-law/  
88 A F M Maniruzzaman ‘The Concept of Good Faith in International Investment Disputes – the 
Arbitrator’s Dilemma’, Amicus Curiae, Journal of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies, Issue 89, 
Spring 2012, 17.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
89 The Ut res rule, another part of the principle of effectiveness is that it favours a treaty interpretation 
that will fulfill the aims of the treaty under consideration.  
 62 
 
         When a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not enable the 
treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the 
former interpretation should be adopted.90 
 
In the Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages case, the Appellate Body of the WTO clearly 
recognised the application of the ut res as an element of the general rule of treaty 
interpretation wherein it states:  
 
          A fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set 
out in Article 31 [of the Vienna Convention] is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam 
pereat).91 
 
The position regarding the application of the principle of effectiveness has not only 
been reiterated in several other decisions92 of the Appellate Body of the WTO asking 
treaty interpreters to ensure that all the terms of a treaty are given meaning and effect 
as required, but that the principle is also one that is or can be extended to other related 
treaties.93 
 
The position, relevance and overall value of the application of the principle of good 
faith in treaty interpretation remain problematic or at best cagey, this despite the 
doctrine being accepted as an integral part of virtually all legal systems.94 Just like the 
way equity operates to counter the hardship of the common law, the principle of good 
                                                
90 See the Commentary on draft articles, [1966] Yearbook of the ILC, vol II, 219, para. 6.  
91 Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, AB-1996-2, WT/DS8,10&11/AB/R (1996). 
92 Korea–Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, AB-1999-8, 
WT/DS98/AB/R, 24, PARAS. 80-81(1999). 
93 See Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, AB-1999-7, WT/DS121/AB/R, 27, 
para. 81 (1999). 
94 M. Sornarajah, ‘Introduction’, Good Faith and International Economic Law, (OUP 2015) 1.  
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faith has developed to ameliorate any undesirable situations created by the strict 
application of the letter and spirit of the law. However, there would not have been any 
problem if this has been the only way the principle is viewed, but its obscure 
character has opened it up to criticism from various sources, least being the fact that 
its existence in the law is to help in finding a biased interpretation to intricate issues.95 
 
The intrinsic subjectivity of the principle of good faith has been used to attack its 
significance. However, other scholars like Sornarajah argued that the principle is so 
widely used in law that its subjective nature is not enough ground to use and destroy 
its application or significance and its continuous use is a testimony to that position.96 
As a principle that suggests normative standard, good faith can light the path in the 
conflict-ridden field of international investment law. As stated in chapter one under 
the statement of the problem, international investment arbitration is at a critical point 
in its development. The field is in a crisis ranging from inconsistent awards relating to 
the same dispute, inconsistent interpretation of investment protection standards or 
treaty clauses.  
 
Various theses or theories have been advanced for these legitimacy crises in 
investment arbitration. Two theories that have bearing on the analysis in chapter five 
of this thesis are centred on the arbitrators and the role they play especially in 
investment treaty arbitration. The first criticism has been arbitrators’ seeming 
negation of the intention of the parties via expansionary interpretations aimed at 
advancing political or economic goals they did not agree on.97 The second criticism 
                                                
95 M. Sornarajah. 
96 M. Sornarajah. 
97 M. Sornarajah, ‘A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in Karl 
Sauvant (ed), Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (OUP 2008) 39. 
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has to do with the selection of the arbitrators from a narrow pool of professionals98 
who apply their expertise and swing the law in favour of investment protection and 
big business rather than the overall interest of the states’ development or otherwise.99 
Further to the role arbitrators’ play, could the principle of good faith then serve as a 
rallying point to correct inconsistency in awards? This point will be dwelled on in the 
analysis in chapter six. Following the general rule on treaty interpretation, the next 
element worth assembling here is the Ordinary Meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty. 
 
3. ‘Ordinary Meaning’ – ‘the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty’, necessarily mean that the element – ordinary meaning – must not be 
read in isolation when applying the general rule. In other words, the ordinary 
meaning must be directly linked with the context and read with the other 
elements of the Vienna rules. As a starting point, anyone looking at the 
wordings of a treaty will first attempt to give the words the usual or at least 
one of the usual meanings attributed to them. It is noted, however, as Gardiner 
opined, with the accompanying caution that “the word ‘meaning’ itself, has at 
least sixteen different meanings”.100 
 
                                                
98 See Anthea Roberts, ‘Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty 
System’, (2003) 107 AJIL 45, 83, Malcolm Langford et al, ‘The Revolving Door in International 
Investment Arbitration’, (2017) 20 Journal of International Economic Law 301-331, Rachel L. 
Wellhausen, ‘Recent Trends in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (2016) 7 Journal of International 
Dispute Settlement’, 117-135. 
99 M. Sornarajah, (n.94) 2, see also Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, 
(OUP 2007) 172-75, Gus Van Harten, ‘Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication (Part 
Two): An Examination of Hypothesis of Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, (2016) 53 Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal 540. 
100 Richard Gardiner (n 75), quoting G Schwarzenberger, ‘Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation: 
Articles 27-29 of the Vienna Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (1968) 9 Va J Int’ L 1 at 13 in 
(n 74) 161. 
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Looking at the content of the general rule under Art.31, it can be deduced that the 
ordinary meaning referred to is definitely that of the ‘terms’. It is the terms of the 
treaty being interpreted whose ordinary meaning the interpreter seeks to understand 
and apply. How does the interpreter know what are the terms and sift them out from 
the treaty is an issue that has been debated and different prepositions advanced. As 
such, the first port of call in what makes up the terms in the language of the treaty is 
to look at not only the wordings but also the content of the treaty as a representation 
of the agreement of the parties.101  
 
The written agreement of the parties needs to be understood by the interpreter if 
justice is to be done in sifting out the terms from such agreement. To do this then, 
consideration must necessarily be given to the definition of the individual words that 
made up the terms. These words need to be understood and analysed before any 
meaningful attempt can be made in determining the real content of the parties’ 
agreement (treaty). In other words, the aggregate result in the Vienna Convention to 
the allusion to ‘terms’ in their context is that the word is concerned with the ordinary 
meaning of words and phrases rather than bargains or packages of stipulations 
contained therein.102 
 
Now, to what extent does getting the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a term important in treaty 
interpretation? This question is relevant considering the minimal significance 
tribunals have attached to this exercise when interpreting treaties. This seems so 
                                                
101 See Article 2(1) VCLT (1969) 
102 Richard Gardiner (n 75) 164. 
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because the meaning of the word ordinary itself may necessarily include lots of other 
synonyms to choose from in order to satisfy whatever is the requirement.103 
Generally, and as a starting point, domestic courts, maybe following the rules in 
statutory interpretation, applied the literal rule and use dictionaries in order to get the 
ordinary, grammatical meaning of a particular word. Is this applicable or relevant to 
the tribunals interpreting sometimes-complex treaties? Irrespective of the interpretive 
body, the use of synonyms is not a pointer to the presence of a single ‘ordinary 
meaning’ of the word; rather it is even a pointer to the contrary. Both domestic courts 
and international tribunals have made use of both ordinary English Dictionary and 
specialist or technical dictionaries to ascertain the meaning of certain words, though 
this usually leaves many interpretive questions wide open to other extrapolations.104 
The WTO cautioned that no matter the type of dictionary in use, dictionaries, alone, 
are far inadequate to answer the intricate questions of treaty interpretation.105 
 
In summary, to get to the meaning of a treaty term using the ‘ordinary meaning’ is not 
an easy task that is achievable by simply looking up the meaning of the words 
constituting the entire ‘terms’. It is also noted that other relevant aspects of the ‘terms’ 
of the treaty that will play a role in interpretation and as such should be looked at 
include the literal meaning of ‘single terms’, to whom does the reference refer, and 
the effect of general treaty language in interpretation since international law did not 
necessarily prescribe any linguistic style for treaties.106 
 
                                                
103 Synonyms like ‘normal’, ‘elementary’, ‘regular’,’ primary’ ‘customary’ Etc, all prop up.  
104 See generally the United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services WTO Appellate Body Report of 7 April 2005, WT/DS285/AB/R. 
105 United States – Measures, paras 54, 164-165. 
106 Richard Gardiner (n 75) 174. 
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The last point here is that even though the ordinary meaning of the ‘terms’ of a treaty 
is necessarily the first step to a meaningful interpretation, it is pertinent to understand 
that this only becomes crucial if such ordinary meaning is established by an inquiry 
into the context and object and purpose of the particular treaty under consideration.107 
 
4. Context – The context in which the ‘terms’ of the treaty occur under the 
Vienna rules signify that it will perform the following roles:108 
i) It will act as a qualifier of the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the 
treaty being interpreted, assisting the interpreter not only in choosing the 
ordinary meaning to be attached to the ‘terms’ but also in altering ‘any 
over-literal approach to interpretation’.109 
ii) It identifies, in the Vienna rules, relevant materials to be considered as 
shaping the context. 
 
The second role aptly explains context and its presence by reference to the entire text 
of the treaty from the beginning to the end, from preamble to annexes, if any, 
importantly though, this is not in any way a repeal of the relevance of the first role, 
reading the words in context, meaning reading them in their primary domain.110 So 
the essentially requirement under context is first to analyse words, as stand alone or as 
part of a phrase, this to be followed by the application of the broader, more extensive 
definition. This process allow the interpreter, a tribunal in the context of investment 
law, to employ several factors, proximate and sometimes even far removed. The 
proximate may include the wordings present or used in relative provisions, in titles, in 
                                                
107 Richard Gardiner (n 75) 166. 
108 Richard Gardiner (n 75) 177. 
109 Richard Gardiner. 
110 Richard Gardiner. 
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punctuations to such unlikely elements as contrasting “with other provisions on 
similar matters or using similar wordings, extending to the function of the context as a 
bridge to the further element in the first paragraph of the general rule, that is ‘object 
and purpose’”. It is the context in which the terms are used that leads us to understand 
the object and purpose for which the treaty was created. 
 
5. Object and Purpose – Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention ends with the 
teleological elements of the general rule of treaty interpretation. The main object and 
purpose of the Vienna rules is to explain the ordinary meaning rather than give 
comprehensive criteria for treaty interpretation.111 Here, the interpreter’s attention is 
drawn to the central question relative to the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty, the way 
to identify and apply them. The fundamental objective of treaty interpretation is to put 
forward a result or argument that clearly further the aims of the treaty and this is only 
possible by ascertaining the object and purpose of the treaty, noting however, that the 
interpreter is not allowed to use the common purpose of a treaty to supersede its text, 
as Gardiner puts it:112 
 
        …object and purpose are modifiers of the ordinary meaning of a term which is being interpreted 
in the sense that the ordinary meaning is to be identified in their light. 
 
Despite all these extensive, well-defined processes of treaty interpretation, ‘the nature, 
role and application of the concept of ‘object and purpose’ in the treaty law (treaty 
interpretation) remain a mystery.113 The use of the phrase ordinary did not in any way 
makes it easy to differentiate between the terms ‘object’ and ‘purpose’, and this may 
                                                
111 Richard Gardiner (n 75) 190. 
112 Richard Gardiner. 
113 I Buffard and K Zemanek, ‘The “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: An enigma?’ (1998) 3, Austrian 
Review of International and European Law, 311.  
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explain why under the rules the terms are treated as compound words in their 
application.  
 
The position may be different in practice. It can be discerned from the judgment of 
the ICJ that there are times whereby the object and purpose of a treaty may not be 
considered as a consolidated idea.114 In the Oil Platforms case, the ICJ has at some 
places referred to ‘objects’ and ‘purposes’ together while at others, the reference was 
to ‘object’ separately, and to ‘objective’, ‘spirit’, and the ‘whole of these provisions is 
aimed at’.115  
 
On the other hand, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) realised that it would be 
practically impossible for anyone to hold that just because Article 31(1) points the 
interpreter to a singular object and purpose, it means that such an object and purpose 
will be easily identifiable in every case of treaty interpretation. The Appellate Body of 
the WTO116 stated: 
 
               …most treaties have no single, undiluted object and purpose but rather a variety of 
different, and possibly conflicting, objects and purposes. This is certainly true of the WTO 
Agreement…The Panel in effect took a one sided view of the object and purpose of the WTO 
Agreement when it fashioned a new test not found in the text of the Agreement. 
 
Agreed, the preamble is always a good starting point for every treaty interpretation, 
however, some caution needs to be exercised here as some preambles do contain 
certain drafting errors and the word ‘preamble’ itself may call for its own 
                                                
114 See generally, Oil Platforms Case, [1996-II] ICJ Reports 803.  
115 Oil Platforms, paras 27, 28, 31, 52 and 36 respectively. 
116 US Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/AB/R (1998) para.17.  
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interpretation. As such, while applying the preamble in reference to the object and 
purpose of a treaty, regards should be made to Article 31(2) and what is obtained in 
practice. From the provisions of Article 31(2) and evidence from practice, an 
interpreter is necessarily required to read the whole treaty before any attempt at 
interpretation. In the US Shrimp’s case, the Appellate Body of the WTO did refer to 
both the preamble of the treaty in question and did a comprehensive analysis of the 
substantive provisions of the treaty.117 
 
Further to the application of the context in which the ‘terms’ appear, Article 31(3) 
made reference to other important elements to be considered when interpreting a 
treaty. The provisions of sub-paragraph (c) referring to ‘any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in relations between the parties’ is the must fundamental 
to this framework of analysis as it codifies the principle of systemic integration.118  
 
It is only through a reference to and a proper understanding of these elements and 
their link to each other that an understanding of the aim and applicability of the 
provisions of Article 31(3) (c) of the Vienna Convention can be reached.119 These 
elements need to be discussed in turn. The discussion will take the form of an 
examination of these elements by application of the above system of using their 
ordinary meaning and also how they apply in context. This analysis may serve as a 
way of seeking for an informed meaning of these terms. The elements are ‘rules’, 
‘relevant’, ‘applicable’ and ‘parties’.  
 
                                                
117 US Shrimp, paras. 12, 17.  
118 Article 31(3)(c), (n 74). 
119 Panos Merkouris, (n 71) 18. 
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(i) ‘rules’ – Using the rules of the application of ordinary meaning first, we 
seek the meaning of terms from the dictionary, and since this is a field of 
law, we look at both English Dictionary and Law Dictionary. The Oxford 
English Dictionary Online define rule as a: 
 
2.a “rule…A general principle, regulation, or maxim governing individual conduct… 
5.a. A regulation framed or adopted by an organisation, institution, or other body for 
governing its conduct and that of its members”.120 
 
Blacks Law Dictionary defines rule as “…1.Generally, an established and 
authoritative standard or principle; a general norm mandating or guiding conduct or 
action in a given type of situation”.121 
 
Applying the above definitions and importantly looking at the context of the 
Convention, ‘rules’ referred to by Article 31(3)(c) is a reference to the rules of 
international law and not to other extensive principles, which may not qualify as 
rules.122 However, it is noted that the reference is extensive enough to be inclusive of 
even other treaties in as much as they are applicable.123 This is not to say there are no 
dissenting voices as to the extent of the application of the term ‘rules’. Some writers 
have stretched the rules so widely as to cover the writing of publicists124, some others 
                                                
120 Oxford University Press, Oxford English Dictionary Online (2014), available: <www.oed.com> 
accessed 26 March 2017. 
121 Black’s Law Dictionary 9th edn, (St. Paul, MN: Thomas West, 2009) 1446. 
122 Study Group of the International Law Commission, “Report on the Fragmentation of International 
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law – Finalised by 
Martti Koskenniemi”, 13 April 2006 (A/CN.4/L.68) (hereinafter ILC Study Group), Campbell 
McLachlan, (n 70) 290, Panos Merkouris (n 71) 19. 
123 Campbell McLachlan.   
124 See Richard Gardiner (n 75) 260. 
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have argued that ‘rules’ could not cover international agreements125 while others even 
argued that general principles of law126 could not be covered by ‘relevant rules’. 
Therefore, applying the rules of interpretation we started with, using the ‘ordinary 
meaning’ of the term ‘rules’ will seem to lead us to the conclusion that the reference 
is to all rules regardless of where they emanate from.  
 
By way of application, it suffice it to say that the WTO Panel in the EC-Biotech127 
case has had occasion to corroborate the initial conclusion as to what the term ‘rules’ 
stands for. The Panel identifies ‘rules of international law’ to cover “(i) international 
conventions (treaties), (ii) international custom (customary international law), and (iii) 
the recognised general principles of law”.128 Many other tribunals have also 
acknowledged this likelihood, including the argument as to whether treaties are within 
the contemplation of the term ‘rules’ of Article 31(3)(c) since they came up at a much 
later stage of the VCLT debate.129  
 
                                                
125 For example Georg Schwarzenberger’s argument that ‘rules of international law’ could not cover 
international agreements because such are incorporated under Article 31(3)(a) – see Georg 
Schwarzenberger, Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation: Articles 27-29 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Virg.J. Int’l. 9 (1968-9) 1, 14. 
 
126 Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: MUP, 1984) 139. 
Sinclair’s position remains outrageous as no support avails it either jurisprudentially or doctrinally.  
127 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
WTO, Panel Report adopted on 21 November 2006, WT/DS291R, WT/DS292R and WT/DS293R, 
paras. 7.67. 
128 EC-Biotech, though the same tribunal observed recognizing ‘general principles’ as a ‘rule’ is not as 
simple as it appears though it indeed held that such principles do fell within the contemplation of 
Article 31(3)(c).  
129See for example on General Principles of Law, the ECtHR decision in Golder v. the United Kingdom 
Judgment of 21 February 1975, Application No. 4451/70, para. 35, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. 
Turkey, ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Judgment of 4 February 2005, Application Nos. 468 27/99 and 
46951/99, para. 111, on whether treaties are within the contemplation of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, para. 111-28 and on Customary International Law, see Sempra 
Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID, Decision of 29 June 2010, on the Argentine 
Republic’s Application for Annulment of the Award, see ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16, para. 138. 
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(ii) ‘Relevance’ – coming from the word relevant, by way of definition, 
means: 
“relevant… 1. …Of a claim, charge, defence, etc.: legally sufficient, 
adequate, or pertinent. 
2. … a. Bearing on or connected with the matter in hand; closely relating to 
the subject or point at issue; pertinent to a specified thing”.130 
 
So, is the term ‘relevant rules’ easily understood from the above definitions? Far from 
it, the definitions did, however, share something in common, they point to a 
connection between one thing and another. Some commentators are of the view that 
the term relevant in the paragraph is in reference to ‘relevant’ rules “touching on the 
same subject matter as the treaty provision or provisions being interpreted or which in 
any way affect that interpretation.”131 Such intervention still did not seem to solve the 
problem as the extent of the similarity of the ‘subject matter’ of the treaty in focus and 
the rule mentioned in Article 31(3)(c) is still ambiguous especially as no doctrinal 
reference exist.132 So Panos Merkouris consequently argued that “the ‘same subject-
matter’ understanding of the term ‘relevant’ seems to be only one of the possible ways 
to identify relevance.”133 The importance of ‘relevant rules’ can only be appreciated if 
they are applied, so the next thing in our assembly of elements is to look at 
‘applicable rules’. 
 
(iii) Applicable rules – there is a peculiar and fundamental problem in the 
analysis of the term ‘applicable’. This problem is with regards to the 
                                                
130 Oxford English Dictionary Online, (n120). 
131 Richard Gardiner (n 75) 260. 
132 Panos Merkouris (n 71) 21.  
133 Panos Merkouris, 22. 
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meaning and analysis both definitional and doctrinal. No critical doctrinal 
scrutiny of the term seems to exist while its definition connects with 
another term that comes before it, ‘relevant’. ‘Applicable’, as an adjective, 
means: 
 
1. “Applicable’ adj. Capable of being applied or put to use…”.134 
2. “Apply’, vb. To put to use with a particular subject matter”.135 
 
Following from the above problematic analysis of the ordinary meaning of the term 
‘applicable’, it will seem that it keeps out all non-binding rules away from the realm 
of the application of Article 31(3)(c).136 Applicable rules will be between the parties, 
the last term in the paragraph being assembled here. 
 
(iv) Parties – From the perspective of the extent of the applicability of the 
provisions of Article 31(3)(c), it seems that it is the term ‘parties’ that has 
generated the most intense debate and scrutiny.137Just like in the other 
terms, first look is at the available dictionary definitions. 
 
“Party n. …6.a. Any of the groups of people constituting a side in a formal 
proceeding, such as the litigants in a legal action, those who enter into a contract, 
                                                
134 Oxford English Dictionary Online, (n120). 
135 Black’s Law Dictionary, (n121) 116. While applying this particular definition of the use of the term 
as a verb, Merkouris pointed out that the term seem to be connected with another term that came before 
it, ‘relevant’ and concluded that this would then seem to be a ‘tautological self-reference’. Panos 
Merkouris.  
136 Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 433. 
137 See generally Campbell McLachlan (n70), Richard Gardiner (n75), Panos Merkouris (n71) 22. 
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etc”.138 “Party. … 1. One who takes part in a transaction… 2. One by or against 
whom a lawsuit is brought”.139 
 
The evident controversy as to the reference to ‘parties’ in the provisions of Article 
31(3)(c) does not seem to be resolved by resort to the above definitions. The two 
definitions simply recognised party as either a party to an agreement or a party to a 
legal transaction, in this context party to a treaty or to a legal dispute.140 A reading of 
paragraph (C) will show that it is not manifestly stated, in the determination of the 
relevance and applicability, whom are the parties referred to, are they parties to the 
treaty or parties in the dispute.141 From the above positions, it is easily seen that 
recourse to the ordinary meaning of the term ‘parties’ will proffer no help in 
discovering its intended meaning.142 
 
In order to avoid the uncertainty, as to which party is referenced in the treaty being 
interpreted, may be recourse has to be had to the context of Article 31(3)(c). This 
becomes necessary because from a reading of the actual context of Article 31(3)(c), 
meaning the provisions of Article 31 itself, it would be seen that the term ‘party’ was 
used quiet pliably in different ways. Some of the ways in which the term has been 
used can be seen by a contextual reference to the provisions of Article 2(1)(g) of the 
VCLT that defines the term ‘party’ as “a State, which has consented to be bound by 
the treaty and for which the treaty is in force”. This reference to party will definitely 
not be only to party to the treaty in interpretation. This is so because, though the 
                                                
138 Oxford English Dictionary Online, (n 120). 
139 Black’s Law Dictionary, (n121) 1231-2. 
140 Panos Merkouris (n71) 23. 
141 Campbell MacLachlan (n70) 291. 
142 Panos Merkouris, ‘Debating the Ouroboros of International Law: The Drafting History of Article 
31(3)(c)’, ICLR 9/1 (2007): 1-31. 
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provision of the Article will go in tandem with that of Article 31(3)(a), it cannot be 
said when the provision is contrasted with the flexible provisions of Article 31(2)(a) 
and (b)’s reference to the term ‘party’. Furthermore, in Article 66(a) VCLT, it was 
clear that ‘parties’ mean ‘parties to the dispute’. Therefore, subject to Article 2(1)(g), 
a State can only be regarded as a party if it is bound upon its signature.143 
 
Thus the provisions of Article 31(3)(c) is so fluid that even applying the provisions in 
the context of the VCLT only yielded entirely conflicting outcomes.144 McLachlan 
succinctly rendered these outcomes in four divergent ways: 
 
(i) that all parties should be the same in both the treaty under interpretation 
and the treaty relied upon, 
(ii) that all parties to the dispute should be the same parties to the other treaty, 
(iii) that if a treaty is not in force between all members of the treaty being 
interpreted, then it can only be considered if the rule contained in it is a 
rule of customary international law and, finally, 
(iv) that, as an intermediate ground, there is no need for a complete identity of 
treaty parties in as much as the treaty relied upon is shown to indicate the 
common intentions or understanding of all the parties.145 
 
                                                
143 Panos Merkouris (n71) 23. 
144 See Linderfalk’s argument on the restrictive interpretation of the term ‘parties’, and conversely see 
Marceau, Palmeter and Mavroidis viewpoint that a reading of the same provisions clearly shows that 
‘parties’ must be recognised as ‘parties to the dispute’ and Gardiner’s nuanced silence on this issue; Ulf 
Linderfalk, ‘Who are the Parties? Article 31, Paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the 
‘Principle of Systemic Integration’ Revisited’, Gabrielle Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and 
Human Rights’, EJIL 13/4 (2002), 753, at 782, David Palmeter and Petros Mavrodis, ‘The WTO Legal 
System: System of Law’, AJIL 92/3 (1998): 398, at 411, Richard Gardiner, (n74) 263-5.    
145 Campbell McLachlan, (n70) 314-15. 
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The relative flaw in all the above interpretations not withstanding146, the last seems to 
have curried the favour of some renowned commentators in the field.147 From all the 
above, it is clear that applying Article 31 textual and contextual interpretation of 
31(3)(c) has not resolved contradictory outcomes of the meaning of the term 
‘parties’.148 
 
From the above brief inquiry into the perspectives of the meaning of the various 
aspects of Article 31(3)(c), it is important to sum-up that the terrain covering this all-
important article is far from clearly expressed. Of course, from the above analysis, it 
seems only the term ‘rules’ has been settled with any measure of closure. However, it 
is not correct to say that the evident controversy surrounding the applicable meaning 
of the constituent terms of this article has made it completely inapplicable, certainly 
not. Though it remains to be seen if Post-VCLT jurisprudence will settle those 
indeterminate parts of Article 31(3)(c), some valid arguments pointing to both the pre-
VCLT and Post-VCLT jurisprudence as possible answers to the reach of this article 
exist.149 Though this is not a critical discourse about the VCLT, it still calls for a look 
at some of the conclusions coming from these arguments. This will enable us 
complete the discussion on the suitability of applying the provisions of Article 
31(3)(c) and the principle of systemic integration investment tribunals in the 
interpretation of treaties or treaty standards, for example the principle of non-
                                                
146 See generally Isabelle van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford: 
OUP, 2009), 372, on the drawbacks of these interpretations. 
147 Campbell McLachlan, (n70) 315, himself seems to favour option (iv), see also Margaret A. Young, 
‘The WTO’s Use of Relevant Rules of International Law: An Analysis of the Biotech Case’, ICLQ 
56/4 (2007): 907, at 914-8, Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO 
Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge: CUP 2003) 254.  
148 Panos Merkouris (n71) 24. 
149 Generally, see Panos Merkouris, and specifically Panos Merkouris (n71) 51-101. 
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discrimination we have been using as example and then its further application by the 
concept of sustainable development. 
 
Following the above analysis of the constituent elements of Article 31(3)(c), the 
failure of getting to the real meaning of the terms therein, a formidable argument exist 
to show one critical element that seems to bind the terms together and determine their 
meanings. The proximity criterion is regarded as a single criterion that can give 
meaning to the terms ‘relevance’, ‘applicability’ and ‘parties’ and has been applied by 
courts and tribunals to probe whether the norm in question is relevant for the purposes 
of Article 31(3)(c).150 Merkouris aptly summed up that this is achieved by the 
combined application of the four different expressions of this criterion151: 
 
(i) terminological/linguistic proximity; 
(ii) subject-matter proximity; 
(iii) shared parties (‘actor’) proximity; and 
(iv) temporal proximity. 
 
International jurisprudence has shown that the consolidated and stable application of 
these four expressions of the proximity criterion is the right approach to Article 
31(3)(c). It is to this international jurisprudence we will turn to as a synthesis of all 
the above positions and the cases in which they were applied is undertaken in chapter 
five.  
                                                
150 Panos Merkouris (n71) 100. 
151 Panos Merkouris. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, an attempt was made to trace the development of the doctrine of legal 
convergence and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), their 
theoretical foundations and application in some areas of international law and other 
international institutions. In the following chapters, the thesis will pursue a 
conscientious, interdisciplinary interpretive approach that will harmonise theoretical 
and jurisprudential insights from law, economics, environment, sociology and 
psychology in the analysis of the intricate doctrinal sphere of international trade and 
international investment law. Chapters three and four will lead the pack. Chapter 
three, devoted to investment law, will show how various investment tribunals have 
interpreted, inconsistently, both investment treaties and investment protection 
standards, leading to uncertainty, incoherence, shallow and muddled arbitral 
reasoning in awards. Decisions of both the Panels and Appellate Board of the WTO 
will be the focus of chapter four to see how they interpret and apply the multilateral 
treaty. The main idea here is to explore the gap that needs to be filled-in for a 
workable harmonisation/convergence of international trade and investment law 
through a more coherent interpretation of the non-discrimination standards. Just the 
way legal convergence occurs within a regime and between legal systems, it can also 
occur between or among legal regimes, and the VCLT can serve as an effective, 
verifiable tool in achieving this. As will be shown in this thesis, parties, both States 
and foreign investors/traders, will be better off with a well sophisticated system that 
will accommodate investment protection and trade liberalization mainly through the 
uniform, harmonised interpretation of treaties and of the standards of treatment like 
the non-discrimination standard. 
 80 
Chapter Three 
Non-Discrimination in International Investment Law 
3.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to point to the persistent inconsistency in the interpretation 
of the non-discrimination principle enshrined in national treatment [NT], most 
favoured nation [MFN] and even such absolute standard of fair and equitable 
treatment [FET]. The issues would be treated from the wider area of international law, 
i.e. international economic law, providing wide ranging perspectives, differences in 
concepts, justifiability of the answers to some of the issues in their respective contexts 
of international trade law and international investment law. In this chapter, the need to 
show the inconsistencies in the interpretation of these obligations by arbitral tribunals 
becomes necessary in order to identify the problem and resultant effect of the 
variations. The chapter will first examine the origin of the principle of non-
discrimination as an element, its content and application.  
 
The principle of non-discrimination stands at the centre of the protection of foreign 
investment and the multilateral trading system. It is said to be a fundamental pillar of 
the WTO. Historically, the principle belongs to the larger body of customary 
international law.1 Though economic development has to do with the promotion and 
protection of foreign investment, however, international investment agreements 
(IIAs), mainly the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the free trade agreements 
(FTAs) are more concerned with the protection of foreign investors and their 
                                                
1 A.F.M Maniruzzaman, ‘Expropriation of Alien Property and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in 
International Law of Foreign Investment: An Overview’ (1998) 8 J. Transnat I. L & Pol’y 57. 
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investments.2 The non-discrimination principle, especially as contained in modern 
IIAs, established that contracting parties to a treaty shall not treat domestic market 
actors more favourably than foreign market actors (referred to as national treatment 
NT) or differentiate between foreign market actors from different origins (known as 
most-favoured-nation obligation, MFN).  
 
The non-discrimination principle is one that is relevant, and as such found, in all the 
fields of international economic law. It is found in the protection of investment and 
intellectual property rights, human rights and in the fields of trade in goods and 
services. The obligation not to discriminate is applicable both De jure3 and De facto.4 
It is significant to note that despite the fact that the principle of non-discrimination is 
common to both trade and investment, the principle has no generally established 
meaning under international economic law.5 This, however, does not negate the fact 
that the economic basis for the claims of non-discrimination is quite similar in both 
international trade and international investment. 
  
The principle of non-discrimination, essentially on the basis of nationality of the 
investor, is included in modern IIAs and more generally in international investment 
law (in ‘national treatment, most-favoured-nation’ and in such absolute standards like 
the principle of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard). The three standards exist 
                                                
2 Today, the investment regime has over 3200 agreements comprising of 2860 BITs and 340 ‘other’ 
international investment agreements. See UNCTAD, International Investment Policymaking in 
Transition: Challenges and Opportunities of Treaty Renewal, IIA Issues Note, no.4, June 2013.  
3 This is the direct and most obvious type of discrimination and is rarely used because it is identifiable. 
In this type, States, through regulations, usually impose or frame discriminatory measures whereby 
some countries drive certain advantages whereas others were denied.  
4 This is the most vicious type of discrimination. Here, States do not use the provisions of law or 
regulations but rather the effect of law or regulations produce discrimination. This type of 
discrimination is especially very complex to identify especially in trade regulations.  
5 See Gde Burca, ‘Unpacking the Concept of Discrimination in EC and International Trade Law’ in C 
Barnads and J Scott (eds), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart 
Publishing 2002) 181, 182. 
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either as stand apart provisions6 or formulated in a single article.7 These standards 
would be the focus of this chapter.  
 
The content of the principle of non-discrimination will be examined from the 
perspective of investment disputes. The general and undefined features of these 
investment standards, their contextual meaning, application and significance can only 
be explained by arbitration, which for a long time was the only acceptable form for 
the settlement of investment disputes,8 however, the inclusion of local remedies rules 
in some modern BITs is effectively changing the trend.9 Arbitral tribunals saddled 
with the responsibility of interpreting and applying these standards have not been 
consistent in their interpretations, hence the lack of certainty in arbitral decision and 
investors legitimate expectations. The inconsistency in interpretation is so deeply 
rooted and extensive to the extent that some arbitral tribunals have delivered so many 
different and conflicting interpretations of the same standard and even in the same 
treaty or other IIAs.10 
Using the elements of the non-discrimination standards, this chapter will evaluate 
how investment tribunals have interpreted national treatment, most-favoured-nation 
and fair and equitable treatment standards. Detailed discussion will be for the national 
treatment provision for obvious reasons. The national treatment provision is among 
the most critical obligations present in all investment agreements. In doing this, the 
                                                
6 The Netherlands-Cambodia BIT, 2006, is a peculiar example. The three provisions are contained in a 
single article but separated into different paragraphs. 
7 European BITs usually put National Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation in the same article while 
fair and equitable treatment is separately framed. 
8 This is under the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States signed on 18 March 1965 and popularly called the Washington or ICSID Convention 
(hereinafter ‘the ICSID Convention). 
9 See Indian Model BIT for example. 
10 See Federico Ortino, ‘Non-Discriminatory Treatment in Investment Disputes’, in Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy, Francesco Francioni, and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (OUP 2009) 345. 
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discussion will be centred on the inconsistencies of the arbitral decisions 
interpretation of these standards and the implication of such. The position of this 
thesis is that the inconsistencies in the interpretation of these standards is a pointer to 
the compelling need for coherence in the interpretation of these investment protection 
standards with a view to assisting investors legitimate expectations of certainty and 
clarity in investment law and the harmonization of trade and investment law 
provisions using the non-discrimination principle.  
 
Chapter four will build on the discussion in chapter three by looking at the same 
standards from the perspective of international trade and the WTO, with the notable 
exception of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard that has no mirror 
reflection in the trade regime. The aim is to show a more settled jurisprudence in the 
interpretation and application of the standards by the WTO Panels and Appeal 
Boards, especially the way the AB consistently reprimanded the Panels where they 
failed to apply the Vienna rules in their interpretation. This will be with a view to 
weaving the argument towards the need for a more coherent, consistent and 
harmonised interpretation of standards under international investment law generally, 
and particularly the lessons that could be learnt from the trade regime in this regard. 
Suffice it to say that the WTO jurisprudence is not bereft of its own shortcomings, out 
of which the most fundamental will be highlighted. 
3.1 National Treatment Obligation – An Overview 
Even though it is trite that non-discrimination is the prevailing rule under public 
international law, generally there is no requirement to treat aliens favourably. Ian 
Brownlie states that:  
               
 84 
                ‘There has always been considerable support for the view that the alien can only expect 
equality of treatment under the local law because he submits to local conditions with benefits and 
burdens. It must be observed by all hands that certain sources of inequality are admissible’.11  
 
Brownlie further argued that ‘it is not thought that the national treatment principle provides a 
reliable general formula’.12 
 
However, despite its inexactness in customary international law provisions, the 
national treatment principle has come to be accepted as a standard provision relative 
to BITs, other IIAs and contemporary international investment law generally.13 It is 
noteworthy here to see that the standard has been omitted from the IIAs completed by 
the APEC countries, the Chinese BITs and the recent Indian Model BIT.14 According 
to UNCTAD 
 
          ‘The national treatment standard is perhaps the single most important standard of treatment 
enshrined in international investment agreements (IIAs). At the same time, it is perhaps the most 
difficult standard to achieve, as it touches upon economically (and politically) sensitive issues. In fact, 
no single country has so far seen itself in a position to grant national treatment without qualifications, 
especially when it comes to the establishment of an investment’.15  
 
National treatment is the obligation by a host state to treat foreign investors and their 
investment no less favourably than national investors or their investments.16 In their 
common phrasing in BITs, the national treatment clause usually comprise of 
contracting States’ obligation to accord treatment ‘no less favourable’ than that which 
                                                
11 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (5th ed. 1998) 602-605. 
12 Brownlie, 536. 
13 See R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 2012) 198. 
14 International Investment Agreements: Trends and Emerging Issues, (UNCTAD 2006) 34. 
15 UNCTAD, National Treatment, International Investment Agreements (IIA), Issues Paper Series, 
1999.  
16 R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, (n 13), 1998. 
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the host State accords to its own investors ‘in like circumstances’. Article 2 of the 
Japan-Korea BIT 2002 provides for national treatment thus: 
 
‘ Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investors of the other Contracting Party and to 
their investments treatment no ‘less favourable’ than the treatment it accords ‘in like circumstances’ to 
its own investors and their investments with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, and sale or other disposal of investments’.  
  
Article 3 of the US-Rwanda BIT 2008 also provides: 
 
‘1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the other party treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.’17 
 
Generally, the national treatment clause is relatively homogenous in most BITs.18 The 
central import of the national treatment clause is the prohibition of differential 
treatment of foreign investors when compared to treatment given to domestic 
investors. However, despite the homogeneity of the clause, the usage of certain terms 
in the clause reveals noticeable differences, for example the use of the term ‘in like 
situations’ rather than ‘in like circumstances’19, ‘similar’ rather than ‘like’, ‘no less 
favourable’ or ‘as favourable as’.20 
 
Apart from the national treatment obligation, many IIAs also contain other non- 
discrimination provisions that are couched in different wordings from those used in 
                                                
17 US-Rwanda BIT, signed on the 19 February 2008, available in 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/US Rwanda.pdf, accessed 19th April 2015. 
18 For example see the language employed in most EU States concluded BITs. 
19 For example see Art 3 US 2004 and 2012 Model BITs.   
20 Dolzer and Schreuer (n.13). 
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BITs like the Japan-Korea BIT and US-Rwanda BIT above.21 Art II (3)(b) of the US-
Estonia BIT22 provides: 
 
‘Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or discriminatory measures the management, 
operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or disposal of investment.’ 
3.2 Scope of Applicability in IIAs 
It is important to appreciate the scope of the applicability of the national treatment 
obligation within the investment law context. When does the obligation commence? 
Is the host state under obligation to provide the treatment pre or post-establishment of 
the investment? A survey of existing BITs revealed that the majority only requires 
protection post-entry of investments, though the United States is one country highly in 
favour of the pre-entry national treatment provisions.23 
 
On the other hand, countries within the European Union enter into BITs that have 
post-entry national treatment protection included.24  
 
A good framing of the post-entry national treatment provisions can be found in the 
provisions of Article 10 (7) of the Energy Charter Treaty: 
 
‘Each Contracting Party shall accord to Investments in its Area of Investors of other Contracting 
Parties, and their related activities including management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, 
treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to Investments of its own Investors or of the 
                                                
21 A good example is Art II (3)(b) the US-Estonia BIT that provides for additional non-discrimination 
requirement. These IIAs also contain 
22 US-Estonia BIT signed on 19 April 1994, available at <http://www.unctad.org/iia> 
23 See NAFTA Chapter 11 for example. 
24 European Countries mostly conclude treaties with only post-entry national treatment protection, for 
example see Art 2(1) of the German Model Treaty 2005. See also the Fraport v. Philippines, Award of 
16 August 2007, para 335.   
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Investors of any other Contracting Party or any third state and their related activities including 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, whichever is the most favourable’.25  
 
On the other hand however, as stated above, the US, Japan and Canada, apart from the 
post-entry, do provide for national treatment protection to right of access to a national 
market, the pre-entry national treatment. Article 4 of the 2004 Canadian Foreign 
Investment Protection Agreement26 provides for pre-establishment national treatment; 
 
‘1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable than it accords, 
in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. 
 
2. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less favourable than it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investments of its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its 
territory.’ 
 
Article 3 of the 2004 US Model Treaty and the NAFTA both contain pre-
establishment protection. NAFTA Art 1102 provides; 
 
‘Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment no less favourable than 
that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments of its own investors with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments’.27 
 
                                                
25 See The Energy Charter Treaty http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf, 
accessed on 22 April 2015. Part III of The Energy Charter cover investment promotion and protection. 
26 Also known as the Canadian FIPAs. 
27 NAFTA, Art. 1102, para 2. See also Art.10.3, Chapter 10 of CAFTA (Central America Free Trade 
Agreement) http://www.caftalaw.net/cafta-text accessed 20 April 2015.  
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From the perspective of public international law, it is imperative to recall that states 
have the sovereign right to permit foreign nationals to establish in their territory or 
not.28 Historically, it is instructive to note that for the IIAs with pre-entry national 
treatment, certain strategic service sectors have always been protected against foreign 
competition so as to develop and safeguard domestic industries and national interests 
in those sectors. The states here, despite their liberalizing IIAs, conclude treaties with 
a detailed, negative list of exemptions from the national treatment provision.29 They 
generally consider these areas to be too sensitive for foreign businesses to partake. 
The NAFTA and ASEAN member states are prominent in the use of the negative list 
of exceptions though the list gets shorter as these states develop their critical sectors.30 
It is usually referred to as the ‘negative listing’ method because it provides a list of 
sectors in which the provision will not apply. Apart from the well known exemptions 
of the area of natural resources, the negative list of exemptions from national 
treatment cover areas such as natural resources, national security, energy, public 
service, aviation and cultural heritage. In the USA-Mongolia BIT mentioned above, 
the US specified sectors excluded from the national treatment as air transportation, 
communication services, ocean and coastal shipping, power production, banking and 
energy. Mongolia’s list of exemptions includes banking and land ownership.31 There 
is also the ‘positive listing’ method whereby state parties to the treaty create a list of 
sectors in which the provision will apply. An example of positive listing can be seen 
in the provisions of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) General Agreement on 
                                                
28 For an in-depth analysis of this position, especially making a case for the developing states, see 
Sornarajah 2004, pp. 97-114. 
29 See for example the USA-Bolivia BIT 1998, Grenada-USA BIT 1986, Iceland-Lebanon BIT 2004 
and USA-Mongolia BIT 1994. 
30 For an in-depth discussion on this, see Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on 
Foreign Investment (CUP 2010) 337. 
31 US-Mongolia BIT, signed 6 October 1994, 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_mongolia.pdf, accessed on 10 April 2015. 
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Trade in Services (GATS) where member states are required to undertake the 
obligation of granting market access and national treatment in designated areas such 
as ‘education’ or ‘environmental services’.32 The negative list method seems to be the 
most preferred because it aligns with the general aim of treaties, which is the 
extensive liberalization of investments and with it, the expansion of the national 
treatment provision.33 
3.3 National Treatment – An Inquiry into Interpretive Discrepancies  
As stated above, arbitral tribunals are saddled with the onerous responsibility of 
resolving investor-state disputes generally. In the cause of the resolution of such 
disputes, these tribunals are often called upon to interpret the national treatment 
provision contained in the relevant BITs.34 The lack of a binding precedent in the 
investment arbitration jurisprudence, the variations in the way national treatment is 
couched in different BITs and the simplistic methodology involved in the drafting of 
the standard has significantly affected its interpretation.35 
 
It is trite the provisions of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
remain the guide for treaty interpretation.36 The rules contained therein give 
international adjudicators enough discretion in interpreting provisions of public 
international law. Though some commentators have argued that these rules are not 
                                                
32 See Art. XVI AND Art. XVII.  
33 The method was the type proposed in the negotiations of the MAI, see the Draft Text on the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), OECD DAFFE/MAI (98) 7/REV1, 1998. 
34 These tribunals include those set up under the ICSID, NAFTA and other ad hoc tribunals. 
35 N DiMascio and J Pauwelyn, ‘Non-Discrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: World Apart or 
Two Sides of the Same Coin?’ (2008) 102 AJIL 48, Federico Ortino (n.10). 
36 Chapter two, above, where the foundational basis of the VCLT, its scope and applicability was 
discussed at length. In chapter five, the thesis will draw upon chapter two to show how the VCLT can 
assist in the harmonisation of the interpretation of the non-discrimination standards in both trade and 
investment law. 
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suitable in the interpretation of the provisions of national treatment, in chapter five, 
this thesis will argue otherwise.37 
 
Majority of tribunals opined that, in a determination of the question whether a State 
has violated the national treatment standard is to determine whether the claimant is in 
‘like circumstances’ or in a ‘similar situation’ to the domestic investor that has been 
purportedly given preference.38 There is a clear division within the investment 
community as to the import of “like circumstances”. Diametrically opposite views 
exist as to whether “like circumstances” exist as the applicable element of the non-
discrimination principles or as an exception to substantiate differential treatment on 
policy grounds.39 Furthermore, though the key elements of ‘likeness’ and ‘less 
favourable treatment’ remain the focus in the interpretation of national treatment by 
arbitral tribunals, these tribunals still find it difficult to extract the purpose and nature 
of the standard within the investment context. The near total absence of the travaux 
prepatoires40 of some relevant treaties and the dearth of well-reasoned, readily 
available awards has made this all the more challenging. 
 
Outside the NAFTA, the GATT/WTO, only a trickle of awards analyzing the national 
treatment standard is available.41 The fact that existing investment tribunals ventured 
                                                
37 Nicolas F Diebold, ‘Standards of Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law’, (2011) ICLQ, 
60, 832. 
38 See for example Champion Trading Company and Ameritrade International, Inc. v. Arab Republic 
of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, Award of 27 Oct. 2006, para. 130. 
39 Marcos Orellana, ‘Investment Agreements & Sustainable Development: The Non-Discrimination 
Standards’ in Sustainable Development Law & Policy, (Spring 2011), 6. 
40 This is with the notable exception of NAFTA. See the NAFTA negotiating texts available at 
http://www.naftalaw.org/commission.htm, accessed on 24 April 2015. 
41 See, Todd J, Grierson-Weiler and Ian A Laird, ‘Standards of Treatment’ in The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law, Muchlinski, Ortino, Schreuer (eds), (OUP 2008) 291, Leila Choukroune, 
‘National Treatment in International Investment Law and Arbitration: A Relative Standard for 
Autonomous Public Regulation and Sovereign Development’ in The Principle of National Treatment in 
International Economic Law, Anselm Kamperman Sanders (ed), (EE 2014), 199. 
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into WTO jurisprudence for guidance reinforced the argument in this thesis that the 
investment regime lacks the required coherence and consistency in the interpretation 
and application of these relative standards.42 The reasoning followed by these 
tribunals remains inconsistent and even contradictory. Furthermore, given that what 
really differentiates these BITs is simply semantics that did not in any significant way 
affect the content of the protection offered by the BITs has not been helpful.  
 
In the determination of national treatment, arbitral tribunals have undertaken an 
inquiry into whether there exists a differentiation in the treatment accorded to the 
foreign investor and/or investment.43 Secondly, it has to be shown whether the foreign 
and/or domestic investor and/or investment operate in a common, competitive 
relationship.44 A look at the real battleground in the interpretation of national 
treatment, likeness, is necessary here.    
 
Many arbitral tribunals have interpreted the national treatment provision on the basis 
of likeness, making like circumstances essential to the interpretation of national 
treatment. However, an interesting observation here is that the interpretations of the 
meaning and operation of the likeness standard by these tribunals varied significantly 
even within the same provision. Many investment treaties have it as a mandatory 
provision while investment tribunals have invoked it in many arbitral awards, even if 
they did reference it as in like circumstances. For example the NAFTA tribunals 
employ the extensive meaning of ‘like circumstances’ in Article 1102 to reach the 
                                                
42 Leila Choukroune, (n.41) 200. 
43 For example Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa (CEMSA) v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF) 99/1, 
Award of 16 December 2002.  
44 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, Award on the Merits, 10 April 2001, para 78. 
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conclusion that the competitive relationship should involve investors and investment 
in the ‘same business or economic sector’.45 NAFTA Article 1102 states: 
 
           ‘Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favourable than it  
            accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, 
               acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of  
               investments’. 
 
In deciding whether ‘in-like circumstances’ should be included in the Draft 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), the OECD maintained that the national 
treatment and the most-favoured-nation treatment are comparative terms.46  
 
For arbitral tribunals, though the provisions of Article 10 of the ECT does not include 
any clear comparator requirement, the tribunal in Nykomb v Latvia argued that the 
universal test in a discrimination evaluation is to analyse like with like despite the fact 
that Article 10 of the Energy Charter Treaty ECT that the tribunal invoked evidence 
no clear comparator requirement.47 
 
Though the IIAs have no particular interpretive methodology as a result of the fact 
that most national treatment provision, due to its position as a relative right, lack any 
detailed elaboration. However, following the NAFTA jurisprudence, some scholars 
fundamentally agreed that non-discrimination has certain legal elements that need to 
be evaluated on the facts, more so when the national treatment provision is being 
                                                
45 Federico Ortino (n.10), 355 
46 OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment Commentary (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 22 April 1998) Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) 9, http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng988rle.pdf accessed on 10 May 2015. 
47 Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v The Republic of Latvia, the Energy Charter Treaty, 
Arbitration Institute of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 16 December 2003, 34. 
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analysed.48 In the analysis of national treatment, some of these elements engaged the 
attention of the arbitral tribunals in their interpretation of this relative standard that 
mirror key strains in the WTO jurisprudence.49 Arguably, majority of scholar put 
these elements as50: 
 
(i) Comparability of the investors 
(ii) ‘Less favourable treatment’ 
(iii)  Justifications 
 
Though the main aim of this segment of the discussion is to show the incoherence and 
inconsistency in the interpretation of the non-discrimination obligation using these 
relative standards, this will be done through the application of the above elements. 
3.3.1 Likeness Put to the Test  
It is the view of some tribunals that in the analysis of the national treatment provision, 
the facts encompassing the standard should be reviewed taking cognizance of its 
‘overall legal context’.51 Based on this, these tribunals have argued that the policy 
objectives of the disputed measure become relevant in the assessment of like 
circumstances. In S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada52, the tribunal remarked that the OECD 
practice indicates that any assessment of ‘like situations’ needs to take cognizance of 
policy objectives in deciding whether businesses are in like circumstances.53 While 
adhering to this rule, the tribunal then held that: 
 
                                                
48 See Dolzer & Schreuer, (n13) 179-184, Newcombe & Paradell 2009, 162-164. 
49 Jurgen Kurtz, The WTO and International Investment Law: Converging Systems, CUP, (2016) 94. 
50 Jurgen Kurtz, 95, Sanders (n 41), Sornarajah (n 30), Ortino (n10), Dolzer & Schreuer (n 13). 
51 See for example S.D. Myers v. Canada, para. 245, Pope & Talbot v. Canada, para. 76. 
52 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of 13 Nov. 2000 (hereinafter 
S.D. Myers v. Canada). 
53 S.D. Myers v. Canada, para. 248. 
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‘The interpretation of the phrase “like circumstances” in Article 1102 must take into account the 
general principles that emerge from the legal context of the NAFTA. The assessment of “like 
circumstances” must also take into account circumstances that would justify governmental regulations 
that treat them differently in order to protect the public interest’.54 
 
The S.D. Myers tribunal, having recognised that the general principles emerging from 
a reading of the provisions in NAFTA should be taken into account in the 
interpretation of ‘like circumstances’, further argued; 
 
   ‘The concept of ‘like circumstances’ invites an examination of whether a non-national investor 
complaining of less favourable treatment is in the same ‘sector’ as the national investor. The tribunal 
takes the view that the word ‘sector’ has a wide connotation that includes the concepts of ‘economic 
sector’ and ‘business sector’.55 
 
From the above, the SD Myers tribunal seemed to have also followed the trade law 
interpretation by linking likeness to competition.56 The use of competition as a 
condition of likeness is a reasoning that was also applied by the tribunal in Pope & 
Talbot tribunal.57 The tribunal further noted that both the foreign and domestic 
investors in the particular instance were engaged in providing the same 
‘polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) waste remediation service, further stated that the 
foreign investor: 
 
                                                
54 S.D. Myers v. Canada, para. 250. 
55 SD Myers, Inc. v Canada, (n 43), at para 250. 
56 Though it is noted that there were other tribunals that did not tow this competition line, just as also 
did some WTO AB decisions. See Occidental and Methanex. 
57 Pope & Talbot (n. 42). The decision will be analysed below. 
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    ‘Was in a position to attract customers that might otherwise have gone to the domestic operators 
because it could offer more favourable prices and because it had extensive experience and 
credibility’.58 
 
The SD Myers provides the first considerable insight into the national treatment 
obligation claim based on an investor-State investment dispute. In SD Myers, the 
tribunal, while applying likeness in the interpretation of the non- discrimination 
principle based on national treatment claim, evidently relied on the measure’s adverse 
effect only on the foreign investor without an inquiry into the intent of the measure.59 
The conclusion reached by the tribunal in SD Myers was that from the business 
viewpoint, SDMI and Myers Canada were in ‘like circumstances’ with the Canadian 
operators because they have the same group of customers:60  
Apart from the OECD practice stated above, the tribunal also made references to 
WTO Law.61 The reference to the WTO is an important point this thesis will come 
back to in the subsequent chapters to show how the interpretation of the non-
discrimination principle under the more sophisticated WTO can serve as a learning 
point that may help in the convergence of the principle under international economic 
law.62 
 
Interestingly, in the US-Ecuador BIT63, the tribunal, in another perspective of the 
reading of likeness as a criterion, departed from the application of competitive 
                                                
58 SD Myers, Inc. v Canada, (n 43), at para 251. 
59 S.D. Myers v. Canada, para. 254. 
60 S. D. Myers v. Canada, para. 250. 
61 Some authors have criticized this approach of the tribunal’s reference to WTO Law as being 
controversial and unconvincing. See Leila (n 41). 
62 S.D. Myers v. Canada (n.49) para. 248. 
63 Occidental Exploration and Production Co v Ecuador, LCIA Case No UN3467, Award, 1 July 2004 
(US-Ecuador BIT). 
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relationship as the basis of analysis of the national treatment standard. It agreed with 
the claimant and refused a ‘narrow’ interpretation of the term ‘in like situations’. 
 
In the Occidental case, the investor’s claim was that Ecuador had breached the non-
discrimination obligation in the form of a breach of national treatment, as it accorded 
it less favourable treatment by denying it value-added tax (VAT) refund while other 
domestic companies, operating in different sectors, were entitled to the refund. Here, 
it is clear that the issue involved the application of conventional standard in assessing 
‘likeness’ between non-competing products.64 The claimant was an oil exploration 
and production company while the domestic companies were in the export of other 
goods including seafood and flowers. In arriving at its decision by rejecting the 
‘narrow’ interpretation of likeness applied by the tribunal in SD Myers, it went into an 
expansive interpretation of the national treatment standard and noted: 
 
    ‘ The Tribunal is of the view that in the context of this particular claim the Claimant is right and its 
arguments are convincing. In fact, ‘in like situations’ cannot be interpreted in the narrow sense 
advanced by Ecuador as the purpose of national treatment is to protect investors as compared to local 
producers, and this cannot be done by addressing exclusively the sector in which that particular activity 
is undertaken’.65 
 
So the arbitral tribunal in Occidental did not follow the economic sector approach to 
determine whether the breach of non-discrimination is based on nationality of the 
foreign investor. Going by the above, the tribunal clearly rejected Ecuador’s 
contention that Occidental should be likened only to domestic investments in the 
same business sector. 
                                                
64 Nicolas Diebold, (n37) 836. 
65 Occidental, (n 61), para 173. 
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It is instructive to note that Petroecuador, which was the domestic competitor of 
Occidental, was also found not to be entitled to the VAT refund and as such was also 
denied that favourable treatment. In the Occidental case, in the process of 
withdrawing from the competition-based approach, the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA) also made reference to WTO Law. It did that by drawing a clear 
distinction between the WTO ‘like products’ and the prevalent BIT reference to ‘like 
situations’.66 Though the Occidental tribunal rejected all other claims, it found 
violations of both the national treatment and fair and equitable treatment standards.67  
 
Another interesting arbitral award that considered likeness in the analysis of non-
discrimination in the context of the national treatment provision is Methanex Corp v. 
US.68 The Methanex tribunal, just like the tribunal in SD Myers, refused to tow the 
competition-based line but at the same time was radically different from the position 
taken by the Occidental tribunal. Methanex case was a NAFTA dispute that involved 
a ban on the use or sale of MBTE gasoline additive based on environmental 
protection grounds. The dispute was on the legality of such a ban by California.  
 
First, answering the question whether Methanex was “in like circumstances” with the 
domestic ethanol producers in question, the tribunal had no problem in agreeing that 
the role of NAFTA Article 1102 is basically to end discrimination based on 
nationality. Secondly, in limiting the class of domestic investors that were in ‘like 
circumstances’ with the foreign investor, the tribunal took a very narrow, and 
                                                
66 See Chapter Four infra for a more concise discussion of the interpretation of non-discrimination 
principle under national treatment standard from the perspective of the WTO. 
67 The interpretation of the FET is discussed in 3.5 below. 
68 Methanex Corp v. US, UNCITRAL, Final Award on jurisdiction and merits, 3 August 2005, Part IV, 
Chapter B (Article 1102 NAFTA). 
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controversial, view on the meaning of likeness by seeing it as something akin to, 
‘identical’, “that is like [the foreign investment] in all relevant respects, but for 
nationality of ownership”.69 Methanex’s argument was that as producers of methanol, 
they were in like circumstances with the producers of ethanol since both produce the 
ingredient used in manufacturing reformulated gasoline and as such, were in direct 
competition.70 So any differential treatment between the same investments could be 
judged to be as a result of the investment’s nationality.71 The tribunal further argued 
that employing the competitive relationship approach canvassed by the investor 
would lead to an expansive interpretation that would be beyond the scope of the 
provisions on national treatment in NAFTA Article 1102.72 The tribunal observed 
thus:  
 
  ‘Given the object of Article 1102 and the flexibility which the provision provides in its adoption of 
‘like circumstances’, it would be as perverse to ignore identical comparators if they were available and 
to use comparators that were less ‘like’, as it would be perverse to refuse to find and to apply less ‘like’ 
comparators when no identical comparators existed. The difficulty which Methanex encounters in this 
regard is that there are comparators which are identical to it’.73  
 
Interestingly, unlike the SD Myers and Occidental tribunals, the Methanex tribunal 
avoided relying on the WTO jurisprudence in its interpretation by firmly demarcating 
between ‘like goods’, as completely a trade concern, and ‘like circumstances’ which 
is an investment provision attribute. This argument, however, is rather faulty since the 
WTO is more than just a trade in goods treaty. The national treatment for example is 
                                                
69 Methanex, para.14. 
70 Methanex v. U.S.A., para 6. 
71 Methanex, para. 14. 
72 Methanex, Pt IV, Ch. B (Article 1102 NAFTA). 
73 Methanex v US, (n 50), at para 17, Pt. IV, Ch. B, 8 
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applicable to all parts of the WTO including intellectual property and the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services.74 
 
In the case of Pope & Talbot Inc. v The Government of Canada, the tribunal declared 
that the first step in any analysis of the national treatment standard should be by 
comparison of investments within the same economic sector, and that not only the 
economic factor but also the policy objectives of the member States should be 
considered.75 The Pope & Talbot tribunal addressed ‘in like circumstances’ from the 
position of the comparators among the softwood lumbar exporters.76 In that case, the 
softwood lumbar producers in the covered areas were considered not to be in ‘like 
circumstances’ with the producers in the covered areas. The Pope & Talbot tribunal 
further recognised that a breach of NAFTA Article 1102 is notionally confirmed 
‘once a difference in treatment between a domestic and a foreign-owned investment is 
discerned’.77 Perhaps no NAFTA tribunal has argued the national treatment standard 
the way the tribunal in Pope & Talbot did. Even though the tribunal rejected the 
Article 1102 national treatment claim but rather found a breach of Article 1105 
minimum standard of treatment, a more interesting part of the award was the 
tribunal’s analysis of the meaning of Article 1102 in comparison to the interpretation 
of the same standard under the WTO jurisprudence. The tribunal clearly accepted the 
proposition of the claimant.   
 
                                                
74 See relevant parts of the WTO/ (GATS). 
75 Pope & Talbot Inc. v The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Award on the Merits of 
Phase 2, 10 April 2001, at para 78, (hereinafter Pope & Talbot). 
76 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, para. 75. 
77 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, para. 79. 
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The tribunal in United Parcel Service of America v Government of Canada 
considered the operators of courier and postal services not to be in ‘like 
circumstances’ because of the difference in their delivery methods.78 
 
The tribunal in Feldman v. Mexico79 also narrowed down likeness by interpreting ‘in 
like circumstances’ to mean operating in the same business, the exporting of 
cigarettes.80 . On the other hand, the tribunal in Champion Trading Co81, also 
adopting the narrow interpretation of ‘in like situations’, decided to look beyond the 
factual situation of the domestic and foreign cotton traders operating in the same 
sector. In the dispute, certain domestic companies received payments from the 
Egyptian Government while the foreign investor was denied despite both being in the 
same cotton trading. The tribunal argued that though both were operating in the same 
economic sector, they were clearly distinguishable as the domestic trades were buying 
their cotton from government designated centres at fixed prices while the foreign 
traders were not.82  
 
The last case in the review of investment tribunals’ interpretation of the principle of 
non-discrimination based on likeness is the interesting case of Bayindir v. Pakistan.83 
The case of Bayindir v. Pakistan was chosen as the last to be reviewed here for its 
many interesting perspectives. Though it was from an ICSID case law, the Bayindir 
                                                
78 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Award on the Merits, 24 
May 2007, (hereinafter UPS v Canada). 
79 Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa (CEMSA) v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, Award (16 
December 2002) (Gantz, Kerameus, Covarrubias Bravo) [hereinafter Feldman v. Mexico].   
80 Feldman v. Mexico, Award, 16 December 2002, para 171. 
81 Champion Trading Company and Ameritrade Internationa,l Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/9, Award (27 October 2006) (Aynes, Briner, Fortier). 
82 Champion Trading Co. v. Egypt, para 154. 
83 Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/29, Award (27 August 2009) (Kaufmann-Kohler, Berman, Bockstiegel) [hereinafter Bayindir 
v. Pakistan].  
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tribunal affirmed the NAFTA jurisprudence three-step examination when assessing 
whether there was a breach of the national treatment obligation. The tribunal held 
that: 
 
The tribunal will first examine whether Bayindir’s investment was in a ‘similar situation.’ If so, it will 
then assess whether Bayindir’s investment was accorded less favourable treatment than PMC-JV and 
whether the difference in treatment was justified.84 
 
In the assessment of likeness in order to confirm the violation of the national 
treatment obligation, the first thing has been for the tribunal to determine a 
comparator that is in “like situation” or “like circumstances” with the claimant. In this 
regard, the Bayindir tribunal argued that being in the same “business sector” is not 
enough for two companies to be ‘in like situations’. It stated that: 
 
The claimant is right that the project and business sectors are the same. This may be relevant in a trade 
law context. Under a freestanding test, however, such as the one applied here, that degree of identity 
does not suffice to displace the differences between the two contractual relationships.85 
 
Having stated that, the tribunal concluded:  
 
The two contractual relationships are too different for Bayindir and the local contractors to be deemed 
in ‘similar situations’. Consequently, the first requirement for a breach of the national treatment clause 
embodied in Article II (2) of the Treaty is not met. It thus makes no sense to pursue the analysis of the 
other requirements.86  
 
                                                
84 Bayindir v. Pakistan, para 399. 
85 Bayindir v. Pakistan, (n.81) para 402. 
86 Bayindir v. Pakistan, (n. 81) para 411. 
 102 
This decision is significant in its different reasoning on the concept of business sector. 
The approach adopted by the tribunal was similar to that in the earlier case of 
Champion Trading v. Egypt.87  
 
From the above brief survey of investment awards, it is observed that the various 
tribunals understood likeness differently and applied it inconsistently and 
incoherently. As such, the standard with which to contrast the activities of domestic 
investors with their foreign counterparts remains debatable.88  
 
Even though this thesis is not advocating for a congenial marriage between the 
jurisprudential approaches of the systems of trade and investment, it is, however, 
going to pinpoint the superior interpretative methodology of the trade law 
jurisprudence. This is with a view to learning something from the more sophisticated 
WTO jurisprudence due to the congenital defect of the system under investment law. 
In chapter five, these inconsistencies and lack of coherence would be synthesized by 
way of cross-reference to chapters three and four.89  
3.4 Treatment between Comparators and the Effect of Intent 
Having established the position of the foreign investor when compared to the 
domestic investor, the tribunals, usually following the three-steps test advocated by 
NAFTA, then move to establish whether the foreign investor has been given treatment 
commensurate with that of the domestic investor. Just as in the case of ‘likeness’, the 
phrasing of the national treatment standard differs as far as the required treatment is 
concerned. The wording most commonly used generally considers treatment of 
                                                
87 Champion Trading Co. v. Egypt, (n. 79). 
88 Dolzer & Schreuer, (n 13), 200. 
89 Sub-head 3.8 below will also analyse some of these inconsistencies. 
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foreign investors and/or investments that is ‘no less favourable’ than is granted to 
domestic investors in the host country. Furthermore, arbitral tribunals have 
continuously differed about the relevant procedure to be followed in establishing 
whether a foreign investor has suffered ‘less favourable’ treatment.90 The tribunals 
disagreed as to whether the measure’s adverse effect on the foreign investor is enough 
to confirm less favourable treatment or whether discriminatory intent is also relevant 
in such a determination of national treatment. 
 
In assessing the requirement of intent of the host government to give preferential 
treatment to its nationals, the tribunal in SD Myers v Canada settles on the effect 
rather than the intent.91 The NAFTA tribunal in Myers stated: 
 
  ‘Intent is important, but protectionist intent is not necessarily decisive on its own. The existence of 
intent to favour nationals over non-nationals would not give rise to a breach of Article 1102 of the 
NAFTA if the measure in question were to produce no adverse effect on the non-national complainant. 
The word ‘treatment’ suggests that practical impact is required to produce a breach of Article 1102, not 
merely a motive or intent that is in violation of Chapter 11’.92 
 
In Siemens v Argentina93, the tribunal was even clearer when it stated that: 
 
  ‘The tribunal concurs that intent is not decisive or essential for a finding of discrimination, and that 
the impact of the measure on the investment would be the determining factor to ascertain whether it 
had resulted in non-discriminatory treatment’.94  
 
                                                
90 Federico Ortino, (n10). 
91 SD Myers v Canada, (n 43). 
92 SD Myers v Canada, (n 43) para 254. 
93 Siemens v Argentina, Award, 6 February 2007. 
94 Siemens v. Argentina, para 321. 
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The tribunals in both Feldman v Mexico95 and Corn Products v Mexico96 seem to 
share Siemens v Argentina’s position that it is the impact of the measure that is 
important not the intention of the host state.  
 
However, in contrast to the various tribunals that considered the probable impact 
rather than the intent of a measure in a finding of discrimination, are tribunals that 
seem to require the presence of intent. The tribunals in Methanex v The United States 
Government97 and that of Genin v Estonia98 both recognised that intention is 
paramount in any attempt to establish the presence of discrimination.  
 
The Methanex tribunal explicitly demanded that in order to initiate a violation of the 
national treatment standard, the Canadian investor ‘ must demonstrate … that 
California intended to favour domestic investors by discriminating against foreign 
investors’.99  
 
 In Genin, the tribunal, while rejecting the non-discrimination claim against Estonia, 
stated: 
 
  ‘ there is no indication that the Bank of Estonia specifically targeted EIB in a discriminatory way, or 
treated it less favourably than banks owned by Estonian nationals. Moreover, Claimants have failed to 
prove that the withdrawal of EIB’s license was done with the intention to harm the Bank or any of the 
Claimants in this arbitration, or to treat them in a discriminatory way’.100   
 
                                                
95 Feldman v Mexico, (n 56), at para 181. 
96 Corn Products v Mexico, Decision on Responsibility, 15 January 2008. 
97 Methanex v US, (n 50), at para 12.  
98 Genin v Estonia, Award, 25 June 2001, at para 369. 
99 Methanex v US, (n 50), at para 12. 
100 Genin v Estonia, (n 68), at para 369. 
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The perspective taken by the tribunal in Occidental seems different. Even though the 
tribunal accepted that the foreign investors were treated less favourably than the 
national companies, that had ‘not been done with the intent of discriminating against 
foreign-owned companies’ and as such held that ‘the result of the policy enacted…in 
fact has been a less favourable treatment to the foreign investor’.101  
3.5 Interpreting Non-Discrimination as Most Favoured Nation Obligation 
The Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment clause in modern investment treaties is 
traceable to the twelfth century features of the friendship, commerce and navigation 
treaties.102 It is a substantive standard that is part of international economic treaties.103 
It has been included in the very first BIT between Germany and Pakistan.104 The 
MFN clause is part of the principle of equality and protection against discrimination 
that is provided by the host state.105 It requires the host state not to discriminate both 
de jure or de facto. The main purpose of the MFN is to ensure that parties to the 
relevant treaty treat each other in a manner at least as favourable as they treat third 
parties.106 The International Law Commission final Draft Articles define the MFN 
treatment: 
 
  Most-favoured-nation treatment is treatment accorded by the granting State to the beneficiary State, 
or to persons or things in a determined relationship with that State, not less favourable than the 
                                                
101 Occidental, (n 48) para177. 
102 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, 10. 
103 Jürgen Kurtz, ‘The Delicate Extension of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment To Foreign Investors: 
Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain’, in International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases 
from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law, 523, 523 (Todd Weiler 
ed., 2004). 
104 1959. 
105 Jürgen Kurtz, The MFN Standard and Foreign Investment: An Uneasy Fit? 5 J. World Investment 
& Trade, 861, 862 (2004), UNCTAD (n 74), David D. Caron and Esme Shirlow, Most Favoured 
Nation Treatment- Substantive Protection, SSRN Research Paper No. 2015=23, (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2590557) accessed on 23 may 2015. 
106 UNCTAD, (n 72), at 10 
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treatment extended by the granting State to a third State or to persons or things in the same relationship 
with that third State.107 
 
The MFN treatment and NT are for the prevention of discrimination on the basis of 
nationality. As such, for a violation of MFN treatment to occur, the difference in 
treatment must be as a result of the nationality of the foreign investor. 
 
As a non-discrimination guarantee just like other investment standards, the MFN has 
varying wordings and appears in different context depending on the object and 
purpose of the treaty containing the clause.108 The bilateral nature of investment 
treaties is another important reason for the differences in wordings. Though it is 
linked to the principle of equality of States, however the obligation only exists when it 
is created by a treaty clause.109 Some treaties provide for a narrow MFN clause while 
other treaties couched it in general terms. Article 3 (1) and (2) of the 1998 German 
Model Treaty combine the MFN and NT obligations: 
 
  “(1) Neither Contracting State shall subject investments in its territory owned or controlled by 
investors of the other Contracting State to treatment less favourable than it accords to investments of 
its own investors or to investments of investors of any third State. 
 
(2) Neither Contracting State shall subject investors of the other Contracting State, as regards their 
activity in connection with investments in its territory, to treatment less favourable than it accords to 
its own investors or to investors of any third State.” 
 
                                                
107 Draft Articles on most-Favoured-Nation Clauses of the UN International Law Commission, in 
Report of the International Law Commission on its Thirteenth Session, 2 Y.B Int’ L. Comm. 11 (1978), 
U.N.Doc.A/CN-4/Ser.A. 1978/Add.1, at 2. 
108 Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law, OECD Working Papers on 
International Investment, (OECD Publishing 2004/02), 3. 
109 OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2. 
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Furthermore, just like in the national treatment standard, some MFN clauses include 
the ‘like circumstances’ terminology. Article 1103 of NAFTA Chapter Eleven, which 
is a clear reflection of the United States BIT Program, provides: 
 
“ 1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords, in like circumstances, to investors of another Party or of a non-Party with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of 
investments. 
 
2. Each Party shall accord investments of investors of another Party treatment no less favourable than 
that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments of investors of any other Party or of a non-Party 
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or 
other disposition of investments.” 
 
The German Model contains a general MFN provision that is not limited to the part 
containing the clause. Majority of the MFN clauses in BITs contain generalized 
promises of MFN treatment applicable to all parts covered by the BIT.110 The legal 
basis for the MFN treatment clause remains the ‘base treaty’ that contains the MFN 
clause.111 Article 7 of the Draft Articles on MFN states: 
 
  “ Nothing in the present articles shall imply that a State is entitled to be accorded most-favoured-
nation treatment by another State otherwise than on the basis of an international obligation undertaken 
by the latter State.” 
 
The provision on the MFN treatment, as a relative and substantive protection standard 
just like the NT standard, definitely requires a comparator. Furthermore, it requires a 
                                                
110 Tony Cole, The Boundaries of Most Favoured Nation Treatment in International Investment Law, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1792542, 557, accessed 18 January 2015. 
111 UNCTAD, (n 72) 22. 
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finding of more favourable treatment given to investors of a named nationality instead 
of the investors covered by the ‘base treaty’.112 Evidently, there should be a 
comparison followed by an objective assessment of less favourable treatment in order 
to make a finding on the violation of MFN treatment.113 
 
The International Law Commission (ILC) expected the interpretation of the MFN 
clause necessarily follows the rules of the VCLT.114 This will require an inquiry into 
the ordinary meaning of the clause in the context and purpose of the particular treaty 
incorporating the MFN.115 The ILC’s work therefore provided an analysis on how the 
MFN clause is governed by the ejusdem generis principle that was used by several 
arbitral tribunals and judicial bodies in their interpretation of the standard.116 The 
principle is to the effect that an MFN clause can attract the more favourable treatment 
present in such other relevant treaties only based on the same ‘subject matter’, the 
same ‘category of matter’, or the same ‘class of matter’.117  
 
It is interesting that despite being a non-discrimination standard, the MFN treatment 
obligation does not in any way require that foreign investors must be treated equally 
regardless of their specific condition or circumstance.118 Rather, differential treatment 
could be justified if the comparators are shown to be in different objective situations. 
As stated earlier, the treaties use varying wordings that include ‘like situations’, ‘like 
                                                
112 UNCTAD, 23. 
113 Dolzer & Schreuer, (n 12) 207. 
114 OECD (n 78) 8, VCLT (35). As stated above when discussing the NT obligation, it almost 
impossible for a tribunal to be in possession of the travaux preparatoires while determining the dispute 
before it. 
115 Dolzer & Schreuer, (n 12) 208. 
116 Article 9, ILC Draft Articles (n 77). 
117 OECD (n 78) 16. 
118 UNCTAD (n 72) 53. 
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circumstances’ or other similar wordings.119 The tribunal in Parkerings v Lithuania120 
opined that a comparison was imperative with another investor who was in like 
circumstances while the tribunal in Bayindir v Pakistan121 provided that the 
comparison between the relevant foreign investors must be tested at the level of the 
contractual terms and circumstances. 
 
The MFN treatment clause can be subjected to certain exceptions. 122 The EU Model 
BIT seems to recognise these exceptions, and posit that the EU investment treaty 
practice ‘may significantly add to a discernible trend towards an approximation (or 
‘re-integration’) of international investment law to (with) international trade law’, … 
leading to ‘a further move towards the de-fragmentation of international economic 
law’.123 Thus these exceptions could be said to be as a result of the wordings of the 
clause or can be exceptions that are expressly stated. In either case, these exceptions 
play significant role in the interpretation of the standard as a substantive treatment 
obligation and also serve as restrictive devices for the negotiating States against 
unplanned negative effect or application. 124  
 
The Majority of treaty practice is concentrated in the areas of substantive application 
of the MFN treatment clause to the area of investment liberalization. In the ADF v 
                                                
119 See for example NAFTA (1992), US Model BIT (2004). 
120 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Republic of Lithuania, ICISID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 11 
September 2007. 
121 Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005. 
122 UNCTAD (n 72) 46. 
123 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, National Treatment and MFN in the (Invisible) EU Model BIT, (2014) 
Journal of World Investment and Trade, 15, 484-505, 17.  
124 David D. Caron and Esme Sharlow, Most Favoured Nation Treatment – Substantive Protection, (n 
75). 
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USA125, the claimant invoked the MFN treatment clause in NAFTA in order to benefit 
from a broader fair and equitable treatment provision contained in third party BITs by 
the United States with Albania and Estonia. The tribunal rejected the investor’s claim 
and found for the respondent that its acts were excluded under Article 1108 NAFTA 
and as such the claimant could not rely on the MFN clause. The claimant’s aim was 
simply to get round the limiting interpretation given to the fair and equitable treatment 
clause under Article 1105 of NAFTA. That is why Roland Klager viewed the FET to 
be a ‘black box’ full of surprises’.126 The vague nature, unpredictable and inconsistent 
interpretation of the standard poses lots of issues in its application, making it ‘a 
prominent cause of action for investor-State claims’.127                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
In CME v Czech Republic128, the tribunal used the award to provide a clarification of 
the meaning of words used in the ‘base treaty’ by invoking provisions in third party 
treaties. In the MTD v Chile129, the tribunal allowed the claimant to use an MFN 
clause to import protection provisions that were otherwise absent in the basic treaty. 
The claimant invoked the MFN clause in the Chile-Malaysia BIT to put forward its 
argument that the more favourable substantive provisions that were contained in other 
third treaties should apply to benefit it.  
 
                                                
125 ADF Group Inc. v United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/1, Award of 9 January 
2003. The ADF v USA remains the only case in which an investment tribunal has interpreted and 
applied an exception to reject an MFN claim. 
126 Roland Klager, Revising Treatment Standards-Fair and Equitable Treatment in Light of Sustainable 
Development in Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski, Shifting Paradigms in International 
Investment Law, More Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly Diversified, (OUP 2016) 67.  
127 Roland Klager. 
128 CME v Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 14 March 2003. 
129 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v, Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 
2004. Though there was an annulment, it did not overturn the decision of the original tribunal on this 
issue.  
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The MFN treatment as a standard, a standard borrowed from the trade regime where it 
is a natural fit, is now applicable in the field of investment and trade and essentially 
provides for equal competitive opportunities with regard to those matters the specific 
MFN clause applies. The standard, together with the NT, is widely regarded as an 
important standard of treatment for both investors and their investments. The MFN 
clauses are commonly found with varying meanings and application in many 
investment treaties. Each MFN clause can only be effectively applied through a 
careful, in-depth analysis of the relevant text in accordance with the general rules of 
interpretation of the Vienna Convention.130 
3.6 The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
Perhaps no investment protection standard has generated such intense interest and 
academic discourse in the last decade than the fair and equitable treatment standard.131 
The FET has been a sleeping beauty, woken up from its deep slumber lately to rescue 
estranged foreign investors. Todd Weiler traced the origin of the standard to the 
‘applicable law’ of the mixed claims commissions of the mid-19th to the mid-20th 
                                                
130 OECD (n 78) 16, see also Chapter Two above for a more in-depth discussion of the application of 
the VCLT. 
131 Numerous texts, articles, book chapters and monographs have been written. See for example Rudolf 
Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, (OUP 2012) Second 
Edition, August Reinisch, Standards of Investment Protection, (OUP 2008), M. Sornarajah, The 
International Law on Foreign Investment, (CUP 2010), Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment, Oxford Monographs in 
International Law, (OUP 2008), Todd Weiler, The Interpretation of International investment Law, 
Equality, Discrimination and Minimum Standards of Treatment in Historical Context, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2013, Jorge A. Huerta-Goldman, Antoine Romanetti & Franz X. Stirnimann, WTO 
Litigation, Investment Arbitration, and Commercial Arbitration, Wolters Kluwer, 2013, Patrick 
Dumberry, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, A Guide to NAFTA Case Law on Article 1105, 
Martins Paparinskis, The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment, Oxford 
Monographs in International Law, (OUP 2013), Roland Klager, Fair and Equitable Treatment in 
International Investment Law, (CUP 2011), Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, International Investment 
Law, Text, Cases and Materials, 2013, Jonathan Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection under Investment 
Treaties, A legal and Economic Analysis, (CUP 2014), Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and 
Christoph Schreuer, The Oxford Handbook of International Law, (OUP 2008), Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours, 12 Santa Clara J. Int’L L. 7 (2014), C Schreuer, Fair and 
Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 journal of World Investment and Trade, (2005) 357-86, S 
Vasciannie, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice, 
70 BYBIL 99, (1999), R Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A key Standard in Investment Treaties, 
39 International Lawyer 87, (2005) and numerous others. 
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Centuries132 while Vasciannie traced it to the OECD Convention of 1967.133 
Paparinskis traced the use of the phrase ‘fair and equitable’ in the field of foreign 
investment protection to the 1948 Havana Charter of the International Trade 
Organisation (ITO).134  
 
The standard is now present in most bilateral investment treaties and remains one of 
the most litigated provisions in IIAs.135 Article II (2) of the Argentina-USA BIT 
states: ‘Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment…’ It is 
also present in many multilateral treaties such as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) of 
1994 and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1992. The Energy 
Charter Treaty has an extensive provision on the FET requirement. Article 10 (1) of 
the ECT provides: 
 
(1) Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and 
create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting 
Parties to make investments in its area. Such conditions shall include commitment to accord at all 
times to Investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment.136 
 
The standard, quite unlike the NT and the MFN, is an absolute, non-contingent one 
and as such does not require the State’s existing treatment of investors or other 
circumstances created by the State.137  The contingent character of the standard has 
made investors completely rely on it, ‘as a divine gift from host States’ and on the 
                                                
132 Todd Weiler, (n 98) 184. 
133 S Vasciannie (n 98) 104. Dolzer traced the concept to the treaties of friendship, commerce and 
navigation (FCN). 
134 Jonathan Bonnitcha, (n 98) 143. 
135 Dolzer and Schreuer, (n98) 131. 
136 See the ECT 1994, ILM 381, 389 (1995). 
137 Katia-Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Developments, in August 
Reinisch, (n 100) 111. 
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other hand it is criticized by the host States ‘because of the unbalanced relationship it 
creates between the foreign investor and host State’.138 
 
Despite being the most invoked provision in investment disputes today and also 
despite the fact that considerable effort has been expanded in an in-depth examination 
of the FET, the standard is still not fully clarified.139 Furthermore, just as in other 
investment treaty standard clauses, there is no universally agreed wording of the FET 
standard. Significant variations from treaty to treaty abound, hence the importance of 
recourse to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and 
reference to its context and history.140 The meaning of the terms ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ 
has not been easy either.141 
 
In bilateral Investment treaty practice, the FET standard is applied as a gap-filling 
measure where other more specific standards have not provided coverage.142 There 
are quite a number of positions linking the FET standard to non-discrimination. One 
argument opined that the FET assumed position as an international investment law 
standard due to its success as equality and non-discrimination standard in other 
commercial contexts.143 Arbitrariness and discrimination, it is argued, effectively fall 
under the FET standard despite the concepts being clearly delineated under specific 
rules in international investment law.144 So generally, any discriminatory treatment is 
                                                
138 Ioana Tudor, (n 100) 3. 
139 Katia Yannaca-Small. 
140 Dolzer and Schreuer, (n 98) 132, CMS v Argentina, Award of 12 May 2005, Sempra v Argentina, 
Award of 28 September 2007. 
141 Krista Schefer, (n 98) 327. 
142 Sempra v Argentina, (n 108) para 297. 
143 Todd Weiler, (n 98) 190. 
144 Dolzer and Schreuer, Huerta-Goldman, (n 98) 15, 27, Ioana Tudor, (n 98) 28. 
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enough to establish a violation of the FET because discriminatory treatment is not fair 
or equitable.145 
 
The tribunal in CMS v Argentina also connected the arbitrariness and discrimination 
protection standard to the FET standard where it observed, ‘…any measure that might 
involve arbitrariness or discrimination is in itself contrary to the fair and equitable 
treatment’.146  This was also the position of the tribunal in Waste Management v 
Mexico.147 All these have gone to show clear manifestations of non-discrimination in 
the FET standard.  
 
It seems an anomaly that the starting point for an analysis of the FET as a standard of 
treatment for foreigners has nothing to do with investment. The reference to the 
expectation of international investment law on host States to treat investors based on 
the fair and equitable principle always goes back to the Neer case.148 The Neer 
arbitration involve a claim presented by the United States to the US-Mexico Claims 
Commission on behalf of the family of Paul Neer, who was killed in Mexico in 
uncertain circumstances. In what is the most authoritative pronouncement on the 
issue, the tribunal stated: 
 
  ‘… the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of international standards….the 
treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency should amount to an outrage, 
to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of 
                                                
145 Ioana Tudor, (n 98) 28-29. 
146 CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award of 
12 May 2005. 
147 Waste Management Inc. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/003/, Award of April 
2004. 
148 Neer v Mexico, Opinion, US-Mexico General Claims Commission, 15 October 1926 (1927) 21 AJIL 
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international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its 
insufficiency’.149  
In the latest pronouncement on the IMS by the ICJ in the Kulbhushan Jadhav case150 
between India and Pakistan, the State of India remains disinclined to signing Protocol 
II additional to the Geneva Conventions that deals with the rights of protected persons 
in situations of internal armed conflicts. However, it was argued that India this does 
not take away the fact that India remains bound by common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions I-III, which is ‘a customary norm of international law which prescribes a 
minimum standard of treatment for civilians caught in an internal conflict’.151 
 
The Claims Commission in Neer clearly emphasized on the need to defer to the host 
State and concluded that the facts of the case did not reveal a lack of diligence to the 
extent that will render Mexico liable. In effect, Mexican authorities’ failure to bring to 
book the perpetrators of Neer’s murder ‘did not per se violate the international 
minimum standard on the treatment of aliens’.152 The Commission dismissed the 
claim. 
Why is Neer important? The decision prepared the ground for the advent of the 
international minimum standard in international law and set the tone for a discussion 
of the standard treatment of aliens. Ongoing argument has centred on the position of 
FET standard in relation to the international minimum standard. In effect, does the 
FET reflect the international minimum standard within customary international law or 
does it represents an autonomous standard? Recently, the ICJ has course to make a 
pronouncement on it in the Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of 
                                                
149 Neer v Mexico, 15 October 1926, 4 UNRIAA 60. 
150 Jadhav Case (India v. Pakistan), pending, www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/168/168-20170616-
PRE-01-00-EN.pdf (last visited 28th August 2017). 
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Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo)153 arguing how the standard attained 
customary international law standard. Many commentators have expressed divergent 
views. Stephen Schwebel, arguing that the FET Standard has attained the status of 
customary international law due to its presence in almost two thousand bilateral 
investment treaties, stated: 
The phenomenon of how and when provisions of treaties binding only on parties may seep into general 
international law and thus binding the international community as a whole is subtle and elusive. It is 
nevertheless a process known to international law. It is a process of which some 2,200 bilateral 
investment treaties are the contemporary exemplar.154 
Alberto Alvarez Jiménez, in his analysis of the ICJ’s Ahmadou Sadio Diallo case,155 
argued that despite the evidence of certain favourable factors within the domain of 
both international law and international investment law together with the uniqueness 
of the Diallo case and novel approach by some States to offer foreign investors lower, 
not higher, level of protection, the FET does not meet the sill of the ICJ’s awaken 
strict approach to customary international law.156 Alvarez’s conclusion was that what 
the Diallo case would achieve was to afford the ICJ an opportunity to define the 
contours and content of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens and would be 
highly unlikely from this for the FET to receive the court’s recognition as customary 
international law.157  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                
153 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, 
Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2012, 324. 
154 Stephen M. Shcwebel, The Reshaping of the International Law of Foreign Investment by 
Concordant Bilateral Investment Treaties in Steve Charnovitz, Debra P. Steger and Peter Van den 
Bossche, eds., Law in the Service of Human Dignity, Essays in Honour of Florentino Feliciano 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 241-244-5. 
155 Alberto Alvarez Jiménez, Minimum Standard of Treatment of Aliens, Fair and Equitable Treatment 
of Foreign Investors, Customary International Law and the Diallo Case before the International Court 
of Justice, available at dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4897681.pdf, (last accessed on the 29th 
August 2017). NB: the author was clear that his opinion was not to preempt the court as he gave the 
opinion before judgment was handed down in the case, rather before the case has even been pleaded 
before the ICJ.  
156 Alberto Alvarez Jiménez, 7  
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In an empirical study of the application and interpretation of the FET standard in 
bilateral investment treaties, Ioana Tudor argued against the two contending 
perspectives.158 Accepting either of the dual positions, the traditional view that simply 
considers the standard to be part of the customary IMS or the modern view, which 
recognised the FET as an independent standard that has attained a customary 
character, she opined, simply add to the confusion concerning the standard.159 She 
suggested an alternative approach, which is to the effect that the FET should be 
analysed, based on its customary character, as an independent standard and not as part 
of the IMS.160 So the FET standard not only has a status of its own but has also 
developed a customary character.161 
The traditional approach to the position of the FET as part of customary IMS has 
found blessing in the NAFTA context while the modern view remain the perspective 
taken in many arbitral awards.162 
The North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, remains the first multilateral 
treaty that offered both individuals and corporate bodies an avenue to ventilate their 
grievances before an international tribunal.163 Article 1105 covering minimum 
standard of treatment is the most controversial and disputed content of NAFTA 
Chapter 11.164 
Article 1105 (1) of NAFTA provides: 
                                                
158 Ioana Tudor, (n 98) 3. Her study involved 365 BITs in which only 19 failed to mention FET. She 
observed that the FET was mentioned in both the Preamble and body of the treaties. 
159 Ioana Tudor, (n 98) 56. 
160 See also F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 (1999) 
The British Yearbook of International Law, 241.  
161 (n 98) 68, See also PSEG Global Inc And Konya Ilgin Elektrik Uretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v 
Republic of Turkey, ICSID, ARB/02/5, Award rendered on 19 January 2007, 238. 
162 See NAFTA Article 1105(1) and also see Pope & Talbot for the BIT position separating the FET 
from IMS. 
163 See Patrick Dumberry, (n 98) 1, North American Free Trade Agreement, (NAFTA) 32, ILM, 605 
(1993). NAFTA is also the first investment agreement between two developed States, United States 
and Canada.  
164 Patrick Dumberry, 2-3. 
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  Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 
 
The above statement, put together with NAFTA parties’ statement on the 
implementation of NAFTA, clearly set the FET to be among the requirements of 
international law. The clarification interpretation given to Article 1105 (1) by the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) has not gone unchallenged; in fact, to some it 
does more than interpret but completely amend the meaning of the provision and as 
such even the agreement.165 
 
FTC’s interpretation of Article 1105(1) NAFTA states that: 
 
  Article 1105 (1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens 
as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party. 
     The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require 
treatment in addition to or beyond that, which is required by the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens. 
     A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate 
international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of Article 1105(1).166 
 
In the Mondev case, the claimant’s argument was to the effect that the respondent 
canvassed a changed of the meaning of the NAFTA provision that was fundamental to 
the case and that such a significant change is a clear violation of the principle of good 
                                                
165 See Mondev International Ltd v United States of America ICSID, ARB (AF)/99/2, Final Award 
rendered on 11 October 2002, Methanex v USA, (n 50) at para 264, see also Pope & Talbot Inc. v 
Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on Damages rendered on 31 May 2002. 
166 FTC Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, Part B. 
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faith.167 The tribunal in Pope & Talbot in its decision on damages took the same 
position. The tribunal, on ‘whether the FTC’s action can properly be qualified as an 
“interpretation”, decided that the action might have amounted more to an amendment 
than an interpretation.168 
 
However, the decision in Pope & Talbot is significant in another respect; that is its 
conclusion on the relation between the FET and the IMS. In its conclusion that there 
is a clear difference, and as such separation between the FET and the IMS, it settled 
that the extent of the treatment in normal standards in operation in the NAFTA 
countries enough to satisfy the requirement of Article 1105.169 The tribunal further 
confirmed the dramatic character of the FET and opined that the standard must be 
interpreted based on the relevant circumstances of the case.170 Several arbitral awards 
that came after Pope & Talbot, agreed with the tribunal’s decision concerning the 
evolutionary character of the FET.171 
 
Considering all the arguments and arbitral interpretations on the relationship between 
the FET and the IMS, Tudor argued that the two are incompatible, for the IMS aimed 
at the physical protection of foreigners and their property while foreign investment 
law was cut for the particular protection of investors.172  
 
                                                
167 Mondev v USA, (n 124) at para 102. 
168 Pope & Talbot, (n 124) paras 47 to 58. 
169 See Ioana Tudor’s in-depth discussion of this position and a further analysis of the FET-IMS 
discussion. 
170 Pope & Talbot, (n 124) see paras 47-59. 
171 Ioana Tudor, (n 98) 60. 
172 (n 98) 65, generally see 65-85, see also the Jadhav Case (India v. Pakistan) (n.150). 
 120 
In his seminal discussion of the FET and IMS from the perspective of NAFTA Article 
1105 also, Patrick Dumberry used two approaches, autonomous and equalizing.173 
Under the independent approach, the FET is given its ordinary meaning in the 
relevant treaty and the proponents of this approach argued that the FET has finally 
crystallised into a principle of customary international law of its own.174 On the other 
hand, the equalizing approach understood the FET as a reflection of the minimum 
standard of treatment under customary international law.  
 
While Dumberry’s conclusion posit that the entire argument concerning the meaning, 
interpretation and position of the FET will not be answered using theories but a 
recourse to the particular FET clause to how it was drafted,175 Klager found the entire 
controversy to be clearly misleading because the division between IMS and the FET 
is without proof.176 Paparinskis conclusion on this is that customary law may 
necessarily be used in the interpretation though one rejects the traditional view that 
the fair and equitable treatment allude to the customary minimum standard.177 
 
The FET has been referred to severally as a ‘catch-all’ provision for investor 
protection because of its extensive coverage and wide presence in investment 
treaties.178 As an overarching clause, it also covers all other standards and is 
sometimes applied by investment arbitrators to refuse assistance to foreign investors 
asking for compensation for any loss ascribed to the host State’s behavior.179 
                                                
173 Patrick Dumberry, (n 98) 37. 
174 See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (n.153).  
175 (n 98) see 37-46. 
176 Roland Klager, (n 98) 88. 
177 Martin Paparinskis, (n 98) 166. 
178 Krista Schefer, (n 98) 327. 
179 Ioana Tudor, (n 98) 68. 
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3.7 Interaction Among Investment Treaty Standards 
The interaction among investment treaty standards is not one that is very clearly 
demarcated, at least as regards some of the standards. The national treatment standard, 
though generally accepted as a standalone, independent standard, is connected to 
other treaty standards and especially to the FET.180 Discrimination based on 
nationality or against a foreign investor will clearly serve as a breach of the FET. The 
MFN standard is undeniably used to ensure non-discrimination and its relative 
interaction with other standards has been accepted.181 Certain investment treaty 
tribunals regard the FET standard to be a far-reaching, all encompassing standard that 
cover all the other standards.182 The FET remains a recurring denominator in all the 
standards. 
 
  ‘Considering the place of the fair and equitable standard at the very beginning of Art.II (2), one can 
consider this to be a more general standard which finds its specific application in inter alia the duty to 
provide full protection and security, the prohibition of arbitrary and discriminatory measures and the 
obligation to observe contractual towards the investor’.183 
 
The position of this thesis is that the standards will be progressively used to show 
their commonality at least in the prevention of discrimination. Arbitral decisions and 
commentaries will be used in the subsequent chapters to show some in-depth 
relationship between the standards. 
                                                
180 Christoph Schreuer, Interrelationship of Standards, in August Reinisch, (n 100) 6. 
181 ADF v USA, para 193. 
182 Nobel Ventures Inc v Romania, Award of 12 October 2005. 
183 Nobel Ventures, para 182. 
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3.8 Tension in Arbitrating Non-Discrimination in Treaty Standards 
Considerable evidence abounds from arbitral practice with regard to the extent of 
inconsistency in the interpretation of key elements of the national treatment standard. 
The tribunals have varying positions as to the nature of the relationship (the likeness), 
between the domestic and foreign investors, which is necessary in the determination 
of discrimination.184  
 
On the issue of ‘likeness’, while the majority view focus on the domestic and foreign 
investors carrying on business in the same economic sector even if not in competition 
with each other, the tribunal in Occidental took a much wider interpretation of 
likeness comparing a foreign oil exporter with a domestic flower exporter. The 
Methanex tribunal’s reading was stricter by restricting the comparison to identical 
investors only. 
 
 The tribunals have also significantly differed in their interpretation of the national 
treatment standard with regard to the relevance of discriminatory intent. While the 
tribunals in Pope & Talbot, Myers, Feldman and Occidental evidently rely on the 
measure’s adverse effect on the foreign investors, other tribunals like the Methanex 
and Genin have accepted the relevance of discriminatory intent in order to establish a 
finding of national treatment claim. Various other tribunals have used varying 
approaches in such issues as the relationship between the measure and the host state’s 
policy objectives in order to reach a finding of difference in treatment.185  
                                                
184 Federico Ortino, (n 9), 364. 
185 Federico Ortino. 
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3.9 Conclusion 
This brief analysis has clearly shown the tension in the interpretation of standards of 
treatment by arbitral tribunals. The inconsistency and incoherence noticed has been 
responsible for the many crises bedeviling the investment regime, which necessitate 
the need to look outside the investment jurisprudence for help – could the WTO 
provide such help? Chapter four is devoted to the WTO’s Panels and Appellate 
Boards’ interpretation of these relative standards of treatment with so as to see if they 
provide any better interpretation that the investment jurisprudence can learn from. 
This does not mean transposing the trade regime into the investment regime. As we 
will see, the WTO has its own inherent problems, suffice it to say it is far better than 
the investment regime in a lot of respects and as such some lessons will be learnt as 
part of the journey towards developing a more coherent interpretation of the non-
discrimination principle for international economic law.  
 124 
Chapter Four 
Non-Discrimination Under The GATT/WTO 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter, just like chapter three that precedes it, is specifically aimed at reviewing 
the interpretation approach taken by the trade regime. It will look at how the trade 
regime interprets and applies the principle of non-discrimination. This is with a view 
to drawing the salient differences between the interpretation of the principle under 
investment law and the World Trade Organisation - WTO. The discourse here is 
necessary in order to tease out the relative development in the jurisprudence of the 
WTO and give an analytical account of how the Panels and the Appellate Body have 
interpreted the non-discrimination principle using the standards of treatment – Most-
Favoured-Nation (MFN) and National Treatment (NT). Of course, the trade 
jurisprudence is ripe with its interpretation and analysis using sustainable 
development approach, the cases that invoked this concept using the VCLT are 
analysed in the next chapter. 
 
Any discussion of the principle of non-discrimination under the WTO will necessarily 
entails a look at the development of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) before it.  
 
The initial idea was to place the GATT under the International Trade Organisation 
(ITO), which unfortunately could not see the light of the day.1 However, in 1947, and 
                                                
1 GATT Art XXIX covers the relationship between the GATT and the ITO. The US vehemently 
rejected the idea of the ITO fearing it will affect its domestic sovereignty.  
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as a prelude to the ITO, some 23 major international trading countries came together 
to bring about a temporary agreement, the GATT that will become the standard 
institutional foundation upon which today’s world trade regime rests.2 
 
The GATT system continued to regulate international trade between nations from 
1948 until the creation of the WTO. The GATT covers such areas as the trade in 
goods, trade liberalization, the sponsorship of the eight rounds of trade negotiations 
and dispute settlement mechanism for the use of the contracting parties. However, 
despite these evident achievements, the GATT was bedeviled by numerous short-
comings or failures, which include, among others, refusal of some parties, especially 
the developing countries, to undertake any obligation, failure of the GATT system to 
have a recognised structure for it to work under, neglect of some critical sectors of 
trade, ineffective dispute settlement mechanism and many others.3 
 
As a result of the above clear shortcomings in the operation of the GATT, the eighth 
round of the GATT trade negotiation that has popularly come to be known as the 
Uruguay Round was held with a view to tackling these problems.4 The effort 
eventually led to the creation of the WTO. 
 
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter the WTO 
Agreement) mainly deals with organizational and structural issues while the 
                                                
2 Michael J. Trebilcock, Advanced Introduction to International Trade, (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited 2015) 10. 
3 William Davey, Non-Discrimination in the World Trade Organisation: The Rules and Exceptions, 
(Hague Academy of International Law 2012) 21-22. 
4 See GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The 
Legal Texts, Geneva, GATT (1994), available online at www.wto.org, accessed on 5 June 2015, (It 
contain the WTO Agreement and its annexes. See it also in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S 194 (GATT 1947), effectively incorporated into the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, WTO Agreement [hereinafter GATT]. 
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substantive obligations covered by the WTO members pertaining to international 
trade are contained in the different agreements added to the WTO Agreement.5 
 
The World Trade Organisation is now the single institutional framework that 
encompassed the GATT and all its related agreements, the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) that form a binding contract between the parties.6 
 
Quite unlike the GATT, the WTO is evidently an international organisation created by 
a multilateral treaty having independent legal personality with rights and privileges to 
enter into relations with other organisations.7 The WTO, despite being mainly a 
multilateral treaty that is devoted to liberalization of trade, is also effectively 
employed in the management and regulation of trade.8 
 
Article III of the WTO clearly spelt out the five main functions of the trade body that 
situate it at the centre of the multilateral trading system.9 The preamble to the WTO 
Agreement states the fundamental principles of the WTO to include trade 
liberalization, promotion of fairness in trade relations, transparency, and non- 
discrimination and special treatment of developing countries. Among all the 
fundamental principles of the WTO, this thesis will be mainly concerned with the 
principle of non-discrimination only. 
                                                
5 See the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, pmbl., cl. 3, April 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
6 WTO Agreement, Art. II (1). 
7 WTO Agreement Art. VIII. 
8 WTO Agreement (n 6). 
9 William Davey, (n 3) 24. 
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4.1 The Principle of Non-Discrimination Under the WTO 
The era of the Great Depression of the 1930s saw many countries employing 
discrimination between and against other countries as a form of protectionist trade 
policies.10 However, there seems to be a putative trend in the US approach under the 
Trump administration; ‘buy American, hire American’ for trade and services! If this 
is implemented, experts predict, there is likely going to be a trade war.11 Inarguably, 
discrimination distorts trade and the market by favouring certain goods and services 
that may clearly be sub-standard and overall more expensive.12 
 
Non-Discrimination is a fundamental pillar and feature of the multilateral trading 
system of the WTO.13 The non-discrimination principle is in effect designed to ensure 
that WTO Members do not discriminate on ‘like products’ based on their origin, that 
is ‘like products’ must be treated equally irrespective of their origin. The rules 
embodying the non-discrimination principle are at the very hearts of the main WTO 
agreements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)14, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)15, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)16 and the many other agreements of the 
WTO.17 
                                                
10 Peter Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation, (CUP 2008) 321. 
11 Other dimensions are the evident re-negotiation of NAFTA on the one hand and the impact of Brexit 
on the other.  
12 Peter Van Den Bossche (n10). 
13 See the Preamble, WTO Agreement, Article I, MFN Principle and Article III, NT Principle. See also 
Makane Mbengue, ‘The Principle of Non-Discrimination in International Trade – GATT Perspective’, 
in UN Lectures, available at <http://www.un.org/law/avl/>.  
14 GATT (n4) 
15 General Agreement on Trade in Services, April 15, 1994, WTO Agreement [hereinafter GATS]. 
16 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15 1994, WTO 
Agreement, [hereinafter TRIPS].   
17 For example, NT obligations can also be found in Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade [hereinafter the TBT Agreement], and also in Article 2 of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Measures (TRIMS), in the same vein, MFN obligations can be found in Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement, Article 9.2 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 [hereinafter the Antidumping Agreement] and Article 19.3 of the Agreement 
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Discrimination is defined as either “the effect of a law or established practice that 
confers privileges on a certain class because of race, age, sex, nationality, religion, or 
disability” or “differential treatment; especially, a failure to treat all persons equally 
when no reasonable distinction can be found between those favoured and those not 
favoured”.18 The WTO Appellate Body, while considering the definition of 
discrimination, stated that: “The ordinary meanings of ‘discriminate’ converge in one 
important respect: they both suggest that distinguishing among similarly situated 
beneficiaries is discriminatory”.19 Under the WTO, discrimination is majorly divided 
into two, De jure and De facto discrimination. De jure discrimination, said to be the 
obvious and rarely used form, is where the State, through deliberate policy and or 
regulation, formulate discriminatory measures that will see to some countries driving 
certain advantages over others. On the other hand, De facto discrimination, which is 
said to be the most vicious and complex type of discrimination in international trade 
law, does not usually emanate from direct regulation but is manifested in the effect 
produced by such regulations or laws. Other, less applicable types of discrimination 
include natural origin, which is similar to de facto discrimination and origin-based 
discrimination that is based solely on the origin of the product. 
The notion of non-discrimination is highly intricate and quite flexible, its definition 
and analysis therefore depends on the context in which it is applied.20 It may be as a 
result of its intricate nature that the Panel in Canada-Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products warned, “‘Discrimination’ is a term to be avoided whenever 
                                                                                                                                       
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. Moreover, both NT and 
MFN obligations appear in Article III of the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), which is 
one of the Plurilateral Agreements that came out of the Uruguay Round.  
18 B. Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed., (St. Paul, Thomson Reuters, 2009) 534. 
19 Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries, 143-147, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004) (adopted Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter 
EC-Preferences]  
20 Julia Ya Qin, Defining Nondiscrimination Under The Law Of The World Trade Organisation, (23 
Boston U. Int’l L.J 215 2005) 218. 
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more precise standards are available, and when employed, it is a term to be interpreted 
with caution, and with care to add no more precision than the concept contains.”21 It is 
instructive that even though the non-discrimination provisions contained in all the 
WTO agreements are stated in clear terms, this alone has not sufficiently addressed 
the problem of defining the concept.22 However, despite the seeming difficulties in 
arriving at a definition of such a concept, the Appellate Body  
has interpreted the sweeping term ‘non-discrimination’ as a stipulation not to treat 
‘similarly situated’ countries differently.23 It opined that discrimination would only 
happen when ‘similarly situated’ countries are offered different treatments. So from 
the Appellate Body’s interpretation, the fundamental issue in making a finding of 
discrimination will be to ascertain the grounds for comparing ‘similarity’ between 
WTO Members, something entirely lacking in the investment regime. This 
interpretation is seen as a great development in the overall jurisprudence of the WTO 
as it brings about a guide in defining the non-discrimination obligation.24 
 
The difficulty in dealing with the non-discrimination standard under the WTO is a 
result of the fact that reaching a finding on the first element, the comparator clause, as 
to whether two situations are quite alike so as to be treated the same is one that is not 
easy to arrive at. It then becomes imperative to ascertain the elements common to the 
two situations that should be examined in order to make a finding as to whether they 
are the ‘identical’ or are ‘similar’.25 Now a follow up question to the above will seem 
to be how can supplementary guidelines be established in order to map out the 
                                                
21 Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 7.94, WT/DS114/R (March 
17, 2000) (adopted Apr. 7, 2000) (while referring to the term “discrimination” as contained in Article 
27.1 of TRIPS). 
22 William Davey, (n 3) 58. 
23 Appellate Body Report, EC-Preferences, (n 19). 
24 Julia Ya Qin, Defining Nondiscrimination Under the Law of the World Trade Organisation, (n.20). 
25 William Davey (n 3).  
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elements that will be relevant and serve as a basis in determining similarity of 
situations? The second element concerns a comparison between the treatments of the 
relevant market actors to see whether one is treated less favourably than the other. 
There seems to be not much in-depth discussion in available literature and case law on 
the interaction between the two elements. Each of the elements, however, has been 
subject to different interpretations under different standards.  
 
May be guidance can be sought from the WTO Agreements with regards to criteria 
relevant in the determination of similarity of situations and similarity of treatment. 
The notion of “similarly situated” is said to underscore all the non-discrimination 
obligations of the WTO. The various agreements contain different criteria that are 
applicable to the determination of “similarly situated” and “similarity of treatment”.  
 
So simply put, the notion, as contained in the provisions of the various WTO 
agreements, prohibit arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and entail equal 
treatment of the WTO Members that are “similarly situated” based on their existing 
conditions.26 
 
Generally, the WTO tribunals, in making a finding about discrimination, also pass 
through the route of making a complete resolution of the likeness or similarity 
between products, services or nationality of the Members. Both the NT and the MFN 
clauses in the GATT and GATS use the notion of “like products”27, “like services”28 
and “like service suppliers”29 in justifying the classification of similarly situated 
                                                
26 Both NT & MFN Clauses consider the WTO Members to be “similarly situated”. 
27 GATT Arts. I:1, III:2 and III:4 (n 4). 
28 GATS Arts. II:1 and XVII:1 (n 15). 
29 GATS. 
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Members. The jurisprudence of the WTO is replete with many decisions where the 
concept of “like products” has been interpreted. Suffice it to say, the AB has 
cautioned that the concept is not to be construed uniformly for all cases; rather each 
case has its peculiarity and ought to be judged as such by the experts interpreting the 
applicable treaty. 
 
For a clear understanding of the interpretation and application of the principle of non-
discrimination under the NT and MFN, it is imperative to have at least a cursory look 
into the general concept of interpretation under the WTO jurisprudence. 
4.2 Interpretation of the Principle of Non-Discrimination under the WTO 
The general provisions covering non-discrimination standard in the WTO agreements, 
unlike what is obtained in the NT and the MFN, simply employ the name 
‘discrimination’ without any specific guidelines to assist in defining the obligation.30 
This makes the term ‘non-discrimination’ to be vague at best. 
 
Considering the treaty-based nature of all the WTO obligations, the question is, how 
do the panels and the AB interpret the provisions of this multilateral instrument? As a 
multilateral treaty, the panels and AB created under the WTO are guided by the 
general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties31 as required by the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding which 
direct all WTO tribunals to apply ‘customary rules of interpretation’ in resolving the 
provisions of WTO agreements.32  
                                                
30 Julia Ya Qin (n 20) 217. 
31 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art.31(1), May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter the Vienna Convention].  
32 Art. 3.2 DSU. See also Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) (Adopted May 20, 1996). 
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Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states: “ A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of a treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”33 The general import of the 
provisions of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is that a treaty interpreter is 
required to interpret following the enumerated stages covered by the article, good 
faith, ordinary meaning, object and purpose of the treaty. Though the ‘object’ and 
‘purpose’ can be inferred to refer to the complete treaty, this has not prevented the AB 
to question these in a particular WTO provision.34 In order to ascertain the object and 
purpose of a particular provision in a treaty, the ordinary meaning of the provision 
becomes imperative since the object and purpose of most treaties are broadly 
expressed in the preamble, making it difficult to apply such in a purposeful way.35  In 
some instances, it is clear that some WTO agreements contain multiple objectives that 
may not be directly connected to a specific provision in the agreement though where a 
WTO tribunal identify the object and purpose of a particular provision, these must be 
in conformity with at least one of the broader objects and purposes of the relevant 
WTO agreement.36 Despite the seeming problem of the way these WTO tribunals do 
this, it is still way ahead of investment tribunals take on this as exemplified in chapter 
three above. 
 
                                                
33 Article 31 VCLT (n31). See Chapter two for an in-depth analysis of the application of the Vienna 
Rules. 
34 For example the Appellate Body Report, US-Gasoline, (n 32) 17-18, 22, where the body examined 
the object and purpose of Article III:4 and the Appellate Body Report, Argentina-Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) 91, where it examined the object and 
purpose of Article XIX. 
35 Julia Ya Qin (n20) 236. 
36 Julia Ya Qin (n20) 236. 
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Thus, it can be safely concluded that the rules for the determination of similarity, 
those rules that will be used to determine ‘likeness’ and ‘less favourable treatment’, 
must follow the fundamental purposes of the WTO Agreement. Thus the definition of 
‘non-discrimination’ can be explored within the setting of the WTO using the 
‘similarly situated’ pattern. 
4.3 Investigating the Pattern of the ‘Similarly-Situated’ within the WTO 
The idea of the ‘similarly situated’ is central to the two fundamental standards of 
treatment applying the non-discrimination principle under the WTO, the NT and MFN 
obligations. The notion of ‘like products’ is used to reach a conclusion as to whether 
two or more WTO members are ‘similarly situated’ and as such should receive similar 
treatment. It follows that, under the GATT provisions of the NT and MFN, the non-
discrimination provisions requires the treatment of ‘like products’ of WTO members 
to be alike irrespective of their national origins. The jurisprudence of the WTO seem 
to be mainly concerned with ‘likeness’ in the concept of ‘like products’ obligations 
unlike the other corresponding concepts of ‘like services’ and ‘like service 
suppliers’.37  
The notion of ‘like products’, as explored in a number of GATT and WTO decisions, 
has come to define the extent of the application of GATT MFN and NT obligations.38 
The term has appeared in the text of a number of WTO agreements and as such has 
always been mandatorily interpreted by the various WTO tribunals anytime a 
Member’s measure has to do with a classification of products. This will necessarily 
                                                
37 The WTO is replete with many cases that discussed like products, correspondingly, only a few 
discussed like services, for example the Panel Report on European Communities-Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 7.322, WT/DS27/R (May 22, 1997) adopted Sept. 25, 
1997, modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS27/AB/R and the Panel Report, Canada-Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, 10.289, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R (Feb. 11, 2000) 
adopted June 19, 2000, modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R. 
38 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar.12, 2001) (adopted Apr.5, 2001) 99. 
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entails asking question about whether two products are ‘like’ and a follow up question 
as to whether the products are similarly situated. It then means that the constitution of 
‘like products’ can essentially be viewed using the ‘similarly situated’ concept. In 
asking the question about ‘similarly situated’ here, recourse most be had to the 
purpose of the comparison between the products and the policy objectives sought to 
be achieved.39 So to know whether two products are really like or are similarly 
situated, recourse must be had to the relevant provision demanding their comparison.  
 
In the Japan-Alcoholic Beverages Case, the Appellate Body provided a general 
interpretation of like products by establishing that the definition of likeness itself will 
depend on the context of the WTO provision within which it appears and is being 
interpreted. The AB, in the said Japan Alcoholic Beverages, referred to the concept of 
‘likeness’ as an accordion by stating “The concept of ‘likeness’ is a relative one that 
evokes the image of an accordion”.40 The concept might either stretches or narrow 
down depending on which of the WTO Agreements is under consideration.  
 
In making an inquiry into the concept of ‘like products’ under Article III, 
GATT/WTO tribunals have developed certain criteria that must be adhered to: 
 
1. What are the products’ property, nature and quality? 
2. Do the products have the same end users? 
3. How do consumers in a given market perceive a given product (consumers 
tastes and habits)? 
                                                
39 Julia Ya Qin (n20) 240. 
40 Japan-Alcohol. 
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4. What are the tariff classifications of the products?41 
 
With the above in mind, the definition of ‘like products’ may necessarily vary within 
the context of the WTO. For example if two WTO provisions that contain the concept 
of likeness vary in the purpose they set out to achieve, then the criteria that will help 
to determine likeness, which must definitely promote the purpose, will also differ, 
affecting the definition of likeness under such provisions. So the criteria do not apply 
at the same level and there is no obligation on a Member to prove them 
cumulatively.42 Comparing the provisions of GATT Article 1.1 MFN and GATT 
Article 111 NT, it can be seen that though the two clauses share identical purposes of 
non-discrimination and ensure equality in competitive market conditions, their policy 
goals are quite different.43 While Article III focuses on removing protection of 
domestic production through internal measures, Article I’s main aim is permitting 
protection of domestic production through tariffs, thereby having as its goal, a tidy 
administration of protection.44 These kinds of variances in policy objectives between 
the provisions in the two standards, MFN and NT, clearly allow for a narrower 
definition of ‘like products’ in Article 1.1 than in Article III.45 
 
Since GATT Article III simply prohibits any importing Member from using internal 
tax or other internal regulations to disadvantage imported products in favour of ‘like 
domestic products’, then the main point is whether the products importing Member 
                                                
41 Compiled in the Report of the Working Party adopted on 2 December 1970 on Border Tax 
Adjustments, GATT Doc. L/3464, GATT Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (18th Supp.) 97, 
101-102 (1972). The Appellate Body has quoted the list with approval in Japan-Alcohol (n40) 20 
42 Makane Mbengue (n13). 
43 Robert E. Hudec, ‘“Like Products”: The Differences in the Meaning in GATT Articles I and III’, in 
Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law 73 (Petros C. 
Mavroidis & Thomas Cottier (eds), Patrick Blatter Assoc. (ed), (University of Michigan Press 2000). 
44 Robert Hudec (n 43) 108. 
45 Robert Hudec (n 43) 112 
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has treated the imported products any ‘less favourably’ than the 
corresponding/competing domestic products. The contending arguments will swing 
between ‘like products’ and treatment ‘not less favourable’. In resolving such 
disputes, the GATT/WTO tribunals have always resorted to applying the above 
criteria.46 Recently, the tribunals seem to also consider substitutability of the products, 
arguing that any determination of likeness is majorly a determination of “the nature 
and extent of a competitive relationship” between the imported and the domestic 
products under consideration.47 
 
In defining ‘like products’, the main controversy seems to be in relation to the “aim-
and-effects” test. The aim-and-effects approach was first developed in the GATT 
Panel Report in the US-Malt Beverages48, prescribing that, the determination of ‘like 
product’ under Article III should entail a look at the basic policy objective of the 
Article as set out in Article III.1. Article III.1 states internal taxes and other regulatory 
measures: 
 
    “should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic 
production”.49 
 
In applying this approach, it will seem that any domestic tax or internal regulation that 
purportedly treats an imported product ‘less favourably’ than a corresponding 
                                                
46 Report of the Working Party (n40) 
47 EC-Asbestos (n 38). 
48 Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT Doc. DS23/R 
(March 16, 1992) (adopted June 19, 1992), B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) 206 (1993). 
49 GATT Art. III.1 
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domestic product may not likely be seen as a violation of the provisions of Article III, 
satisfying that the measure has a clear non-protectionist regulatory purpose.50 
 
However, it seems to be the majority view of many WTO tribunals’ commentators 
that the Appellate Body of the WTO had debunked the aim-and-effects approach in 
defining like products especially in the Japan-Alcohol51 and EC-Bananas52 cases.53 In 
the two cases cited, the AB has, critics argued, been excessively formalistic and 
incoherent in the treatment of fundamental issues rooted in the WTO policing of 
domestic regulatory policy.54 The AB seemed to have acceded to the critics in that its 
position was altered in subsequent cases for example in the EC-Asbestos where 
Canada challenged the French’s ban of asbestos products as a clear violation of 
Article III.4. In its well considered decision, the AB clearly explained that the term 
‘like product’ referred to in Article III.4 must be interpreted with a view to giving 
meaning and appropriate scope to the enabling principle set out in the provisions of 
Article III.1.55  
 
In an interesting twist also, the AB further consolidated its noted shift in position by 
concluding that any determination of ‘likeness’ under the provisions of Article III.4, is 
basically a finding about “the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between 
and among products”.56 So the position of the AB is now clearly defined, for ‘like 
products’ in Article III.4, the body has accepted market ‘effects’ as the main element 
                                                
50 See US-Malt Beverages (n48). 
51 Japan-Alcohol (n39), see Robert Hudec (n43) 
52 EC-Bananas (n37) 
53 There seems to be a minority opinion to the effect that the AB has not really discredited the aim-and-
effects approach if read correctly. See Donald Reagan ‘Further Thoughts on the Role of Regulatory 
Purpose under Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Tribute to Bob Hudec’, 37 
J. World Trade 737 (2003) 
54 Julia Ya Qin (n20) 245, see also Robert Hudec (n43) 375 
55 Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos (n 38) 98. 
56 Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos (n38) 99 
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in defining likeness but refused to acknowledge the importance of regulatory ‘aim’ in 
the determination of likeness.57 However, for ‘like products’ in Article III.2, first 
sentence, the AB refused to acknowledge both the market effect and the regulatory 
aim of any challenged measure by a Member as relevant to its definition.58 
 
Generally, flowing from the above GATT/WTO tribunals’ discussions, the similarly 
situated analysis can be applied using the aim-and-effects approach. Applying the 
similarly situated analysis here, it can be reasoned that the determination of likeness 
between imported and domestic products would not be successful without an 
informed reference to the purposes of the Article III provisions that require their 
comparison. The expansive and main purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism 
whenever a Member is applying internal tax and regulatory measures.59 It then 
follows that, in the determination of likeness under Article III, it is only those 
elements that are helpful in verifying the protectionist nature of a measure that should 
be applied. 
 
It is instructive to note that, applying the similarly situated evaluation to the 
interpretation of like products has pointedly revealed a significant amount of 
inconsistency in the AB’s interpretation of the provisions of GATT Article III. It has, 
on the other hand, established the advantageous position of the aim-and-effects 
principle. The aim-and-effects principle is one that has a clear policy guideline and 
ensures certainty in the application of the provisions of Article III. The principle 
                                                
57 Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos (n38) 99 
58 It is worthy of note however that the tribunal may find a violation of Article III.2, second sentence, 
without making a corresponding finding in Article III.2, first sentence, see Appellate Body Report, 
Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75, 84/AB/R (adopted Feb. 17, 1999) 118. 
 
59 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol (n.39) 16. 
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further acknowledge that the most important elements in the determination of likeness 
are clearly those that are valuable in identifying protectionism, stopping which is the 
basic function of Article III. 
4.4 Interpretation of Non-Discrimination under the Most-Favoured-Nation 
Obligation 
The Most-Favoured-Nation, MFN, is one of the foundational principles of the WTO 
law and is a key element of the three principal WTO agreements comprising of the 
GATT 1994, the GATS and TRIPS. The MFN found in the foregoing agreements is 
only amendable by the unanimous agreement of the Members.60 The principle is 
mainly found under the provisions of Article 1 of the GATT. This sub-topic will trace 
the origin, rationale, interpretation and application of the rule within the GATT/WTO 
practice.  
 
Looking beyond Article 1 of the GATT, the WTO is replete with many other non-
discrimination obligations. The application of Article 1(1) can be far reaching, 
examining issues such as the content and scope of the MFN, its relative advantages, 
the nature of its touted unconditional application and most importantly the import of 
‘like products’ in the application of non-discrimination, which is what this part will 
dwell on more. 
 
As examined in the introductory part of this chapter, the notion of like products is one 
that has been very problematic in the GATT/WTO jurisprudence. It has appeared in a 
number of provisions either as a stand alone or in relation to some other competitive 
                                                
60 WTO Agreement, Art. X (2) 
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products.61 This has definitely mean having different meanings of the term in the 
various provisions, which in turn leads to various interpretations by the WTO Panels 
and the Appellate Body. Article III can serve as a good example. It can be observed 
that the meaning of ‘like products’ in paragraph 2, which relates to internal taxes, is 
viewed as being different from its meaning in paragraph 4, which deals with internal 
regulations. It has been opined that the difference in Article III occurs because while 
Article 4 relates only to like products, the provisions of paragraph 2 relate to both like 
and directly competitive or substitutable products. If like products is used as a 
parameter, it would be assumed that, since Article I is identical to Article III (4) in 
that it also applies to like products, then the definition of like products in Article I 
would be proximate to the definition of like products contained in Article III (4). It 
has been argued that the scope of the definition of ‘like products’ under Article I (1) 
ought to differ based on whether the challenged measure is a tariff or tariff related 
measure or whether it is an internal tax or regulation.62 
 
Though both the WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have not found it worthy to 
give like products any prominence in the discussion of the provision of Article I, one 
particular type of case stands out. The case has to do with a claim of a member’s 
violation of the MFN clause by the member deliberately treating two like products 
differently for tariff purposes. 
 
In the WTO Panel’s Report, Spain-Unroasted Coffee63, Spain subjected coffee to a 
tariff though at that time coffee was not subject to a tariff. Originally, Spain had dealt 
                                                
61 See for example GATT Articles I & III (4) that refer to “like products” only while Article XIX refers 
to “like and directly competitive products”. 
62 William Davey (n3) 78. 
63 Panel Report, Spain-Unroasted Coffee. 
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with unroasted, non-decaffeinated coffee under one tariff heading and subject to one 
tariff rate. The country later changed its policy and divided coffee into five different 
tariff headings, which were subject to two different tariff rates. The first rate of seven 
percent had coffee under three headings while the second rate was duty free and had 
coffee under the other two headings. So lower tax rates were applied to the “mild” 
coffees. As a result of this classification and varied tax rates, Brazil, an exporter of 
strong coffee to Spain, objected to the new tariff regimes. It challenged the regime as 
a violation of the provisions of Article I (1). The Panel argued that organoleptic 
differences resulting from geographical factors, cultivation methods, the processing of 
beans and the genetic factor were not enough to allow for a different tariff treatment.64 
It further pointed out that coffee, in its end-use, was universally regarded as a well-
defined and single product intended for drinking and then noted that no other 
contracting party applied its tariff regime in respect of unroasted, non-decaffeinated 
coffee subject to different tariff rates.65 The Panel then concluded that unroasted, non-
decaffeinated coffee beans should be considered ‘like products’ within the meaning of 
Article I.1.66 
 
Davey argued against the findings of the panel by positing that in today’s ubiquitous 
coffee shops, to conclude that coffee is a single product is odd at best because coffee 
is often not sold as a blend and can vary significantly depending on its origin and how 
it is distributed.67 Hence, it will seem there is then the need for a better interpretative 
approach, sustainable development?  
 
                                                
64 Panel Report, Spain-Unroasted Coffee, Para. 4.6 
65 Panel Report, Spain-Unroasted Coffee, Para.4.7-4.8 
66 Panel Report, Spain-Unroasted Coffee, Para. 4.9 
67 William Davey (n3) 80 
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The viewpoint of the Coffee Panel can be distinguished with that of the SPF Lumber 
Panel.68 In the SPL Lumber, Canada was dismayed that the Japanese tariff bindings in 
GATT allowed higher tariffs on dimension lumber from certain species than from 
such other species. Canada then challenged the tariff treatment of dimension lumber 
by Japan.69 From the tariff structure in the challenged measure, it seems Canadian- 
origin dimension lumber was likely to be subjected to higher tariffs than the United 
States-origin dimension lumber. According to Canadian legal claim, all dimension 
lumber was inherently one like product and could not be treated differently for tariff 
reasons. 
 
Looking at the two cases, one realistic difference between them emerges. It is evident 
that Spain had not bound its tariff for coffee, while Japan, on the other hand, had, in 
earlier tariff negotiations, negotiated and bound those differential rates for the lumber 
under consideration. The panel’s position was to the effect that for Canada to establish 
likeness in the two products, it has to begin from the Japanese tariff classification. 
Since it is acknowledged that the concept of dimension lumber was neither in the 
Japanese tariff regime nor in any internationally accepted customs classification, as 
such, the panel, in its well-considered opinion, refused to consider Canada’s reliance 
on the concept as its justification for certifying likeness of products under the 
provisions of Article I (1).70 The panel’s view was that “tariff differentiations are 
basically a legitimate means of trade policy”.71 
 
                                                
68 Panel Report, Japan-SPF Lumber 
69 Panel Report, SPL Lumber, para.5.11 
70 Panel Report, SPL Lumber, para.5.14 
71 Panel Report, SPL Lumber, para.5.10 
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Principally, the SPF Lumber panel accepted that the GATT rules allow the use of 
tariffs to give differing levels of protection to domestic producers. This, however, is 
contingent upon the condition that the relevant contracting parties respect the 
negotiated tariff bindings. Though the Coffee and Lumber cases appear to be in 
conflict with each other, some academic commentators seem to prefer one, the 
Lumber case approach, arguing that the case recognised the right of WTO Members to 
determine the sectors they wish to protect.72 This position has support from the fact 
that the WTO is really not a free trade consensus but an agreement that acknowledge 
the likelihood of its members electing to preserve higher rates of protection in 
peculiar sectors. There are, however, commentators that prefer the Coffee case 
approach.73 
 
Another important part of the MFN that is worthy of even a brief look at is the issue 
of unconditionality. It is the requirement of Article I (1) that the advantage at issue is 
to be given to other WTO Members “unconditionally”. The panel in the early GATT 
case, Belgium-Family Allowance74 has interpreted the term ‘unconditionally’ as used 
in Article I (1). In the case, Belgium, through its law, foist an internal charge on 
foreign goods that were purchased by public bodies when those goods originate in a 
country whose system of family allowances did not meet certain peculiar needs. The 
panel stated75: 
 
                    “Belgium has granted exemption from the levy under consideration to products 
purchased by public bodies when they originate in (six countries). If the General Agreement were 
                                                
72 William Davey (n3) 84, Robert Hudec (n43) 114-116 
73 P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: Text, Cases and 
Materials, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 329-330. 
74 Panel Report, Belgium-Family Allowance 
75 Panel Report, Belgium-Family Allowance, para. 3 
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definitively in force …, it is clear that that exemption would have to be granted to all other contracting 
parties (including Denmark and Norway). The consistency or otherwise of the system of family 
allowances in force in the territory of a given contracting party with the requirements of the Belgian 
law would be irrelevant in this respect”. 
 
The Belgium-Family Allowances case has been referred to for the thesis pointing to 
the impossibility of distinguishing between products on the condition of the factors 
under which they were made.76 
 
A more modern case that has considered a broad view of the meaning/interpretation 
of the word “unconditionally” is the EC-Tariff Preferences. The WTO Panel that 
ruled on the case held77: 
 
                    “7.56 … The European Communities’ position is that ‘unconditionally’ in Article I: 1 
means that any advantage granted may not be subject to conditions requiring compensation. The Drug 
Arrangements are not conditional, according to the European Communities, because the beneficiaries 
are not required to provide any compensation to the European Communities. 
 
                      7.59 In the Panel’s view, moreover, the term ‘unconditionally’ in Article I: 1 has a 
broader meaning than simply that of not requiring compensation. While the panel acknowledges the 
European Communities’ argument that conditionality in the context of traditional MFN clauses in 
bilateral treaties may relate to conditions of trade compensation for receiving MFN treatment, the Panel 
does not consider this to be the full meaning of ‘unconditionally’ under Article I (1). Rather, the Panel 
sees no reason not to give the term its ordinary meaning under Article I (1), that is, ‘not limited by or 
subject to any conditions’. 
 
                                                
76 William Davey (n3) 88 
77 Panel Report, EEC-Beef, para. 4.3 
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                   7.60 Because the tariff preferences under the Drug Arrangements are accorded only on the 
condition that the receiving countries are experiencing a certain gravity of drug problems, these tariff 
preferences are not accorded ‘unconditionally’ to the like products originating in all other WTO 
Members, as required by Article I (1).” 
 
Though the case did go on appeal, the AB did not find it worthy to discuss the 
conclusion reached by the panel. Though two previous WTO panels have also reached 
conflicting decisions on the meaning of unconditionality, the Tariff Preferences panel 
did not also made any reference to their conclusions. In the two different cases, 
certain favoured entities had an exclusive right to import products at a lower tariff rate 
than would ordinarily be appropriate. The question then was should the tariff 
advantage given to a particular product that comes from some country also be given to 
a corresponding like product that comes from a WTO Member? Two WTO panels in 
Indonesia-Autos78 and Canada-Autos79 evidently approached the question differently.  
 
In the Indonesia-Autos, a Korean company that had a special relationship with an 
Indonesian company had its automobile exports accepted into Indonesia as duty free 
exports, while all other automobile imports were subject to a high tariff. The panel 
stated that80: 
 
                    “In the GATT/WTO, the rights of Members cannot be made dependent upon, 
conditional on or even affected by, any private contractual obligations in place. The existence of these 
conditions is inconsistent with the provisions of Article I (1), which provides that the tax and customs 
duty benefits accorded to products of one Member (here on the Korean products) be accorded to 
imported like products from other Members ‘immediately and unconditionally’ “. 
                                                
78 Panel Report, Indonesia-Autos 
79 Panel Report, Canada-Autos 
80 Panel Report, Indonesia-Autos, para. 14.145 
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The panel, after an exhaustive review and the above stated position, concluded that 
the Indonesia-Autos was an explicit violation of the MFN clause. The Canada-Autos 
case stand in contrast with the Indonesian case. In the Canada-Autos, one Swedish 
and several other US companies had the right to import automobiles duty free into 
Canada. Here, the WTO panel concluded that the MFN clause would be violated only 
if the deal certainly led to discrimination on the basis of origin.81 By way of 
interpretation, this will mean that if the companies under consideration imported 
automobiles from many different countries, then a charge against origin-based 
discrimination would not stand. To all intents and purposes, it is evident that though 
the panel did recognised that the General Motors could import automobiles duty-free 
from all parts of the world into Canada, the bulk would seem to be from the US, and 
as such a clear violation of Article 1 could be established. The Indonesia Autos could 
have reached the same conclusion if it had carried out similar investigation.82 There is 
no gainsaying the fact that the MFN remains the fundamental GATT tariff principle.  
 
The Canada-Autos was the only case that was appealed between the two cases 
reviewed above. Even then, it seems the Appellate Body did not find it worthy to 
discuss the divergence in approaches between the two Panel reports.83 Many 
commentators seem to side with the Indonesia-Autos panel.84 Davey argued that 
importing a product at a favourable tariff rate definitely means all like products 
coming from other WTO Members would definitely receive the same tariff treatment 
since “the emphasis in Article I is on equal treatment of like products, 
                                                
81 Panel Report, Indonesia-Autos, paras. 10.18-10.50 
82 William Davey, (n3) 91 
83 William Davey, (n3) 91 
84 William Davey, (n3) 91, Robert Hudec (n43) 
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unconditionally”.85 If equal tariff treatment makes it conditional on the identity of the 
importer, then the aim of both the above approaches and the provisions of the Article 
will be defeated.86 
 
This sub-head will not go into a discussion of other GATT MFN obligations such as 
the provisions of Articles XIII and XVII, GATS Article II, TRIPS Article 4 and the 
TBT and SPS Agreements. Suffice it to say there seems to be little controversy in the 
way the various panels have interpreted the provisions of Article I. This may be as a 
result of the fact that there seems to be little or no resistance to the general principle 
that discriminating between countries in trade policies issues is wrong.87 
4.5 Interpretation of Non-Discrimination under the National Treatment 
Obligation 
The National Treatment (NT) obligation basically requires that foreign goods should 
be treated in the same way with domestic goods. The import of this under the WTO 
Agreement is that WTO Members will come to an agreement on the level of 
protection to be given to domestic goods during tariff negotiations and ensure that no 
further protection will be provided secondarily. Tariff negotiations will come to 
naught without the NT rule as discriminatory measures could come into play against 
foreign goods after they must have cleared customs.  
 
                                                
85 William Davey, (n3) 92 
86 William Davey, (n3) 92, this position, however, is not unmindful of the exceptions to Article I, for 
example exceptions for certain preferential agreements and for developing countries exceptions.   
87 Except of course if the discrimination is pursuant to agreed exceptions in preferential trade plans for 
developing countries and other regional groupings.  
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The NT clause is basically contained in GATT Article III. Applying the interpretative 
expression of the language of Article 31 VCLT, the purpose of Article III of the 
GATT is clearly stated: 
 
        “Members recognised that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of 
products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in 
specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to 
afford protection to domestic production”. 
 
Though the language used in the above paragraph is non-mandatory, it is important to 
note how the non-mandatory principle contained therein has been incorporated in two 
of the three mandatory substantive paragraphs of Article III. The significance of the 
paragraph is in the way the Appellate Body held that the said paragraph informs all of 
the provisions of Article III and should be used whenever the paragraph is to be 
interpreted.88 
 
It is discernible from the content of Article III that the import of the Article is to stop 
WTO Members from neutralizing the outcome of tariff measures by taking definite 
steps that discriminate against imported goods. Surprisingly, however, it seems all the 
GATT panels and the WTO Appellate Body sees Article III as a provision governing 
fair competition between imported and domestic products. The GATT panel in the 
Italian Agricultural Machinery case in 1958 stated89: 
 
                                                
88 See Panel Report, Italian Agricultural Machinery. 
89 Panel Report, Italian Agricultural Machinery, para.11-12 
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                    “ 11. The intention of the drafters of the Agreement was clearly to treat the imported 
products in the same way as the like domestic products once they had been cleared through customs. 
Otherwise indirect protection could be given. 
                           12. Accordingly, Article III (4) covers …any laws or regulations which might 
adversely modify the conditions of competition between the domestic and imported products on the 
internal market”. 
 
The GATT panel in the US –Section 337 case also took the same position by stating 
that Article III (4) required “effective equality of opportunities for imported 
products”90, this is in respect of the measure that can be situated within its realm. The 
WTO Appellate Body seems to have towed the line of the two cases in its own 
interpretations of Article III.91 
 
Article III is central to the GATT system with Article III (2) and III (4) phrased 
similarly in some instances, this leading to occasional interpretive overlap. The 
alcoholic beverages cases are seen as the leading authorities in testing the 
interpretation and application of Article III. In these cases, the classic argument of an 
exporting country was that the way in which such beverages are taxed support 
domestic products. This would definitely not be from de jure but from de facto 
differentiation that disapproves imported products. For a violation of the WTO rules 
to occur will depend on whether the products involved, though strictly identifiable, 
are seen as adequately similar that the relevant WTO rules require them to be taxed 
alike. Article III (2), first sentence essentially raised two fundamental questions – 
whether there is a differentiation in the way two products are taxed and, secondly, 
what constitutes like products. It is the second question that is of interest here.  
                                                
90 Panel-Report, US-Section 337, para.5.11 
91 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II. 
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In Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, the claim was about a Japanese-origin beverage- 
called shochu, which was taxed at a lower rate than certain other alcoholic beverages- 
example vodka, whisky, gin and various other liqueurs, considered being of more 
interest to the complainants. Though there were said to be Japanese producers of the 
beverages of interest to the complainants, the shochu was mainly a domestic product. 
The argument canvassed by the Japanese government was that the tax difference 
indicated that shochu was a working class drink, an inexpensive type of alcoholic 
beverage, different from the higher priced beverages of interest to the complainant in 
the case. Though mainly correct, it seems, however, that some classes of shochu were 
up for sale as substitutes to, for example, vodka. 
 
Both the United States and Japan, in the case of Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, argued 
for the WTO Panel to take a completely dissimilar approach in defining like products. 
Their central argument was that the panel should just use the aims and effect test in 
the Japanese measure and decide whether it was a protectionist measure or not; if not, 
then the products ought not to be taken as ‘like products’; and if yes, then they ought 
to be taken as ‘like products’.92 Certainly, nothing in the language of Article III (2) 
supports this position. However, help can be sought from the provisions of Article III 
(1) referred to by Article III (2) since the provisions of Article III (1) surely point out 
that the purpose of Article III in general is to prevent protectionist measures.93 Japan 
argued that the tax differentiation was done for social reasons and was not 
protectionist while the United States argument was that administering such a test 
would result in the inference that the Japanese tax system breached Article III (2). 
                                                
92 Panel Report, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, paras. 4.24-4.35 
93 William Davey, (n3) 162 
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It was interesting that the WTO Panel rejected both arguments.94 The Panel’s own 
position was that nothing in the language of Article III (2) or in the term ‘like 
products’ informed the kind of examination both the United States and Japan 
suggested. It viewed the endeavor to use the aims and effects test to define ‘like 
products’ as essentially changing the GATT rules. The position under the traditional 
approach was that whenever a measure was discovered to be in violation, then the 
respondent must be ready to show that an exception was applicable. The US/Japanese 
approach was somewhat different; here the complainant need to demonstrate the 
inadmissibility of an exception in its attempt to establish the presence of protectionist 
aim or effect in defining ‘like products’ in the case in point. The panel conclusion was 
that though there was some little precedence for the US/Japan approach, superior 
reasoning tilt towards the traditional approach.  
 
In applying the traditional test, the WTO panel necessarily shadows the earlier GATT 
panel that decided on Japanese alcohol taxes and concluded that only vodka could be 
deemed a ‘like product’ to shochu.95 This followed the fact that though there was no 
physical and end user difference in the products, at least for the purposes of the 
Japanese tax law, it was impossible to filter shochu through white birch charcoal, 
which vodka was at the time. The only like products the panel found then were 
shochu and vodka.96 
 
                                                
94 Panel Report, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, paras. 6.20-6.21 
95 Panel Report, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages I, para. 5.7 
96 Panel Report, Japan-alcoholic Beverages II, para. 6.23 
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The Appellate Body looked at the framework of Article III (2) and upholds the 
panel’s conclusion by observing:97 
 
                     “No one approach to exercising judgment will be appropriate for all cases. The criteria 
in Border Tax Adjustments should be examined, but there can be no one precise and absolute definition 
of what is ‘like’. The concept of ‘likeness’ is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion. The 
accordion of ‘likeness’ stretches and squeezes in different places as different provisions of the WTO 
Agreement are applied…We believe that, in Article III: 2, first sentence of the GATT 1994, the 
accordion of ‘likeness’ is meant to be narrowly squeezed.” 
 
It can be deducted from the conclusion of the Appellate Body that, except if origin-
based discrimination is involved, only a few products will qualify for ‘like products’ 
under GATT Article III (2) first sentence. It seems the Appellate Body did not 
consider the aims and effects test in its review of the panel’s report. It however 
ratified the panel’s choice of the traditional approach.98  
 
In the Thailand-Cigarettes (Philippines) case,99 the United States and the European 
Union complained against a Philippines measure, which levied lower taxes on certain 
distilled spirits produced from sugar cane molasses than on spirits produced from 
other sources of ethyl alcohol. The panel highlighted that the final products in issue 
were basically the same.100 Its interpretation used physical characteristics of the 
finished products, their end uses, competitiveness, tariff classifications, consumer 
perceptions and the treatment of the domestic and imported spirits relevant for 
differing regulatory purposes. As the imported products were subject to taxation 
                                                
97 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, 21 
98 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, 19-23 
99 Panel Report, Philippines-Distilled Spirits, paras. 7.30-7.85 
100 Panel Report, Philippines-Distilled Spirits, paras. 7.30-7.85 
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beyond that fixed on like domestic products, then a breach of Article III (2) first 
sentence was established.  
 
Certain other tribunals have found both domestic and imported products to be like 
products for the purposes of Article III (2) first sentence. The products in the above 
cases could be differentiated based on their physical characteristics and the fact that 
some of them involved de jure discrimination based on origin. This may seem a better 
position looking at the content of Article III (2), second sentence.  
 
The Appellate Body in the Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, ruled that the second 
sentence of Article III (2) contain three elements, competitive or substitutable 
products, dissimilar taxation and protection. Here there is the need for a little further 
insight into how other tribunals have looked at the definition of like products before 
concluding the sub-head though no in-depth analysis will be provided and not all 
aspects of Article III (2), second sentence will be entertained.  
 
It has not been easy for any WTO tribunal to determine whether two products are in 
competition to the extent that they can be regarded as “directly competitive or 
substitutable” so as to satisfy the requirements of Article III (2) second sentence. In 
the Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, the panel discovered that shochu and some other 
distilled spirits of concern to the complaining parties were directly competitive or 
substitutable products. It seems the panel based its reasoning on the economic 
substitutability of the products.101 In the Korea-Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate 
Body distinctly recognised that “an approach that focused solely on the quantitative 
                                                
101 William Davey, (n3) 177 
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overlap of competition would, in essence, make cross-price elasticity the decisive 
criterion in determining whether products are ‘directly competitive or substitutable’”. 
We share the Panel’s reluctance to rely unduly on quantitative analyses of the 
competitive relationship.”102 In the Chile-Alcoholic Beverages, the panel also 
reviewed the same factors, as had the panel in the Korean case. The panel in the 
Philippines-Distilled Spirits case concluded that the like products it found were also 
directly competitive or substitutable. From these cases, it is evident that most of the 
panels were prepared to discover the presence of directly competitive or substitutable 
products based on their similarities ranging from their physical characteristics to end-
uses to marketing and even to product price elasticity.103  
 
As explained in the preceding paragraphs and also under the discussion of the MFN 
treatment, one thing is clear from the interpretation of Article III (2) by the various 
panels and Appellate Bodies – the narrow definition given to ‘like products’ therein. 
The aim of the various interpretations seems to be the restriction of the application of 
the provision, especially the second sentence, to only cases that involve origin-based, 
de jure, discrimination. If this stands, it can then be deduced that de facto 
discrimination can only be considered and interpreted under the provisions of Article 
III (2), second sentence. This is so because to succeed under this sentence, it has to be 
shown that the tax measure is put in place in order to afford protection and as such no 
‘innocent’ tax measures that may violate Article III will be allowed.  
 
To conclude this sub-heading, it is imperative to briefly look at the interpretation 
given to ‘like products’, which is the second element under Article III (4). GATT 
                                                
102 Appellate Body Report, Korea-Alcoholic Beverages, para.134 
103 Though it is evident that the Chile and Korea panels did not really rely on these factors. 
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1994 did not actually made the interpretation of (4) important like it does the 
provisions of Articles I and III (2). Evidently, before the coming of the WTO, the 
main GATT case that discussed the interpretation of like products was the EEC-
Animal Feed Proteins.104 The panel was clear in its conclusion that different products 
applied protein to animal feed and as such not qualified to be considered like products 
irrespective of their common end-use due to the variations in their protein content, 
tariff classification and physical characteristics.105 Post 1990, a panel, the US-Malt 
Beverages, concluded that low alcohol beer and high alcohol beer were not like 
products.106 After an extensive review, it concluded:107 
 
     “…In the view of the Panel, therefore, it is imperative that the like product determination in the 
context of Article III be made in such a way that it not unnecessarily infringe upon the regulatory 
authority and domestic policy options of contracting parties”. 
 
Apart from the fact that the panel used the standard criteria for defining likeness of 
products – end uses, physical characteristics and consumer perceptions in reaching its 
conclusion, it discussed the need for affording government enough regulatory 
space.108 
 
It seems the first WTO case that discussed the definition of like products in 
considerable detail was the EC-Asbestos109 case. The panel was faced with the 
questions as to the degree to which the term ‘like products’ should be interpreted in 
                                                
104 Panel Report, EEC-Animal Feed Proteins  
105 Panel Report, EEC-Animal Feed Proteins, para. 4.2 
106 Panel Report, US-Malt Beverages. 
107 Panel Report, US-Malt Beverages, para. 5.72 
108 See D. Regan, ‘Regulatory Purpose and ‘Like Products’ in Article III: 4 of the GATT (with 
Additional Remarks on Article III: 2)’, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 36 (2002), 443-478.  
109 Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, (n38). 
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the same way in both Article III (2) and (4) and if so interpreted, what would be the 
implications of such interpretation. As seen above while discussing non-
discrimination and the interpretation of like products, Article III (4) is mainly 
concerned with the treatment of like products, while Article III (2) only regulates the 
treatment of like products through its first sentence and directly competitive or 
substitutable products through its second sentence. This will necessarily mean that if 
the same definition of like products is to be applied to both Articles, it is clear that the 
extent of the applicability of the two paragraphs will be seen to be quite different. 
Since both Article III (2) and (4) seek to ensure that internal taxes or regulations are 
not used to give an unfair advantage to domestic products in line with the provisions 
of Article I, then interpreting them in a such a way to achieve different scope will be 
meaningless.110 
 
From the above, it can be discerned that quite unlike the provisions of Article III (2), 
the definition of ‘like products’ in light of Article III (4) must have an extensive reach 
than that of Article III (2). This seems to be the position reached by the Appellate 
Body in the EC-Asbestos case. Despite the heated controversy in earlier WTO 
decisions over how like products should be ascertained, it seems that the later cases 
since the EC-Asbestos have resolved this especially in light of Article III (4).111 
 
Even though the MFN clause appeared in many WTO agreements, only four did cover 
the NT obligation – TRIPS, GATS, TBT Agreement and the Plurilateral Government 
Procurement Agreement (PGPA).112 It is not the position of this chapter to give an 
exhaustive account of all of these areas, suffice it to say, the main idea is to give an 
                                                
110 William Davey (n3) 198. 
111 See for example Turkey-Rice 
112 Though it is not contentious that the Plurilateral Agreement also covers the MFN.  
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account of the varying positions of various GATT/WTO Panels and Appellate Body 
in the interpretation of these principles using the non-discrimination obligation as a 
basis. 
4.6 General Exceptions to the Non-Discrimination Obligations under WTO Law 
Arguably, the general exceptions to the non-discrimination obligations are one of the 
most fundamental distinguishing features of the multilateral trade regime. The 
provision of general exceptions in the jurisprudence of the WTO, its content and 
application is clearly not mirrored in the jurisprudence of any bilateral investment 
treaty. In chapter six, when synthesizing the contents of all the chapters, an attempt 
will be made, if need be, to recommend the need for the application of exceptions in 
investment treaties as a learning curve from trade.  
 
Looking at the MFN and NT standards discussed above, particular exceptions 
applicable there can be distinguished. MFN’s fundamental exceptions in Article 
XXIV – free trade areas and custom unions and Enabling Clause exception – for 
preferential treatment of developing countries, generally permit origin-based 
discrimination. The two applicable exceptions governing NT obligation are both 
covered under Article III – Government Procurement under Article III (8) (a) and 
Domestic Producer Subsidies – Article III (8) (a).  
 
The non-discrimination obligation is impacted upon by the general exceptions 
incorporated in the GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV, though the exceptions 
are more visible when the NT obligation is considered. GATT Article XX contains 
the most important individual exceptions. Its basic, elementary structure is made up of 
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the general introductory clause and the said chapeau, which was followed by the 
different specific exceptions.    
 
The starting point when a measure has been challenged as discriminatory is to ask if 
the said measure can be justified under the said Article XX. The way this Article 
functions has generated considerable controversy. The controversy has led to the 
question as to whether Article XX should be viewed narrowly as an exception to the 
extensive obligations covered under Article I and III or should it be viewed as a 
system that gives Governments enough regulatory/policy space to advance their 
goals? The likelihood that interpreting Article XX narrowly to prevent a breach of 
Article III was said to have strongly influenced the definition of like products using 
the protective aim and effect test. Importantly, it seems the WTO Appellate Body did 
not buy into this position.113 
 
Under the WTO, unlike under the earlier GATT cases, Governments have been given 
more discretion to adopt policy measures that help them achieve their set out goals. 
Various panels and the Appellate Body have espoused an inclusive interpretation to 
those specific exceptions in the areas of health, public morals and conservation. A 
generic interpretation of the cases showed that Governments would have the 
regulatory space to decide even where the facts rationalizing the decision are ill 
defined. The panels and WTO Appellate Body decisions also seem to approve that 
Governments can put in place the level of protection they plan for in specific 
regulatory/policy areas. From this brief discussion, it can be concluded that Article 
XX has a very expansive interpretation allowing Governments wide discretionary 
                                                
113 See the US-Shrimp case 
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power in the areas covered without any constrain from the WTO’s non-discrimination 
rules. 
4.7 Navigating the Tension between Non-Discrimination and Special and 
Differential Treatment 
From the onset of the GATT negotiations, developing States have agitated that they 
should be given special and differential treatment.114 The agitation became necessary 
then due to the position of the developing countries that the so-called exceptions 
contained in the GATT were only effectively accessed by the developed, 
industrialised countries. This demand gained currency due to the persistence of the 
developing countries and a corresponding acceptance of such need by the developed 
countries.  
 
The above concern and agitation led to the conclusion of an important agreement, the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) between the OECD countries and the 
developing countries. The main aim of the system was for developed countries to give 
tariff preferences to developing countries. Generally speaking, giving tariff 
preferences would be inconsistent with the provisions of GATT Article I; hence the 
need to agree on a system that will allow such preferences and this was allowed by the 
GATT.115 The Enabling Clause, adopted via a ministerial agreement, replaced this 
waiver allowing tariff preferences during the Tokyo Round of 1979. Apart from the 
                                                
114 J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, 628-640 
115 See ‘Decision of 25 June 1971 of the GATT Contracting Parties on the Generalised System of 
Preferences’, GATT 18th Supp. BISD, Geneva, GATT, 1974, 24. 
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developed world adopting the GSP, the WTO has embraced the waiver allowing these 
developing countries to accord preferences to the least developed countries.116 
 
The most contentious issue regarding the GSP has been its relationship with the non-
discrimination obligation. Are the GSP schemes subject to the non-discrimination 
requirements? This question becomes important because of the interest it generates as 
the main focus in the EC-Tariff Preferences case brought by India against the 
European Union’s GSP scheme.117 India claimed before the GATT Panel that the EU 
drug arrangements breached GATT Article I and that the EU could not justify its act 
by depending on the Enabling Clause since the said arrangements did not meet the 
Enabling Clause’s non-discrimination requirements. So the main issue the panel 
contented with was whether a GSP scheme under the Enabling Clause could 
discriminate between the Clause’s beneficiaries. So the main issue raised by the panel 
is the meaning of the term “non-discrimination” in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause. 
It is interesting that the panel did found in favour of India that the term “non-
discriminatory” referred to in footnote 3 to paragraph 2 (a) of the Enabling Clause 
called for undifferentiated tariff preferences under the GSP schemes to be made 
available to all developing countries without any differentiation.118 
 
                                                
116 See ‘Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries’, General Council Decision of 15 
June 1999, WTO Doc. WT/L/304 (17 June 1999), extended until 2019, WTO Doc.WT/L/759 (29 May 
2009). 
117 Panel and Appellate Body Reports, EC-Tariff Preferences. 
118 Panel Report, EC-Tariff Preferences, para. 7.161. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S 194 (GATT 1947), effectively incorporated into the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, WTO Agreement [hereinafter GATT]. General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S 194 (GATT 1947), 
effectively incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, WTO 
Agreement [hereinafter GATT]. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S 194 (GATT 1947), effectively incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, WTO Agreement [hereinafter GATT], is of course subject to the exception 
for the implementation of self-evident limitations. 
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The detailed argument between the parties and in-depth discussion and analysis by 
both the panel and the Appellate Body is not what this thesis is about. Suffice it to say 
that the Appellate Body did explain that paragraph 2 (a) permits preferential treatment 
for developing countries “in accordance with the Generalised System of Preferences”. 
The Body first centred its attention on the introductory language of the Enabling 
Clause “Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement” and 
concluded that this will necessarily operates as an exception.119 The European Union 
did countered this by arguing that since the Enabling Clause was the most 
fundamental execution of the special and differential treatment for developing 
countries that was among the main objectives of the WTO, it should not be designated 
as an exception to the primary rules.120 The charaterisation of the Enabling Clause as 
an exception did not in any way lessen the application of the Clause.121 
 
The Appellate Body did not really resolve the meaning of the term “non-
discriminatory” in the EC-Tariff Preferences.122 However, after an exhaustive review 
of the argument from both sides and applying the context of paragraph 3 (c), the aim 
of the European Union’s drug arrangements (which was the EU’s appeal of the 
panel’s finding that the EU’s drug arrangements did not comply with the non-
discrimination requirements of the Enabling Clause), the Appellate Body found that 
the EU measure failed to meet the requirements. It concluded that:123 
 
                                                
119 Appellate Body Report, EC-Tariff Preferences, para. 90 
120 William Davey (n3) 140. 
121 The Appellate Body did point out to other important WTO objectives that were made out as 
exceptions. 
122 William Davey (n3) 145 
123 Appellate Body Report, EC-Tariff References, para.187. 
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       “The term ‘non-discriminatory’ in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause requires that identical tariff 
treatment be available to all similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries. We find that the measure at issue 
fails to meet this requirement for the following reasons…” 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter gave an analytical account of the non-discrimination principle under the 
WTO both textually and from the Panel and Appellate Body decisions. In trying to 
understand the relative coherence in the jurisprudence of the multilateral regime of the 
WTO based on some of the decisions reviewed, the chapter analysed the elements of 
the non-discrimination principle, its application and the exceptions. These exceptions, 
which are clearly absent in the investment context, help in the definition of the 
standards of treatment and the preference given to developing countries. This is not 
oblivious of the criticism of the WTO exceptions as being contrary to the rule of law. 
In investment law, it seems only a positivist interpretation (for example an investor 
given FET) stuck and no any other leeway but to protect the right of the investor. It 
remains to be seen whether, after the synthesis/analysis in chapter six, it is possible 
for international law to have consistent/coherent standards, and these should be 
uniform though not higher standards, for both trade and investment regimes. This will 
be interesting in view of the new BITs agreed or under discussion, the newly signed 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the evident re-negotiation of NAFTA, Brexit and the 
possible Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).  
 
Chapter five will be devoted to looking at the areas of convergence between trade and 
investment by looking at the possibility of integrating the WTO exceptions, by way of 
learning from the trade regime, into the international investment law’s principle of 
non-discrimination. The chapter will draw principally from the possibility of 
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convergence of legal regimes by using the principle of legal convergence and the 
Vienna Convention as analytical tools. Other areas or justifications for convergence 
that the chapter will enumerate include the effect of lack of in-depth legal reasoning in 
arbitral awards, movement between actors, shared history between trade and 
investment and newly emerging treaties that are coalescing towards convergence. 
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Chapter Five 
Conceptual Framework: Sustainable Development as a Convergence 
Factor for International Economic Law 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter introduces sustainable development as a legal concept. International 
economic law is used in this chapter to mainly denote the fields of trade and 
investment. The main idea is to see whether the WTO and investment treaty tribunals 
can use it as an intellectual lens to interpret the non-discrimination standard in both 
regimes of international trade and international investment law with a view to having 
a uniform and harmonious interpretation in these contending fields of international 
economic law. The concept of sustainability was originally developed in the context 
of international environmental law. The term ‘sustainable development’ is broadly 
understood from the Brundtland Report to mean ‘development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their 
own needs’.1 Pointing to the basis on which the concept of sustainable development 
rests – economic development, social wellbeing and social development, and 
environmental protection, provided much clearer definition.2 The International Law 
Commission (ILC), in its 2002 New Delhi Declaration, alluded to the broader terms 
covered by the concept of sustainable development. The New Delhi Declaration, 
                                                
  
1 Gro H. Brundtland et al., ‘Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our 
Common Future’ (4 August 1987) UN Doc A/42/427/ Annex available at: http://www.un-
documents.net/our-common-future.pdf [1]. 
2 Marie-Claire C Cordonier Segger and A Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law (OUP 2004) 1,also 
see UN Conference on the Human Environment, ‘Declaration on the Human Environment’ 
(Stockholm, 16 June 1972) UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1. 
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referring to the broader terms covered by sustainable development, provides that the 
concept: 
 
involves a comprehensive and integrated approach to economic, social and political processes, which 
aims at the sustainable use of natural resources of the Earth and the protection of the environment on 
nature and human life as well as social and economic development depend, and which seeks to realize 
the right of all human beings to an adequate living standard on the basis of their active, free and 
meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom, 
with due regard to the needs and interests of future generations.3   
 
The chapter will first trace the evolution of the concept under international law. 
Secondly, it will examine the legal nature and scope of the concept before providing a 
brief analysis as to how it is applied. Thirdly, an analysis of the application of the 
concept by international courts and tribunals will be undertaken. Flowing from the 
theme of the discussion, the central argument that will finally be focused on is that 
sustainable development can serve as a suitable interpretative tool that can aid 
international courts and tribunals to harmoniously analyse trade and investment 
agreements in a sustainable way for a possible future convergence of the regimes of 
international trade and investment. 
5.1 Overview of the Concept of Sustainable Development  
Historically, the concept of sustainable development is traced back to the forestry law 
in Central Europe. This earlier historical mention did not use the term ‘Sustainable 
Development’. The present concept is traceable to the 1972 United Nations 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment.4 Though the declaration did not 
                                                
3 ILA, ‘Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development’ (New 
Delhi 2002) in (2002) 2 Intl Envtl Agreements: Pol, L & Econ 211, 2122. 
4 (n.2). 
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tackle the issue of ‘sustainable development’ directly, such can be inferred from the 
wording of Paragraph two in which State governments agreed that ‘the protection and 
improvement of the human environment is a major issue which affects the well-being 
of people and economic development throughout the world’.5 The Declaration 
contains 26 Principles, of which Principle 21 connotes the right of every State to 
sovereignty over its natural resources and a corresponding duty to ensure that 
activities within its jurisdiction do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or areas outside its jurisdiction.6 The principle only relates to trans-boundary 
effects of States’ activities and not in any way to States’ management of their natural 
resources.7 Such management is addressed under other principles.8  
 
Principle 10 could also be seen as significant in that it establishes that price stability 
and positive returns for raw materials are issues of great importance to developing 
countries. Therefore, the declaration demanded that a State’s environmental policy 
should be geared towards enhancing, not diminishing, the development potential of 
developing countries.9 The Declaration that stemmed from the 1972 Conference led to 
the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).10  
 
However, sustainable development first became manifest in the 1980s, especially in 
the report of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and World 
                                                
5 Stockholm Declaration (n.2). 
6 (n.2), Principle 21. 
7 Stockholm Declaration (n.2), 
8 Especially Principles 2-5 and 13 and 14. See also Schrijver. N.J., Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, Cambridge University Press, (1997), 122-128 for a 
detailed discussion. Further, Principles 6-12 comprehensively addressed the relationship between 
development and the environment. 
9 (n2) 45. 
10 It is now a subsidiary organ of the United Nations General Assembly – See UN doc. GA res. 2997 
(XXVII), (15TH December 1972). 
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Conservation Strategy.11  Sometime in 1982, the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) adopted the World Charter for Nature.12 The Charter’s main concern is the 
conservation and better management of living natural resources.13 Though the early 
texts examined above clearly formulate the fundamental ingredients of the concept of 
sustainable development, it was the Brundtland Commission Report that first, not 
only defined, but also provided the political acceptance of the concept of sustainable 
development.14  
 
In 1983 the UNGA established the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED)15 with the following mandates16:  
 
a) to propose long-term strategies to achieve sustainable development in the 
year 2000. 
b) to recommend ways in which greater co-operation could be achieved 
between developing countries themselves and between developing 
countries and developed countries. 
 
In 1992 the Rio Conference on Environment and Development was convened17 “to 
promote the further development of international environmental law, taking into 
                                                
11 See Markus Gehring & Andrew Newcombe, ‘Introductory Notes - Sustainable Development in 
World Investment Law’, in Sustainable Development in World Investment Law, Segger, Gehring and 
Newcombe (eds), Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands, (2011) 7. 
12 UN Doc. A/RES/37/7, (28TH October 1982). 
13 (n2) 46. 
14 (n2) 47. 
15 (n1), The Commission became known as the Brundtland Commission. 
16 The mandate objective is to lead to “the achievement of common and mutually supportive objectives 
which take account of the interrelationship between people, resources, environment and development”, 
ibid, as quoted in (n2) 64. 
17 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (1992). 
This conference came on the heels of the UNGA accepting the Brundtland Report and the need to hold 
another conference specifically on Environment and Development after the Stockholm Conference. It 
 168 
account the Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment 
(UNCHE), as well as the special needs and concerns of the developing Countries.”18 
 
The Rio Conference led to the conclusion of two multilateral treaties: the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)19 and the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD)20. Among the most important outcomes of the 
conference were the non-binding declarations, chief among them, the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development.21 It consists of 27 principles and Agenda 21, 
which is the programme of action for the twenty-first century. While Principle 27, 
which is the final principle, calls for “the further development of international law in 
the field of sustainable development”, Agenda 21 specifically calls for “a balanced 
and comprehensive development of international law in the field of sustainable 
development, giving special attention to the delicate balance between environmental 
and development concerns.”22 Pursuant to Agenda 21, UNGA requested ECOSOC to 
set up the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) with the mandate 
to monitor the progress made in the implementation of Agenda 21, discuss national 
reports on the implementation of the Agenda, assess the availability of funds, 
possibility of the transfer of environment-friendly technology to developing countries 
and finally make recommendations for new forms of co-operation aimed at 
                                                                                                                                      
is worthy to note that in between these two conferences, many other smaller but no less important 
developments in the area of sustainable development took place. In the expended chapter, these other 
developments would be dealt with in some detail. 176 UN member states and 50 intergovernmental 
organizations participated in the conference. 
18 1992 Rio Declaration. 
19 Popularly known as the Climate Change Convention, New York, 9th May 1992, entered into force 
on (21st March 1994). 
20 The Biodiversity Convention, Rio de Janeiro, 5th June 1992, entered into force on (29th December 
1993). 
21 (n17). 
22 (n17), other principles include those of sovereignty over natural resources, precautionary principle, 
equity between generations etc.  
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sustainable development.23 Unlike the Stockholm Declaration, the Rio Declaration 
was basically concerned with the reduction of poverty and the provision of 
development needs. 
 
Immediately after the Rio Conference, treaties such as the Anti-Desertification 
Convention24, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)25, the Energy 
Charter Treaty26 and most importantly the Kyoto Protocol27 to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change were all concluded. These conventions highlight 
environmental protection as a key in poverty eradication and sustainable 
development. While the Desertification Convention confirms the threat posed to 
trade, investment and socio-economic development by desertification28, the NAFTA 
explicitly states, among others, that State Parties shall not relax their environmental 
and labour standards in order to attract foreign investment29. It also provides that 
except in rare circumstances, normal regulatory measures to protect the environment 
shall not be deemed as expropriation30. In the same vein, the Energy Charter Treaty 
allows member States to adopt or enforce any “measure necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health”31. It also enjoins them to strive to take precautionary 
measures to prevent or minimize environmental degradation, and to “take account of 
environmental considerations throughout the formulation and implementation of their 
                                                
23 See Buitenen A, ‘The Commission on Sustainable Development: the Outcome of UNCED?’, (1994), 
7 LJIL, 89. 
24 The United Nations Convention, Paris, (14th October 1994), entered into force on (26th December 
1996). 
25 NAFTA (1992). 
26 The Energy Charter Treaty (1994). 
27 The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC, 
Kyoto, 11th December 1997, entered into force on 16th February 2005, UN doc. FCCC/CP/L.7/Add.1, 
10th December 1997, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
28 Segger and French, ‘Governing Investment in Sustainable Development: Investment Mechanisms in 
Sustainable Development Treaties and Voluntary Instruments’, in (n11) 645 and 660-663. 
29 NAFTA Art.1114 (2) 
30 Art.1114 (1) 
31 ECT Art.24 
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energy policies”32. The Kyoto Protocol imposes not only duties on member States to 
cut emission but also enjoin them under the Clean Development Mechanism, to make 
funds available for investment in renewable energy and other projects that would 
reduce emissions in developing countries33.   
 
The concept of sustainable development reached its zenith at the Johannesburg World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD).34 UNGA charged the Summit with the 
responsibility “to reinvigorate the global commitment to sustainable development”.35 
The main focus of the summit was reviewing the extent of compliance with already 
agreed policy and the integration between environmental, economic and socio-
development policies.36 At the end of the summit, two policy documents were 
adopted. The first was a political document, the Johannesburg Declaration on 
Sustainable Development re-affirming our collective responsibility for a good living 
environment and the overall welfare of the inhabitants of this plane, now and in the 
future.37 The second was an international action programme, the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation as regards the reduction of poverty, changing unsustainable 
consumption patterns etc. and the implementation of an institutional framework for 
sustainable development.38  
 
                                                
32 Art.19 
33 (n28), 676-679. 
34 WSSD, UN doc. A/RES/55/199, (20th December 2000). The Summit took place between August-
September 2002. Other important events that took place before the Johannesburg Summit include, 
among others, the Right to Development, the World Trade Organisation, and the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration of the WTO, the UN Millennium Development Goals etc. 
35 WSSD, UN. Doc. 
36 (n.2) 94. The Summit’s main focus from these perspectives was water and sanitation, energy, health 
care, agriculture and bio-diversity. 
37 WSSD (n34) 1. 
38 (n28). 
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The above overview sums-up the development of sustainable development from 
inception to the Johannesburg Declaration. The overview summarily provided a 
description of what the early development of the concept entailed and the different 
phases the concept has passed through. However, as Schrijver observed, even the 
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development did not, with any particularity, 
refer to the role of law in the promotion of the concept of sustainable development.39 
This was a manifest shortcoming, which this chapter will address in the following 
sub-headings. The Declaration barely referred to the role of international law in 
sustainable development, briefly touching on the principles of international 
environmental law, human rights, the law of treaties, etc. 
5.2 The Legal Basis of Sustainable Development 
This will clearly develop the scope of writing an informed view of the existing 
conflict as to the legal nature and scope of sustainable development. A lot of 
arguments exist today as to whether sustainable development has acquired the legal 
status that is necessary for it to be applied in treaty obligations and interpretations. Its 
fluid nature and scope have informed these arguments. Commentators have talked to 
the extent of belaboring the issue. Arguments ranged from its status as a legal norm to 
its scope and applicability under treaty law. 
 
However, integrating ‘sustainable development’ concerns into IIAs to the extent of its 
application, as an analytical/interpretative tool requires an in-depth look at its legal 
status. Different commentators have far reaching and varying opinions regarding its 
legal nature/status, with some asserting that it has attained a customary international 
                                                
39 (n2) 96. 
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law status.40 According to Virally, for any proposition to have legal breadth, it must 
be framed ‘with the intention to modify…elements of the existing legal order, 
or…that its implementation effectively achieves this result’.41 Applying Virally’s 
argument, it can then be concluded that sustainable development as a 
notion/proposition, is evidently legal in scope because the entire Rio Declaration is 
framed in the context of rights and obligations that are expressed in a rigid and 
binding manner.42 Not only in the Rio Declaration, sustainable development as a 
proposition is also formulated in several binding and non-binding 
documents/instruments with a view that the formulation will give rise to a legal 
outcome.43 However, it has been argued that mere legal span of such a proposition is 
far from being enough to qualify it as law.44 For it to have a legal status, such 
proposition must have been accepted as a binding one that can lead to a valid rule of 
law, which necessarily must come from one of Article 38(1) ICJ Statute’s 
acknowledged sources of international law namely conventions, customs and general 
principles of law. In answer to their permeating into the known sources of 
international law and even beyond into international treaties, sustainable development 
propositions are available in more than 300 conventions and 112 multilateral treaties, 
out of which 30 are intended for universal participation.45 Though there is still a loud 
                                                
40 On this point, see generally P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd edn, CUP 
2003) 254, Virginie Barral, ‘Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of 
an Evolutive Legal Norm’ (2012), Vol. 23 (No.2) EJIL 377 at 383, Katharina Berner, ‘Reconciling 
Investment Protection and Sustainable Development, A Plea for an Interpretative U-Turn’, in Steffen 
Hindelang and Markus Krajewski (eds), Shifting Paradigms in International Investment Law: More 
Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly Diversified (OUP 2016). See infra for a discussion of its 
customary nature/status.  
41 Virally (tr), ‘Le role des “principes” dans le development du droit international’, in Faculte de droit 
de I’Universite de Geneve, Institut universitaire des hautes etudes internationals. Recueil d’etudes de 
droit international en hommage a Paul Guggenheim (1968), 531, 535, (n.40). 
42 Rio Declaration (n17), see also Barral, (n.40). 
43 For example the notion is expressed in a lot of resolutions of international organisations, 
programmes of action, Declaration of States etc. 
44 Virginie Barral, (n40) 383. 
45 Virginie Barral, (n40) 384, full data from the survey reaching that conclusion set on file with the 
author. 
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cry out there by critics, this data is proof of the agreement among members of the 
international community on the relevance of sustainable development in the field of 
international law. A further contending argument by critics is the location of 
sustainable development within the body of the treaty itself, arguing that it mostly is 
confined to the preamble, which is a non-binding position within the treaty. This is, 
however, countered by the fact that at least 207 of the treaties that invoke sustainable 
development located it within the body/part of the treaty, making it an idea the parties 
to the treaty acknowledge as binding.46 So the notion of sustainable development is 
alluded to, as an objective that treaty/contracting parties ought to undertake to 
achieve, and the effective ways to follow in order to achieve the propositions 
contained therein. 
 
Agreed, despite its penetration into treaty law, and unlike such non-binding soft law 
instruments like the Rio Declaration referred to above, the expression of the terms of 
sustainable development are quite pliable. They are sometimes set out in a language 
that is inexact and loose and as Barral pointed, ‘the provisions are often closer to 
setting out an incentive than purporting to be strictly constraining’.47 This softness in 
which the sustainable development provisions are cast in the treaty led to further 
criticism that its provisions are ineffective to produce well-founded rules of 
international law.48 However, as the new vision of sustainable development continues 
to take track, this is no more tenable as the new Morocco-Nigeria BIT49 shows by 
having obligatory provisions on sustainable development based on the modern 
evolutionary trend in international law. In addition, the criticism will also not succeed 
                                                
46 Virginie Barral, (n40) 384, detailed empirical data are set on file with the author.  
47 Virginie Barral. 
48 For example see Baxter, International Law “In Her Infinite Variety”’, 29 ICLQ (1980) 549, 554. 
49 Preamble, Arts. 1(3), 24(1) Morocco-Nigeria BIT (December 2016). 
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on another front for, as Weil argued, ‘the unpredictable or unconstraining nature of 
certain provisions inserted in treaties has nothing to do with their legal character’.50 
However, the way some treaty provisions traditionally set out motivation for an action 
whereby the treaty ask the parties to ‘strive to, or ‘promote’, are nothing but hortatory 
expressions rather than legally binding provisions/rules that are grounded standards of 
international law.51 As such, it is then evident from this analysis that reason of 
softness alone is way out insufficient to stop sustainable development provisions from 
attaining their valid status of being norms of international law.52 
However, it is trite under international law generally or treaty law in particular that 
the resultant effect of any treaty is, fundamentally, binding only between the parties to 
that treaty in question. So for us to find out whether sustainable development idea 
benefit from general normative reach, then it must be evidenced in customary 
international law. 
5.3 Sustainable Development as Customary International Law 
There is the need here to briefly explore how can international custom be identified. 
Any discussion or examination of customary international law necessarily goes back 
to the provisions of Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the ICJ. The Court states under 
Article 3853: 
(1) The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it, shall apply: 
(b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law 
                                                
50 Weil, ‘Observations de M. Prosper Weil Weil’, Annexe: Observations des membres de la 
Commission sur le rapport proviso ire. 60-1 AIDI (1983) 366, 370, as quoted in Barral (tr) (n40). 
51 For example the way many provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty are presented just as 
compromise formulae. See Cameron, Chapter One. 
52 If anything, Barral argued, this would only increase the margin of appreciation of the contracting 
parties when they execute their treaty obligations. 
53 Article 38 ICJ Statute, available online www.icj-cij.org/en/statute. 
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The Court, in accepting custom as a formal source of international law that merits its 
application, must be evidenced by general practice that is accepted as law. From the 
definition, two fundamental elements depicting the presence of a custom can be 
gleaned, one objective or material element and the other one subjective or 
psychological element. The objective or material element is referred to as State 
practice while the subjective or psychological element is referred to as opinio juris 
sive necessitates (acceptance as law).54 Though customary international law has been 
described as ‘the generalization of the practice of States’55, which is largely true, 
however the grounds for making such generalization necessarily require an 
assessment of ‘whether the practice is fit to be accepted, and is in truth generally 
accepted as law’.56  
There is the need to go back to some expert views from the past up to the ILC 2016 
draft conclusions on identification of customary international law for a little insight 
into these elements that help in the identification of international custom. As to what 
constitute State practice, there has not been a unanimous agreement. For example 
some publicists argued that only physical acts could be considered as dependable 
sources of State practice as mere statements and even claims by these States are not 
constant.57 This position did not seem to have much support from the beginning as the 
counter narrative was the difficulty of making a distinction between the action of a 
State and its pronouncements.58 Today, the majority view favours the fact that State 
                                                
54 See generally, James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn. OUP 
2012)  23-28 
55 Fisheries (UK v Norway), ICJ Reports 1951, 116, 191 (Per Judge Read). 
56 James Crawford (n54) 23. 
57 Anthony D’Amato, ‘The Concept of Custom in International Law’, (1971) Ithaka, 88. 
58 Michael Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’, (1974-75) British Yearbook of 
International Law, 3. 
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practice is regarded as any public act coming from a competent State organ or any act 
that can be ascribed to it.59 
Opinio juris, on the other hand, is not only an essential element of custom but it is the 
element that ‘precisely separates the wheat from the chaff’.60  The kind of 
requirements needed to establish opinio juris, just like in State practice, has been at 
best controversial.61 Why should States be compelled to legally follow a particular 
act? To some experts, the answer lays in consent, custom seen as similar to a treaty 
being an implicit, casual demonstration of States’ will62 while others see States as 
being bound by the custom because they function under the sense of a legal obligation 
to so act.63  
Assuming there is even some form of unanimity on the meaning of State practice and 
opinio juris, the question as to the proportion of the constituting elements will 
linger.64 One criticism seems to come from the traditional approach that hold that 
opinio juris must always go with a very comprehensive and practically uniform State 
practice.65 
                                                
59 See the International Law Association London Conference’ Final Report of the Committee on 
Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statements Applicable to the Formation of 
General Customary International Law (2000) 14. The Permanent Court of International Justice PCIJ, in 
the Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), PCIJ, Series A, No.10, 28, held that omissions by States can also be 
held as State practice where the omission is clearly from a conscious duty to refrain from an act.  
60 Tamás Hoffman, ‘Dr. Opinio Juris and Mr. State Practice: The Strange Case of Customary 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 47 Annales U. Sci. Budapestinensis Rolando Eotvos 
Nominates 373, 375. 
61 Tamás Hoffman. 
62 Gregori Danilenko, ‘The Theory of Customary International Law, German Yearbook of International 
Law’ (1989) 31, 9 as quoted in Tamás Hoffman 
63 Olufemi Elias, ‘The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary International Law’, (1995) 44 
ICLQ 501. 
64 Tamás Hoffman, 376. 
65 Though this segment is not really an extensive discussion of the theories behind the development of 
Opinio Juris and State practice, it important to note here that two scholars disagreed with the 
traditional approach. Kelsen was of the view that State practice was the only element required in the 
formation of custom while Bin Cheng posited a similar single element theory holding Opinio Juris as 
the only evidence required because State practice does not possess any normative relevance in the 
establishment of custom.   
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As a response to the appearance of new areas of international law and the 
fragmentation manifest in the field, a modern approach to the development of custom 
under international law was revealed.66 Those in support of this modern approach 
refer to the ICJ’ judgment in the Nicaragua’s case and concluded that a firm 
appearance of Opinio Juris will be able to replace the unavailability of State practice 
and vive versa.67 Although it is not the place for this thesis to delve into the counter 
arguments against both the traditional and modern concepts as propounded by 
Koskenniemi, it will not be out of place to briefly state the criticism. Koskenniemi 
argued that international law is either apologetic or utopian, meaning that it only 
recounts what States really do and strive to rationalize these acts retroactively or it 
attempts to foist a capricious set of moral rules fully distinct from reality.68 Since 
international legal arguments generally shy away from either of these extremes, they 
definitely swing between Apology and Utopia, effectively leading to uncertainty of 
the content of legal norms.69 
It is impossible to conclude this segment of the discussion without reference to the 
2016 ILC’s draft conclusions on identification of customary international law.70 The 
ILC posit that for the determination of ‘the existence and content of a rule of 
customary international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general 
practice that is accepted as law (Opinio Juris)’.71 The Commission pointed out that 
any assessment of the evidence for the presence of general practice that is accepted, as 
law, must take cognizance of the context and circumstances in which the evidence 
                                                
66 The emergence of new branches of international like environmental law, natural resources law and 
human rights informed this development. 
67 Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, jus cogens and 
general principles. Australian Year Book of International Law, Vol. 12, 1989-1990, 82. 
68 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Oxford 1989). 
69 Tamás Hoffman (n 60) 377. 
70 Chapter V, 2016 ILC Report on the work of the sixty-eight session.  
71 ILC 2016, Conclusion 2. 
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occurred.72 According to the ILC, the constituent elements must also be established 
independent of each other.73 The requirement of general practice, being a constituent 
element of customary international law, posit that it is mainly the practice of States 
that play a part in the ‘formation, or expression, of the rules of customary 
international law’. 74 The above briefly sum-up the development, distinction and 
general application of State practice and Opinio Juris. In the following paragraphs, 
attempt will be made to show how sustainable development, as argued by some 
scholars and seen in some decisions, is achieving the status of customary international 
law.  
Arguably, some commentators strongly assert that the notion of sustainable 
development has attained the status of customary international law evidenced by 
Opinio Juris and State practice.75 However, Lowe’s argument on this front was to the 
effect that the creation of the concept of sustainable development varies significantly 
from the way customary international law comes into existence.76 He opined that 
‘unlike rules of customary international law, the concept is not created by the 
traditional combination of ‘State practice + Opinio Juris’ or some variation thereon; it 
is essentially a judicial rule, created by judges and under their control. The judges are, 
of course, free to draw upon the practice of states (and indeed upon any other 
articulations of the concept): but they are not bound to do so, and they are not 
confined by it’. On the other hand, moreover, others maintained that no sufficient 
evidence exist to support this view, pointing out that the ICJ’s majority judgment’s 
                                                
72 ILC 2016 Conclusion 3. 
73 ILC 2016  
74 ILC 2016, Conclusion 4, Requirement of practice. In some instances, the practice of international 
organisations also aid the formation or expression of the rules of international customary law while the 
conducts of other actors may not. 
75 P. Sands, (n40). 
76 Vaughan Lowe, ‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’ in Alan Boyle and David 
Freestone (eds), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future 
Challenges (OUP 1999). 
 179 
pronouncement on the Gabčìkovo-Nagymaros Project, though made reference to the 
notion’s legal status, failed to settle or subscribe to its customary international law 
status.77  
 
How do we get out a convincing answer to these contending arguments? Attention 
must be directed to judicial pronouncements in case law for support because that is 
where some legal certainty and guarantee are found.78 International lawyers seem to 
defer to judicial decisions because of the fact that judges’ pronouncements spread out 
past the parties to the case, especially on any pronouncement regarding customary 
international law, the existence of which is quite difficult to prove.79 In fact, it is this 
onerous responsibility they shoulder and the authority with which their 
pronouncements are held that makes international judges to be quite measured and 
reluctant, especially in acknowledging the existence of customary international law.80 
Evidently, international judges seem to have carried this exercise to the recognition of 
sustainable development’s potentially customary nature, thereby ensuring that their 
decisions remain acceptable to States.81 A look at some judicial decisions and arbitral 
awards will reveal how judges and arbitrators navigated the murky waters of 
establishing and or recognizing the legal and customary nature of sustainable 
development. 
                                                
77 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) [1997] I.C.J. Rep.7, 37, (Sept 25 1997), see 
the application of the case below under the heading - Judicial Decisions/Arbitral Awards. See 
Katharina Berner, (n40) 182, Fitzmaurice, International Protection of the Environment, 293, Recueil 
des Cours (2001) 9, 52; ILA, Vaughan Lowe, (n 54).  
78 Gabčìko-Nagymaros, both the majority and Weeramantary’s dissenting views are important here for 
contrast.  
79 Virginie Barral, (n40) 386. 
80 Virginie Barral. 
81 Virginie Barral. 
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5.4 Recognition of the Concept of Sustainable Development - Judicial 
Decisions/Arbitral Awards 
Sustainable development as a concept has found judicial blessing by being invoked in 
the decisions of some important world judicial bodies. This assertion appear too 
simplistic due to the fierce objection by various academic commentaries as to its 
customary nature.82 As expressed above, while some see sufficient evidence of Opinio 
Juris and State practice to ground it as a customary rule even one that is theoretical 
and general, requiring tangible evidence from judicial decisions83, others completely 
steer away from the question by drawing attention to the fact that its applicability is 
found elsewhere than in its legal nature.84  
 
The International Court of Justice, in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros85 case, which 
remains the first point of judicial reference to the recognition of sustainable 
development independently of its inclusion in any treaty, made direct reference to it in 
its lengthy judgment: 
 
 “… Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for mankind 
– for present and future generations – of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered 
and unabated pace, new norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great 
number of instruments during the last two decades. Such norms have to be taken into 
consideration, and such new standards given proper weight, not only when States 
contemplate new activities but also when continuing with activities begun in the past. This 
                                                
82 Generally see (n40). 
83 Virginie Barral (n40) 385. 
84 Virginie Barral, Fitzmaurice, (n55) 60 and Vaughan Lowe, (n54). 
85 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros .See also the separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry in the same case 
wherein he argued that sustainable development is not only a concept but also a principle of 
international law that has a normative value. Further see Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) 
[1974], I.C.J, 253, 341-344 (Dec 20); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia) [1999], I.C.J. Rep 
1045, 1087-1088 (9 Dec 13); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) [2007], I.C.J. 
Rep 135, 180.  
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need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly 
expressed in the concept of sustainable development…”86 
 
The above majority decision of the ICJ not only invoked the concept but also 
established the need for States to always integrate their development needs with 
concern for the environment and as such indirectly gave its judicial blessing to the 
integration principle of sustainable development. It was this same paragraph that 
commentators used to attack the concept’s legal status. Varying arguments were made 
that though the court did touch on the notion, it seems to have deliberately ‘refrained 
from resolving this issue and did not acknowledge its customary international law 
status in the end.87 
However, the separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry in the same case has been 
celebrated as giving the concept the necessary legal interpretation/backing it needed.88 
He argued that the sustainable development principle is a necessary component of 
modern international law not only as a result of its objective necessity but also by 
reason of its broad and established recognition by the global community, not only 
developing countries.89 Alluding to its customary character, he was clear that the 
support of the international community ‘does not of course mean that each and every 
member of the community of nations has given its express and specific support to the 
principle – nor is this a requirement for the establishment of a principle of customary 
international law’.90 
In relation to its application, Weeramantry addressed the contending problems of the 
scheme that led to the dispute between Slovakia and Hungary, arguing that an 
                                                
86 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, 140. 
87 Katharina Berner, (n40) 183. 
88 See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, separate opinion of Vice-President Christopher Gregory Weeramantry, 
(n55) 85. 
89 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, 92. 
90 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, Weeramantry. 
 182 
international law principle was needed to resolve such competing concerns.91 He 
concluded that sustainable development is such a principle and is one that forms an 
integral part of international law. In fact, it was Weeramantry’s argument that to 
maintain that such a principle is absent in law is to hold that the current state of the 
law is one that allows placing two contending principles side by side without 
providing a corresponding principle that can reconcile them; he posited that 
sustainable development is a principle of reconciliation.92 
 
Furthermore, the ICJ, in the Pulp Mills93 case, while recalling its findings in the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case94, made important comments on the legal implications of 
sustainable development. This time around, the court moved a step further to establish 
that the object of Article 27 of the Statute of the River Uruguay95 was ‘consistent with 
the objective of sustainable development’, and though this did not confer a customary 
law status to sustainable development, it clearly moved it from being merely just a 
concept to an objective.  
Maybe not surprisingly, it was at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague 
that the tribunal in the Iron Rhine case made the brazen move to confer a customary 
status on sustainable development. The Iron Rhine Railway tribunal (Belgium v. 
Netherlands)96 Award, while giving its opinion on the issue of balancing 
environmental and development concerns, argued that where development may cause 
harm, then there is a duty either to prevent completely or mitigate such harm and held 
                                                
91 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, Weeramantry, 86. 
92 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, Weeraantry, 87.  
93 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, ICJ, Judgment, 20 April 2010, available at: 
www.icj-icj.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf. 
94 Pulp Mills, para.76. 
95 The Statute of the River Uruguay was what Argentine claimed Uruguay has breached.  
96 Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Railway Case (Belgium v. Netherlands), Perm.Ct.Arb. Rep.1, 28-29, 49 
(2005). 
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that integration is now an accepted principle of international law.97 With the 
invocation of paragraph 140 of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, the tribunal pass on a 
forceful opinion that ‘sustainable development and integration of environmental 
measures in economic development projects are two facets of the same coin, which 
would suggest that, on this occasion, the arbitral tribunal did indeed accept the 
customary nature of sustainable development.98 The Tribunal further reviewed and 
linked its findings to the position of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the 
Environment, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and 
recalled, citing with approval, the ICJ’s observation in the Gabčìkovo-Nagymaros 
case on the need to always reconcile economic development objectives and 
environmental protection99. 
 
It seems that despite the fact that it is difficult for any single regime to innovate and 
adapt to the challenges posed by the broad application of sustainable development 
concerns, the WTO seem to be making giant strides. The fact that the Doha Round 
was stalled, this has not stopped the Dispute Settlement Board from making 
significant progress in both procedural and substantive matters through the 
sustainable development interpretation of the WTO Rules.100 The 1994 WTO 
Agreement has, in its Preamble, incorporated the sustainable development 
principle.101 Whilst preambles are not recognised as legally binding provisions like 
the substantive parts of the treaty, nevertheless they are certainly seen to contribute to 
                                                
97 Iron Rhine, para.59. 
98 Virginie Barral (n40) 387. 
99 Iron Rhine. 
100 Markus Gehring and Alexandre Genest, ‘Dispute on Sustainable Development in the WTO Regime’ 
in Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and C.G.Weeramantry, Sustainable Development Principles in the 
Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals (1992-2012), Routledge Research in International 
Environmental Law (2017) 357. 
101 The WTO Agreement (n5). 
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the interpretation of treaties. At least under the provisions of international law, a 
treaty’s preamble is recognised as part of the context in which that treaty is to be 
interpreted and it also plays a significant role in identifying the object and purpose of 
the treaty.102 Though not really a legally binding declaration, at the Singapore 
Ministerial Declaration, sustainable development was broadened to include not only 
the ideal application of natural resources but also show it as a direct consequence of 
liberalized trade.103 The outcome of the Geneva Ministerial Conference is more 
outstanding since it was there that the WTO and the Member States officially identify 
sustainable development as not only linked to natural resources or unavoidable 
consequence of economic liberalization process but is also one of the objectives of the 
WTO.104 In a lot of its decisions, especially the AB’s decisions, the WTO has applied 
or interpreted the principle of sustainable development, positively. 
   
The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, in the US Shrimps-Turtle Case 
Report105, invoked the concept of sustainable development by making reference to the 
Preamble of the 1994 WTO Agreement, which “explicitly acknowledges the objective 
of sustainable development”.106 The Appellate Body further stated that sustainable 
development is now a “concept” that “has been generally accepted as integrating 
economic and social development and environmental protection”.107 The Report 
further lauded the need for integration of economic development with environmental 
                                                
102 Generally see Chapter Two for a detailed discussion of the perspectives under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (signed 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 
UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 (VCLT) Art.31.  
103 Singapore Ministerial Declaration (18 December 1996) WT/MIN (96)/DEC 36 ILM 218 available 
online: <http://docsonline.wto.org> para.16. 
104 Geneva Ministerial Declaration (20 May 1998) WT/MIN (98)/DEC/1 available online: 
<http://docsonline.wto.org> para. 4. 
105 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (1998), WTO Doc. 
WT//DS58/AB/R (Appellate Body Report), available online: http://docsonline.wto.org.  
106 Shrimps-Turtle, para.129. 
107 Shrimps-Turtle. 
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concern and showed that the concept has now been accepted as integrating economic, 
social development and environmental protection.108 Even though it fell short of 
recognizing its customary international law nature, the WTO AB acknowledged its 
suitability in dispute resolution, even going far as extracting particular legal results 
therein.109 Numerous other GATT/WTO decisions impacting on sustainable 
development abound and these would be discussed under the following sub-head 
dealing with the principles of sustainable development, especially those touching on 
the precautionary principle, integration and interrelationship, sustainable use of 
natural resources and common but differentiated responsibilities.   
5.5 Principles and Further Application of the Concept 
In developing the conceptual justification of this thesis, which is the basis of this 
analysis, it is relevant here to point to the principles of international law relating to 
sustainable development as propounded by the International Law Association (ILA) 
Committee on the Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development.110 The New Delhi 
Declaration, though essentially a soft law instrument, identified seven key principles 
of international law in the area of sustainable development. These principles and how 
they have been interpreted especially by the  GATT/WTO are explored below: 
 
1. The Duty of States to ensure Sustainable use of Natural Resources 
 
                                                
108  Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, ‘The Role of International Forums in the Advancement of 
Sustainable Development’, 10, Sustainable Dev. L & Pol’y, (2009-2012). 
109 Shrimps-Turtle, para. 127-131. 
110 New Delhi Declaration, (ILA, 2002) (n3). Principles 1-7 are mentioned below and Principle 7 is 
discussed in summary. See also Al-Saleem, K.I., The Legal Framework for the Sustainable 
Development of Iraqi Oil and Gas: A Study in Particular Reference to the Kurdistan Region, and with 
Special Emphasis on the New Delhi Declaration (UoP Ph.D. Thesis 2015). 
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It is a well-established principle of international law that all states enjoy sovereignty 
over their natural resources111. They enjoy exclusive ownership and management of 
such resources in accordance with their environmental and economic agenda. 
However, this exclusive right is coupled with a corresponding responsibility on such 
states to ensure that they utilize such resources in an effective, sustainable manner for 
the benefit of their people, both present and future generations. 
The accompanying responsibility is one that requires states to ensure that the 
activities within their territory do not cause damage to areas beyond their national 
jurisdiction. As stated earlier, this obligation exists so as to balance their own right to 
the exclusive use of their natural resources. It is a way of striking a balance between 
environmental and economic concerns.112 It is said that this duty has been reflected in 
both Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration.113  The term ‘sustainability’ of natural resources was not in use when 
international law first moved in to accommodate both the environment and 
development as integrated concepts as established in the above declarations.114 The 
duty of States to ensure sustainable use of natural resources referred to under this 
principle is from the viewpoint of the social aspect of sustainable development.115 
This aspect is clearly concerned with development that is geared towards meeting 
basic human needs. 
 
                                                
111 New Delhi Declaration, Art.1 (2), also UNGA Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources, Dec 17, 1973 (entered into force Feb. 5, 1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 238 (1974), Art.3, 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity, Jun 5, 1992 (entered into force Dec. 29 1992), reprinted in 31 
I.L.M. 822 (1992), Preamble, UNFCCC, May. 9, 1992 (entered into force Mar.24, 1994), reprinted in 
31 I.L.M. 849 (1992).   
112 (n2) 9. 
113 Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Ashfaq Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law: Principles, 
Practices & Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 110. 
114 Bosselmann K, The Principle of Sustainability, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, England, 
2008) 27. 
115 ILA Declaration, Principle 1(2), also see Varral, (n.41). 
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The application of this principle could be seen from the state’s management of its 
natural resources in a sustainable manner. This type of management is what Segger 
and Khalfan referred to as ‘sustainable management approach’ whereby the states, as 
managers, set their own standards to regulate the rate of exploitation of these 
resources.116 So the principle of sustainable use of natural resources has direct bearing 
on environmental, economic and social concerns. 
By way of application, the duty of States to ensure sustainable use of natural 
resources was tested under the GATT in the Tuna-Dolphin I case.117 It was a dispute 
involving Mexico and the United States wherein Mexico complained that United 
States adoption of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) violated the GATT. 
The GATT Panel ruled in favour of Mexico by proclaiming that the MMPA was 
inconsistent with the provisions of GATT Article III.118 It further refused to account 
for the MMPA under GATT Article XX by stating that the exceptions provided by the 
GATT to protect human or animal life or health119 or exhaustible natural resources120 
are only applicable to measures taken within the jurisdiction of the importing country. 
At issue also in the GATT are that its provisions effectively prevented any trade rules 
that exhibited ‘extraterritoriality’ and so the GATT Panel finally emphasised that a 
trade restriction could only be permitted under GATT Article XX (g) if targeted at the 
conservation of natural resources. Arguably, the reasoning of the Panel in Tuna-
Dolphin I seems to be that no trade (import) restriction planned to take care of 
                                                
116 Segger & French, ‘Governing Investment in Sustainable Development…’ in (n11) 116. 
117 US-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Complaint by Mexico et al.) (1991), GATT Doc. DS21/R, 39th 
Supp.. B.I..S.D. (1993) 155 available online http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/bookspe/analytic_index-
_e/introduction_01_e.htm. Even though the GATT Panel disregarded the duty to ensure sustainable use 
of natural resources in its decision, the WTO AB overturned such conclusions in both the Shrimp-
Turtle I (n.83) and Gasoline cases (United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline) (1996), WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (Appellate Board Report), available online: 
<http://docsonline.wto.org>. 
118 See Chapter Four for a detailed discussion of all the fundamental provisions. 
119 GATT Art. XX (b). 
120 GATT Art. XX (g). 
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environmental concerns extraterritorially is justifiable under GATT Article XX, and 
even those measures addressing domestic environmental concerns required rigorous 
scrutiny before they can be valid.121 This might have informed why many 
commentators argued that the duty to ensure the sustainable use of natural resources 
was disregarded by the GATT 1947. Interestingly however, the Panel’s conclusions in 
the Tuna-Dolphin regarding Article XX (g) did not escape the WTO AB’s scrutiny.122 
The Appellate Body, in rendering its decision in the Gasoline case, explained that 
GATT Article XX (g) in no way foist a “least GATT inconsistent” test to any trade 
measure that covers exhaustible natural resources.123 Likewise, in the Shrimp-Turtle I, 
the WTO Appellate Board decision clearly overturns the Panel’s decision in the Tuna-
Dolphin case in relation to the provisions of GATT Article XX (g) by beaming its 
searchlight on the expression “exhaustible natural resources”.124 In reaching its 
conclusion, the WTO AB emphasised that “exhaustible natural resources” must be 
interpreted having regards to “contemporary concerns of the community of nations 
about the protection and conservation of the environment” supporting the 
conclusion/decision with the WTO Agreement’s unmistakable recognition of “the 
objective of sustainable development” in its preamble.125 The preamble remains the 
first point of reference in understanding what the framers’ intention was and as such 
“must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed 
                                                
121 Markus Gehring and Alexandre Genest, ‘Dispute on Sustainable Development in the WTO Regime’ 
in Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and C.G.Weeramantry, Sustainable Development Principles in the 
Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals (1992-2012), Routledge Research in International 
Environmental Law (2017) 360.  
122 See (n.95). 
123 Gasoline (n95), Markus Gehring and Alexandre Genest (n.97), it is noted however that GATT 
Article XX (b) did foist that test and as such relevant since it uses the enabling term “necessary”. 
Though despite all these the WTO AB finally refused to confirm U.S roles under GATT XX’s chapeau.   
124 The WTO AB argued that the expression necessarily includes living organisms, sea turtles included. 
125 Shrimp-Turtle I (n83) para.129, see also the Preamble, WTO Agreement. 
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to the WTO Agreement”126 this necessarily qualifies the GATT, particularly Article 
XX (g) in this respect.127 
2. The Principle of Equity and the Eradication of Poverty 
 
This principle is concerned with both inter-generational (the right of future 
generations to enjoy a fair level of the common patrimony) and intra-generational 
equity (the right of all peoples within the current generation of fair access to the 
current generation’s entitlement to the Earth’s natural resources)128. The principle of 
equity, which is a key component to the promotion of sustainable development, is 
aimed at protecting natural resources, our common concern, from overexploitation. 
The principle further called for co-operation in the eradication of poverty in 
accordance with Chapter IX on International Economic and Social Co-operation of 
the UN Charter and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development as well as 
the duty to co-operate for global sustainable development and the attainment of equity 
in the development opportunities of developed and developing nations. It is worth 
noting here that the principle clearly viewed the eradication of poverty, just as is 
established in Principle 5 of the Rio Declaration, to be paramount in achieving 
sustainable development.129  
 
The application of this principle can be seen in Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration, the 
Programme of Action of the World Summit on Sustainable Development130, which 
                                                
126 Shrimp-Turtle I (n.83) para.153. 
127 Noteworthy here is the fact that the AB did not particularly overturn the Tuna-Dolphin case on the 
basis of ‘extraterritoriality’, it rather examined that the U.S. trade measures in relation to the sea turtles 
established a “sufficient nexus” to the U.S. because the sea turtles moved around in U.S. territorial 
waters.  
128 (n17), Principle 2.1. 
129 Rio Declaration, (n17). 
130 WSSD (n34). 
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clearly recognized the need and resolve for poverty eradication, and the Monterrey 
Consensus on Financing for Development which sets out the objectives for poverty 
eradication and the need to mobilise resources, both domestic and foreign, towards 
achieving that goal.131 Although these are soft law instruments, nevertheless they 
represent recognition by the community of countries about the close connection 
between poverty eradication and sustainable development, and the significance of 
investment towards achieving both objectives. 
 
Reference to intergenerational equity is now grounded in many international 
instruments, showing wide recognition of the principle in the way natural resources 
should be used.132 Equity, in both its ‘intra’ and ‘inter’ generational perspectives, has 
weaved together the human interests in environmental protection, socio-economic 
development and human rights.133 Sustainable development of natural resources and 
intergenerational equity are said to come together in the protection of ecosystems long 
inhabited by indigenous communities.134  
 
3. The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
 
The notion of common but differentiated responsibility posits that in order to promote 
the concept of sustainable development, there is the need to take into account the 
differing capabilities of States.135 Both states and other actors within the state136 have 
common but differentiated responsibilities. All States are duty bound to co-operate in 
                                                
131 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, UN Doc.A/AC.257/32, March 2002. 
132 See Preamble, para.23, see also Art 8 & 10, UNFCCC, (n28) and Preamble, para.20 Convention on 
Biological Diversity, (n43).   
133 (n37). 
134 (n37). 
135 ILA Declaration, Principle 3(2). 
136 Rio Declaration Principle 3.1. 
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order to achieve global sustainable development and environmental protection. All 
other actors, especially transnational corporations, are required to contribute to this 
global partnership137. The idea of differentiated responsibility is primarily to take into 
account the economic and developmental situation of the state, particularly 
recognizing the special needs and interests of the developing countries and of 
countries with economies in transition. The principle further requires developed 
countries to bear special responsibility in reducing and eliminating their unsustainable 
patterns of production and consumption and play a leading role in matters relevant to 
sustainable development138. The principle appeared both in the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation139 and the Climate Change Convention140, which provides that parties 
to the convention should act to protect the climate system “ on the basis of equality 
and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities”. This idea has been recognized and accepted by States in treaty and other 
State practice. 
 
The ILA New Declaration identified two elements to the differentiated 
responsibilities principle141. First is the common responsibility of States for the 
protection of the environment at all levels. The second is the need to take into account 
each State’s contribution to the occurrence of a particular environmental damage and 
its ability to contain such environmental threat.  
The principle of common but differentiated responsibility has been applied in various 
ways. State parties to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol agreed to differing commitments to 
                                                
137 Rio Declaration 
138 Principle 3.4, (n17). 
139 UN (WSSD) (n34). 
 
140 (n19). 
141 ILA New Delhi Declaration (Principle 3(1) and 3(4)). 
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reduce greenhouse gas emissions142. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration stressed the 
need to consider “the extent of applicability of standards which are valid for the most 
advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for 
developing countries”143. The 1992 Biodiversity Convention affirmed, “biological 
diversity is a common concern of mankind”144 and noted that the special needs of 
developing countries must be taken into account145. 
The WTO Agreements’ Special but Differentiated Treatment is similar to the ILA’s 
Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities. In the Indian-Quantitative 
Restrictions case146, the WTO Panel, in dealing with the development needs of 
countries, invoked the WTO Preamble and accepted the rationale for the “special and 
differential” treatment in connection to a country’s economic potential as established 
under the WTO enabling document. The Appellate Body was more direct in reference 
to the issue of fair differentiation and also that of sustainable development by 
rejecting the European Communities’ (EC) arguments that the EC’s tariff preferences 
were founded on sustainable development objectives. Though it agreed with some of 
the arguments of the EC and even overturned some of the panel’s findings that 
interpreted the non-discrimination principle relative to the objectives of the GATT 
and the WTO, accepting that the differentiation between developing countries based 
on the needs of those countries remains a possibility. However, the Appellate Body on 
the other hand found that the objectives of the WTO could indeed be accomplished by 
applying the “General Exceptions” and inscribed that “the optimal use of the world’s 
                                                
142 See Annex B, Kyoto Protocol, (n27).   
143 Stockholm Declaration, (n2), Principle 23. 
144 The Biodiversity Convention, (n20), Preamble. 
145 The Biodiversity Convention, (n20), Art.20 (5)(6) and (7). 
146 India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (1999), 
WTO Doc. WT/DS90/R (Report of the Panel), para. 7.2. 
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resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development” is long 
overdue.147   
 
As demonstrated above, though States have responsibilities to protect the environment 
and promote sustainable development, but as a result of their different social, 
economic and ecological positions, they must shoulder different level of 
responsibilities.   
 
4. The Principle of Precautionary approach to Human Health, Natural 
Resources and Ecosystems 
Article 4 of the ILA New Delhi Declaration stipulates “ a precautionary approach is 
central to sustainable development in that it commits States, international 
organisations and the civil society, particularly the scientific and business 
communities, to avoid human activity which may cause significant harm to human 
health, natural resources or ecosystems, including in the light of scientific 
uncertainty.”148  
 
Many regional treaties and declarations have also recognised and included the 
precautionary principle, for example the Bamako Convention provides: “each party 
shall strive to adopt and implement the preventive, precautionary approach…”149 
According to the Maastricht Treaty: “community policy on the environment…. shall 
be based on the precautionary principle and on the principle that preventive action 
                                                
147 Gehring and Genest, (n.99), arguing further that this could be achieved via the application of the 
WTO exceptions like contained in Article XX(g) GATT. 
148 ILA New Delhi Declaration, (n3), see also Art.7, 2000 IUCN Draft Covenant on Environment and 
Development (2nd ed. IUCN, Gland 2000). 
149 Bamako Convention on the Ban into Africa and the Control of Trans-boundary Movement and 
Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, 29 Jan. 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 775 (1991).  
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should be taken…”150 The 1991 Ministerial Conference on the Environment of the 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific invoked 
the precautionary principle thus: “in order to achieve sustainable development, 
policies must be based on the precautionary principle.”151 
 
With regards to non-binding instruments, the principle of precautionary approach has 
been earlier on enshrined in the Rio Declaration thus:   
 
   “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall 
be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation”152 
 
Sustainable development cannot be achieved if states and all others are not committed 
to avoiding all human activities that may cause significant harm to human health, 
natural resources or ecosystems. An aspect of the precautionary approach noted in the 
principle is the application of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) to identify 
possible harms.153 It means that in all activities that can affect human health, natural 
resources or the ecosystems, precaution should be taken even if no scientific certainty 
exists to show actual existence or certain future occurrence of harm or the extent of its 
severity on any of them.  
                                                
150 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (amended by the Treaty on European 
Union), Art.130(r)(2). 
151 Declaration on Environmentally Sound and Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific, 
Para.19, (1990), Report of the (ESDAP) Ministerial Meeting on the Environment, Bangkok. 
152 1992 Rio Declaration, Principle15, (n17), see also Agenda 21, JPOI. 
153 ILA Declaration, Principle 4, EIA need is also noted in Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration.  
 195 
 
Investment treaty tribunals have not addressed the precautionary principle expressly 
neither have States specifically invoked it in their regulatory activity.154 However, the 
WTO in the EC-Hormone case, made a reference to the principle in an obiter where it 
maintained that the precautionary principle had become part of customary 
international law.155  
The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, ITLOS, partly based its 1999 
decision in the Bluefin Tuna on the reading of the precautionary principle.156  
 
Nevertheless, the precautionary principle has been relied upon in a number of cases as 
a basis of legal obligation. The I.C.J had opportunity to comment on it in the 
dissenting opinions of Judges Weeramantry and Palmer in the Nuclear Tests Case.157 
In 1973, New Zealand asked the I.C.J to ban France from testing nuclear weapons in 
the atmosphere and before the I.C.J could make any pronouncement on it, France 
stated that it was not planning to test any nuclear weapons, so the I.CJ dismissed the 
case. In dismissing the case however, the court added, “ if the basis of this judgment 
were to be affected, the Applicant could request an examination of the situation”.158 
France was to withdraw its jurisdiction to the I.C.J later. 
 
In 1995 France decided to launch an underground nuclear test and New Zealand 
sought to sue it pursuant to the I.C.J’s decision to re-open the matter based on the 
                                                
154 Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Andrew Newcombe, ‘An Integrated Agenda for Sustainable 
Development in International Investment Law’, (n11) 121. 
155 1998 WTO Beef Hormone Case, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
Jan 16, 1998, ET/DS26/AB/R, www.wto.org (last visited September 14, 2016), para.123. 
156 Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan, Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, ITLOS 
Cases Nos. 3 & 4, Order of 27 August 1999, available in <www.itlos.org> (last visited 15 September 
2016). 
157 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, 1994 I.C.J, 457-458. 
158 Nuclear Tests, 477. 
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1973 jurisdiction.159 In its argument before the court also, New Zealand invoked the 
precautionary principle. The majority decision considered New Zealand’s claims to be 
new, stating that France’s tests this time around were not atmospheric but 
underground and as such the I.C.J had no jurisdiction.160 The majority refused any 
comment on the precautionary principle invoked by New Zealand. However, Judge 
Weeramantry not only opined that the I.C.J had jurisdiction but went further to state 
that the precautionary principle invoked by New Zealand authorized an injunction to 
prevent potential harm to the environment and that in the relevant case, France’s 
activity posed significant harm to the environment and as such it had the burden of 
proving that its nuclear activity was safe.161 He concluded this aspect by stating “ this 
last application of the precautionary principle, to which France is a party, has 
particular relevance to the matter presently before the court”. 162 In his dissenting 
opinion, Judge Palmer addressed the relevance of the principle directly and stating 
that “ the norm involved in the precautionary principle has developed rapidly and may 
now be a principle of customary international law relating to the environment”163 and 
went on to say that “ there are obligations based on Conventions that may be 
applicable here requiring Environmental Impact Assessment and the precautionary 
principle be applied”.164  
 
The Pulp Mills165 case is significant as it was the first time that a majority decision of 
the. I.C.J directly addressed the precautionary principle. The Pulp Mills was a dispute 
between Argentina and Uruguay wherein Argentina accused Uruguay of violating the 
                                                
159 1995 Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, 1995 I.C.J, p.361 
160 Nuclear Tests, 307. 
161 Nuclear Tests, 348. 
162 Nuclear Tests, 343. 
163Nuclear Tests, 412. 
164 Nuclear Tests. 
165 Pulp Mills (n71). 
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countries’ treaty obligation protecting the Uruguay River by authorizing the 
construction of a Pulp Mill that eventually polluted the river. Argentina maintained 
that under the precautionary principle, Uruguay had the burden of proof to show that 
its construction of the Mill will not cause significant harm to the environment. The 
court, in a majority opinion, rejected both Argentina’s application of the 
precautionary principle to shift the burden of proof166 and its use of the precaution to 
lower the standard of proof required of it to show the occurrence of environmental 
harm.167 The court stated, “While a precautionary approach may be relevant in the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of the statute, it does not follow that it 
operates as a reversal of the burden of proof”.168 Though the court did not find the 
application of precaution as necessary in the case, however its understanding of a 
broad application of the principle is important as it can be used to advance the 
argument that the court can sometimes issue injunctions in cases where some amount 
of harm is noted.169  
However, the dissenting opinion of Judge Vinuesa applied the principle positively in 
favour of Argentina. In agreeing with Argentina’s argument that authorizing the 
construction and the eventual construction of the Mill provided enough basis of 
uncertainty on the possible harm to the environment he opined “this will be no more 
than a direct application of the precautionary principle, which indisputably is at the 
core of environmental law. In my opinion, the precautionary principle is not an 
                                                
166 Pulp Mills, para. 160. 
167 Pulp Mills, para. 164. 
168 Pulp Mills. 
169 See Kazhdan D, ‘Precautionary Pulp: Pulp Mills and the Evolving Dispute between International 
Tribunals over the Reach of the Precautionary Principle’, 38, Ecology L.Q, 527, 2011, 546. 
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abstraction or an academic component of desirable soft law, but a rule of law within 
general international law as it stands today”.170  
 
It can be seen that though the I.C.J had the opportunity to pronounce on the 
precautionary principle in a majority judgment in the Pulp Mills, it did not make any 
explicit statement as to the exact meaning or status of the principle under international 
law. 
 
The precautionary principle essentially gives the benefit of the doubt to environmental 
protection. Taking precaution is premised on the belief that natural systems are 
susceptible to harm as opposed to being durable.171 Moreover, precaution in its 
practical application, unlike other standards, is essentially preventive in nature while 
other preventive standards may not necessarily be precautionary.172  
 
The effective participation of developing countries at the Johannesburg Summit can 
be seen in the Summit’s call to “ support developing countries in strengthening their 
capacity for the sound management of chemicals and hazardous wastes by providing 
technical and financial assistance.”173 From the perspective of sustainable 
development, the precautionary principle can be seen to have gained recognition from 
the sphere of environmental law to social and economic (investment) and even trade 
law. This can be interpreted from the contributions of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, WSSD seeking to redirect the debate from the exact 
                                                
170 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), I.C.J., Dissenting opinion of Judge 
Vinuesa (Order of July 13 2006) 5, 152. 
171 Sands, (n40) 150. 
172 Sands, (n40) 151, other preventive standards may not be precautionary in their application. 
173 (n40), also JPOI, para.23. 
 199 
position of precaution under international law to its endorsement and acceptance as 
complementary to the highly regarded science-based decision-making.174 
 
5. The Principle of Public Participation and Access to Information and 
Justice 
 
The requirement of public participation and access to information and justice has been 
held by the ILA to be paramount to sustainable development.175 It viewed public 
participation especially to be essential to sustainable development and good 
governance ‘in that it is a condition for responsive, transparent and accountable 
governments’.176 Agenda 21 specifically posits “ States will ensure broad public 
participation in initiatives for sustainable development through access to information 
and access to justice.”177 This principle is reflected in many domestic legal systems.178 
States usually take it upon themselves to ensure that all citizens have access to 
information in possession of public bodies and private sectors, participation by 
minority groups, access to justice by the indigent and vulnerable groups, etc.179 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Declaration on the Right to Development 
all contained provisions for public participation at national levels.180 The Declaration 
                                                
174 WSSD (n34), see also (n40). 
175 ILA Declaration, Principle 5(1)(2)(3), (n3). 
176 (n.34), Principle 5. 
177 (n.17). 
178 See 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Chapter IV, especially S.39, see also the 
1992 Constitution of Ghana, Chapter V, 1996 South African Constitution (No. 108, as amended) 
Chapter II. 
179 Nigerian Constitution, 1999. 
180 Art. 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights G.A Res.127 A, UN Doc.A/810 (1948) and 
Art 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 (1966) and the 
UNGA 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development. 
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on the Right to Development recognised it as central to fair socio-economic 
development.181 The Brundtland Commission Report and the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation also recognized the principle to be central to the promotion of 
sustainable development.182 
 
People can only participate in the decision-making process that affects them if they 
have access to information necessary for participation. So States are expected to make 
such information easily accessible to the public to ensure their effective participation. 
Finally, access to justice to all those that might be affected by governmental decisions 
is fundamental to the realization of sustainable development. According to the United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESCR), this will 
allow individuals make and enforce their rights before national courts and tribunals.183 
To achieve this, the committee further states that all State parties should allow all 
universally recognised human rights standards to operate directly in their national 
legal systems.184 
 
The Brundtland Commission, in identifying “effective participation” as a necessary 
part of sustainable development, specifically pointed to the importance of Non-
governmental Organisations (NGOs) and indigenous people’s participation.185 The 
Commission considers their participation as very significant in promoting sustainable 
development.186 
            
                                                
181 UDHR, see its Preamble and Art.1 respectively. 
182 (n1, 17 AND 34 respectively). 
183 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN ESCOR, 2000, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2000/. 
184 UN ESCOR, General Comment No.9, Domestic Application of the Covenant. See also (n.45). 
185 Our Common Future (n1). 
186 Our Common Future, (n.1). 
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6. The Principle of Good Governance 
 
The principle of good governance has been recognised in the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation (JPOI) of the UN World Summit for Sustainable Development in 
holding that good governance is a fundamental principle that will ensure sustainable 
development. The JPOI states that: 
 
       ‘Good governance within each country and at the international level is 
essential for sustainable development…’187 
 
Further to the above, the Johannesburg Declaration also recognized the importance of 
the principle by stating its commitment to: 
 
       “Undertake to strengthen and improve governance at all levels for the 
effective implementation of Agenda 21, the Millennium Development Goals 
and the Plan of Implementation of the Summit.”188 
 
The principle of good governance is at the core of human development. This is a 
principle that is much more relevant to the developing world today where there is a 
dire need of reforms in both institutional and administrative frameworks that will 
ensure good governance. The Principle of good governance as advanced by the ILA is 
one that requires States to ensure that strong and coherent institutions exist to allow 
                                                
187 JPOI (n34). 
188 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, (n34). 
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citizens to realize their potential, exercise their individual and collective rights and 
live in an environment where the rule of law is respected.189  
 
All major financial institutions and development organisations have recognized and 
insist on the requirement of good governance both at the domestic and international 
levels to foster development.190 The United Nations Development Programme set out 
the characteristics of good governance to include the rule of law, participation, 
responsiveness, transparency, accountability, equity, consensus orientation, 
effectiveness and efficiency and strategic vision.191   
 
The issue of good governance is not only central to the eradication of poverty and the 
promotion of sustainable development everywhere but also to the maintenance of 
global security, harmonization of national developmental policies, transparency, 
accountability and strengthening of both administrative and judicial institutions for 
effectiveness. 
 
The principle of good governance also requires States to ensure the development of a 
socially responsible investment climate. 
 
7. The Principle of integration and Interrelationship, in Particular in 
Relation to Human Rights and Social, Economic and Environmental 
                                                
189 ILA Declaration, see Principle 6(1)&(2). 
190 Generally see the 1989 World Development Report by the World Bank, the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development Peer Review Mechanism, the African Development Bank, ADB, the DFID, the 
1992 World Bank’s Governance and Development Report, United Nations Convention to Combat 
Corruption, United Nations Development Programme’s Governance Policy Paper 1997, the 1997 IMF 
Report (wherein the Fund decided to incorporate good governance as a criterion for getting its 
assistance), same position was taken by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), etc. 
191 World Bank Report, UNDP Governance Policy Paper, (New York: UNDP 1997). 
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Objectives 
 
The last principle is an all-encompassing one in that it suggests an integration and 
interrelationship of the principles of social, economic, and environmental objectives. 
The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, in its objectives, states that governments 
“will promote the integration of the three components of sustainable development – 
economic development, social development and environmental protection – as 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars”.192 
 
In the application of the integration principle, Segger and Khalfan stated that four 
degrees of the principle could be identified from the perspectives of those regimes 
that view international economic, social and environmental law as separate and 
distinct fields and the other regimes that fully integrate these three areas of law and 
consider them as one193 They identified these degrees as separate spheres, parallel yet 
interdependent spheres, partially integrated spheres and highly integrated new 
regimes194. Their entire argument centered on taking holistic approach to the analysis 
of integration, as they put it, “one which describes and tracks the degree to which 
international regimes integrate economic, social and environmental law”195 something 
sustainable development can achieve by the integration of trade and investment.  
 
The Principles mentioned in the Declaration include the duty of States to ensure 
sustainable use of natural resources, the principle of equity and the eradication of 
                                                
192 WSSD (N34), para.2, other soft law instruments that recognized the principle include the Agenda 21 
and 1992 Rio Declaration and the Stockholm Declaration of 1972. 
193 Segger & Khalfan (n2) 106. 
194 Segger & Khalfan (n2) 107. It is not the place for the present discussion to go into the details of 
these spheres. 
195 Segger & Khalfan (n2) 106-107. 
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poverty, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the principle of 
precautionary approach to human health, natural resources and ecosystems, the 
principle of public participation and access to information and justice, the principle of 
good governance and the principle of integration and interrelationship, in particular in 
relation to human rights and social, economic and environmental objectives. The last 
principle is an all-encompassing one in that it suggests an integration and 
interrelationship of the principles of social, economic, and environmental objectives. 
The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, in its objectives, states that governments 
“will promote the integration of the three components of sustainable development – 
economic development, social development and environmental protection – as 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars”.196 
Trade’s relationship with both the environment and social development necessarily 
depends on how the regimes’ rules and method of application prescribed the extent to 
which trade advances sustainable development goals.197 It is argued that public 
international law, under the aegis of which international trade is situated, ‘can and 
should adopt a principled approach to ensure that it can deliver on its global objective 
of sustainable development’.198 By way of application, the WTO Panel, in the EC-
Biotech case199, pointed out that a WTO Panel may examine “other relevant rules of 
international law when interpreting the terms of WTO agreements if it deems such 
rules to be informative”.200 In the China-Raw Materials201 case, the WTO Panel 
affirmed the principle of permanent responsibility over natural resources, the freedom 
                                                
196 JPOI para.2. 
197 Gehring and Genest, (n99) 381-382. 
198 Gehring and Genest, (n99) 382. 
199 EC-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, Add.1 to Add.9, and Corr.1 (Panel Report), adopted 21 November 2006. 
200 EC-Biotech, (Panel Report), para.7.93.  
201 China-Measures Related to the Exploration of Various Raw Materials (2011) (Reports of the 
Panel). 
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to exploit these resources for development sake and the position of GATT Article XX 
(g) that further emphasises the need to also manage these resources in conformity 
with sustainable development.202 The Panel finally reached the conclusion that overall 
economic development and conservation of these natural resources can certainly work 
in symmetry and alongside WTO obligations.203 This, the Panel hope, will make it 
possible for sustainable development to expand into future WTO decisions.204  
5.6 Grounding of Sustainable Development under International Investment Law 
Generally, sustainable development concerns and their relationship with investment 
can be reviewed from the perspectives of treaty texts, investment and other disputes 
and academic writings. These three areas, though rather different from each other, all 
are interconnected in the way they deal with sustainable development in international 
investment agreements. 
 
The Brundtland Report’s definition of sustainable development205 has come to be 
accepted as the most widely recognized and applied definition of the concept. 
However, that could not be said of the definition of investment. Even the most widely 
accepted investment law instrument, the ICSID Convention206, did not directly define 
investment though the language of Article 25 of the Convention is quite clear in 
stating that an ICSID tribunal can only have jurisdiction where the dispute in question 
                                                
202 See China-Measures, paras.7.378-7.381. 
203 China-Measures, para.381. 
204 China-Measures, para.381. 
205 Our Common Future (n1). 
206  Popularly called The Washington Convention; The International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes was established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States. It has been ratified by at least 159 countries; see 
www.icsid.worldbank.org (last accessed 29th December, 2016). However, a lot of ICSID tribunals 
define investment using the notion of development. 
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arises ‘directly out of an investment’.207 So flowing from the provisions of Article 25, 
Parties must signify their consent before submitting any dispute to ICSID.208 States 
usually do this through International Investment Agreements (IIAs) (which are 
usually in the form of Bilateral Investment Treaties, BITs) or through other 
recognized instruments.209 
 
The IIAs definition of investment only represents the investment-protection 
perspective that reflects the asset-based approach.210 However, the IIAs usually failed 
to set out any criteria that can be used to ascertain whether an asset qualifies as an 
investment.  In such situations, the ICSID tribunal is left with two options, either to 
consider the activities of the investor as investment within the jurisdiction of the 
ICSID tribunal or be allowed the latitude of making its own findings and 
determination.211 Since there is no common definition of the concept of investment in 
both the ICSID and the model IIAs, then there is the need for a shift in approach to 
the developmental element of investment canvassed by a number of ICSID 
tribunals,212 an area this thesis will impact by advocating future investment treaties to 
include sustainable development/investment in their definition of  investment.  
                                                
207  ICSID, see also Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) 138. 
208 Article 25 essentially covers jurisdiction, and submission to jurisdiction of a court or tribunal is a 
general rule under international law. 
209 Article 25. 
210 Jezewski, M., ‘Development Considerations in Defining Investment’ (n11) 215. 
211 Jezewski.   
212 Jezewski, see also Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak Republic (Decision of the 
ICSID Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, (24 May 1999), known as CSOB v. Slovakia), MHS v. 
Malaysia, Case No. ARB/05/10, (Award of 17 May 2007), see also the US Model BIT (of 2004), 
German Model BIT of 2005 and US-Mozambique BIT (signed in 1998). The author argued that this 
approach is one that makes the concept of contribution to the host State’s economic development a 
central feature in the definition of investment and the system of investment treaty protection.   
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In the Malaysian Historical Salvors Arbitration, MHS v. Malaysia213, the pertinent 
issue before the tribunal was whether the salvage of antiquities qualified as an 
investment. The first arbitral tribunal held that it did not qualify as an investment 
under the ICSID because it did not contribute to the economic development of the 
host country. However, the annulment committee held that the first tribunal was in 
error in giving too much significance to the need for socio-economic development 
because there is no objective meaning or criteria for determining whether or not a 
particular investment contribute to socio-economic development. Moreover, though 
the opening sentence of the ICSID Preamble referring to the “need for international 
cooperation for economic development”214 cannot in any way qualify as definition of 
investment, it nevertheless suggests that for an ICSID tribunal to have jurisdiction, the 
outcome of the investment must be of “some positive impact on development”215 of 
the particular host State.  
 
Furthermore, though there is no system of stare decisis in the ICSID, but decisions 
and awards can still carry some precedential value if they are well reasoned.216 As 
such, in MHS v. Malaysia, all the cases considered by the arbitrator as valuable to the 
interpretation of the notion of investment under the provisions of Article 25(1) 
underscore economic development as a necessary component of investment.217 
Finally, the decision may help in defining whether or not BITs should protect 
portfolio investment. There is also the argument by a segment of the investment 
                                                
213 MHS v. Malaysia 
214 The ICSID Convention. 
215 Schreuer (n185) 125. 
216 Schreuer. 
217 The arbitrator considered seven ICSID Cases, among which was Patrick Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. 
Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7 wherein the tribunal required that the investment in question must 
contribute “in one way or another to the economic development of the host State”. It is instructive here 
to note that though the decision was subsequently annulled, but the tribunal in MHS v. Malaysia 
considered the Award not the Annulment, (n190). 
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community to the effect that foreign investment should contribute to the host State’s 
development.218 
 
Traditionally, these treaties were negotiated between the developed and developing 
states.219 On the one hand, the developed States entered into these treaties with the 
primary concern of making profit and always protecting their corporations or 
nationals’ investments from the possible discriminatory policies or unfair treatment of 
their host, developing States. On the other hand, the developing, host states do so to 
attract Foreign Direct Investment, FDI to further their development.220 However, one 
could argue whether the proliferation of IIAs essentially promotes FDIs and whether 
the increase in FDIs necessarily promotes development?221 It is trite that the 
investment canvassed by developing States is one that should positively contribute to 
their development but a reading of the texts shows that most of these traditional IIAs 
were not designed to achieve any development outcomes, sustainable or otherwise. 
Where some eventually refer to development, they do so marginally, and as Joubin-
Bret put it, “as a political goal that is not specifically aimed at the developing country 
treaty partner, but at the economic development of all contracting partners, 
irrespective of their status”.222 This has been the focus of almost all the older IIAs, a 
trend that still finds its way into current treaty practice as various developments in the 
area have done little to integrate sustainable development principles in the majority of 
                                                
218 See generally, Roberto Echandi and Pierre Suave (eds), Prospects in International Investment Law 
and Policy, World Trade Forum, (CUP 2013). 
219 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)(2007), there 
are now more than 3200 IIAs involving 194 States in operation, see Quantitative Data on Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Double Taxation Treaties, available at 
<http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WbeFlyers.asp? intItemID=3150&lang=1>  
220 Anna Joubin-Bret et al., International Investment Law and Development (n11) 16. 
221 Anna Joubin-Bret, a further insight on this is discussed below. 
222 Anna Joubin-Bret. Furthermore, these IIAs are mostly, as stated above, only protective in nature 
with little concern for the promotion of investment or transparency. 
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modern IIAs.223 The mention of development is at least a pointer to the need for 
sustainability approach that will incorporate such concern. 
However, from the works of the International Institute of Sustainable Development 
(IISD) and some scholarly writings, certain development-related innovations are 
emerging as proposals for inclusion in IIAs224. This is with a view to integrating 
environmental, economic and social concerns into investment agreements. 
 
The International Institute for Sustainable Development has so far proposed a Model 
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, popularly 
known as the IISD Model.225 The model is relevant to this discourse as it tries to 
integrate sustainable development with international investment. It is doing this 
having observed that currently, almost all existing IIAs have a single-track approach 
to investment, which is the protection of foreign capital and investment.226 The 
Preamble exhaustively presents the perspective of the proposal, clearly emphasizing 
the need for a balanced approach to investment, looking at both rights and obligations 
that should exist between investors, host countries and home countries, or as one 
writer puts it, “emphasizing both investor rights and public goods”.227 The Model 
aligned its project with the perspective of sustainable development as propounded in 
the Brundtland report, the Rio declaration, the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) and the Millennium Development Goals, and it is now 
consistent with the current United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.228 
                                                
223 Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Andrew Newcombe, ‘An Integrated Agenda for Sustainable 
Development in International Investment Law’ (n11) 124. See also China-Germany BIT (2003) quoted 
in the above. 
224 See the IISD Model, available online at <www.iisd.org/investment> the Model was first proposed in 
(2005). See also (n11) supra for a collection of expert articles pointing to this development. 
225 IISD Model.  
226 See (n2) 219. 
227 Preamble to the IISD Model Agreement, (n202). 
228 IISD Preamble, (also the SDG 2030). 
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More importantly, the Model’s focus on the notion of investment covers only 
activities that are actually taking place in the host country in the form of operations or 
undertakings and also recognizes the permanent character of the investors’ 
contribution to the development of the host country.229 According to the provisions of 
Article 2(c) of the IISD Model definition, any activity, operation or undertaking 
physically present in the host State as an investment will satisfy its notion of 
investment provided that: 
 
a) “Such investments are not in the nature of portfolio investments..: 
b) There is significant physical presence of the investment in the host 
State; 
c) The investment in the host state is made in accordance with the laws of 
that host state: 
d) The investment is part or all of a business or commercial operation; and 
e) The investment is made by an investor”.230 
 
From the viewpoint of investment arbitration, the position of the home State in terms 
of environmental regulations contained in a number of recent IIAs has also been 
challenged. The resulting awards interestingly found in favour of the host State’s 
environmental measures. A case in point is the Glamis Gold v. United States231, which 
was brought by a Canadian mining company under the North American Free Trade 
                                                
229 See (n185), it was further argued here that this development is only measured from the perspective 
of the host State’s set goals but is not an objective standard. See below a discussion of similar point 
from the perspective of national treatment standard. 
230 Article 2(c)(v)(a-e) Model IISD Agreement. 
231  Glamis Gold v. United States, Award (NAFTA Arb Trib, 2009), available online at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organisation/125798.pdf, also known as the Gold Standard Case in 
investor-state arbitration, (last accessed on 23rd December 2016). 
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Agreement (NAFTA). The case was instituted after California enacted a law that 
required the complete backfilling of open-pit mines located around a Native American 
sacred site. Coincidentally, the Glamis Gold project site was located near this sacred 
site and Glamis Gold initiated an arbitral proceeding, arguing that complete 
backfilling of this site will substantially make its mining investment in the project 
uneconomical and that the law was a violation of the previous standards under which 
the project was initiated.232 On the other hand, the United States responded that 
mining is a highly regulated business and that the Native American sacred site has 
been an area of regulation for several years and that Glamis Gold, a company holding 
mining rights in the area should expect such regulation to be in place and enforced.233 
The tribunal, in giving its award in favour of the United States, discussed among other 
things, the position of the environment in relation to investment measures such as 
regulatory takings and fair and equitable treatment. 
 
Another interesting arbitral award is also a NAFTA Award in the Methanex Corp v. 
United States234 where the tribunal, in finding in favour of the State, had the 
opportunity to make pronouncements on investor-protection agreements especially as 
regards human health, public participation and environmental rules.235 
5.7 Academic Commentary 
Sustainable development concerns in international investment law are also achieving 
prominence within academic circles from the myriad of literature available now in the 
                                                
232 Glamis Gold, see also Romson A, 41. 
233 This is within the legitimate expectation of the Glamis Gold. 
234 Methanex Corp v. United States, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, available online at 
http://www.state.gov./documents/organisation/51052.pdf. There are other cases pending before several 
investment tribunals concerning environmental regulations etc. for example the Marion Unglaube v. 
Costa Rica that is pending before the ICSID, see ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1. 
235 Methanex. 
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area. According to the provisions of Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, the writings of highly regarded publicists are among the traditional 
sources of international law.236 These publications range from proposals to host States 
on how to negotiate new IIAs to arguments in support of developing States to re-
interpret and redirect existing IIAs taking into cognizance sustainable development 
concerns with a view to ensuring that environment, social and economic problems are 
taken into consideration.237 Many academics have reviewed the development of the 
concept from various perspectives and advanced arguments as to its nature, current 
status, applicability and future expectation. Gehring and Newcombe, in their 
introductory contribution to the book Sustainable Development in World Investment 
Law, reviewed the history of the inception of the concept and reached the conclusion 
that “the concept did not focus on limiting economic activity but rather on re-directing 
development in order to ensure the potential for long-term sustained yield”.238 They 
maintained that though there is a general consensus on the importance of FDI’s in the 
drive towards sustainable development, a lot needs to be done to make sure that 
current international investment law regimes are re-balanced and re-interpreted so as 
to promote sustainability.239  
 
                                                
236 Article 38, ICJ Statute. 
237 See Morocco-Nigeria BIT (2016) and UNCTAD Reports 2016-2017 on these developments.  
238 (n11) 3. The book is one of the current collections of expert articles by senior academics and 
investment experts that centrally look at sustainable development and its implication within the current 
regime of international investment law. 
239 (n11) 9, see also Investment Promotion Agencies and Sustainable FDI: Moving towards the Fourth 
Generation of Investment Promotion, Vale Columbia Centre on Sustainable International Investment, 
and Mugabe, J., Governing Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policies and Practices 
Reconsidered, in Zarsky L, (ed), ‘Introductory notes’ in International Investment for Sustainable 
Development, (Earthscan Publishers, London) 3. 
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For example, Mayeda240 contended that existing IIAs are not designed nor are they 
suitable for ‘the promotion of a comprehensive conception of development’241. He 
further observed that both the negotiating parties and the tribunals that later interpret 
these IIAs have not deemed it appropriate to see investment issues through a 
sustainable development lens and failed to ‘recognize that sustainable development 
involves a ‘cross-sectional’ analysis that implicates issues of human rights, 
environmental law, and distributive justice’.242 They owe legal obligations to their 
communities because these treaties will impact on their subsequent policy decisions 
such as regulating the environment, water services, roads etc that are owned or 
managed by foreign investors. This is the main reason why even the New Model US 
and Norwegian BITs explicitly provided that the parties should not lower their 
environment and labour standards in order to attract investment. In fact, the US Model 
BIT 2012 strengthens the right of States to regulate. Today, many modern treaties are 
taking this interesting approach. 
 
Mayeda’s position is that the best way of ensuring that IIAs are compatible with 
sustainable development is for states to ‘negotiate sustainable investment 
agreements’243. His proposal in the design of future, more sustainable investment 
agreements, advocates for the incorporation of certain features that will assist host 
States’ ability to promote sustainable development.244 
 
                                                
240 Mayeda G., ‘Sustainable International Investment Agreements: Challenges and Solutions for 
Developing Countries’, 535 (generally) in (n11). 
241 (n11) 542. 
242 (n11), see also Zarsky (n217) and Jezewski (n188). 
243 (n11) 544. 
244 (n11). 
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The proposal signifies a radical departure from existing IIAs with a significant shift to 
development perspective to aid the host States’ use of foreign investment to develop 
not only infrastructure but also institutions, something this thesis is also advocating. 
5.8 National Treatment in the Context of Sustainable Development – An example 
of the Relationship between Investors’ Rights and Host States’ Regulatory Space 
The principle of national treatment is misleading in its simple formulation.245 In its 
standard phrasing across BITs, it comprises of the contracting States’ obligation to 
accord treatment ‘no less favourable’ than they accord to their own investors ‘in like 
circumstances’.246 The phrase ‘like circumstances’ is used to determine a violation of 
the standard. The broad connotation of the obligation has given latitude to investment 
arbitrators to apply an excessively wide interpretation of the standard, making them 
group public welfare regulation of general application to be a violation of the 
standard.247 This latitude can be employed to incorporate sustainable development in 
the interpretation of national treatment. 
 
In considering the principle of national treatment, the starting point is determined by 
the treatment host States accord domestic investors in relation to foreign investors 
who are in like circumstances. The fallout from this is the extensive application of the 
principle to regulations and other governmental decisions.248 Most importantly also, 
such an extensive application and expansive interpretation of the standard has the 
negative effect of restricting otherwise beneficial, though sometimes controversial, 
governmental policies. This will finally result in ensuring the creation of standards of 
                                                
245 Kate Miles (n11) 268. See Chapter two supra for an in-depth discussion of the interpretation of 
‘like circumstances’/‘likeness’.  
246 R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP 2012) 198. 
247 Kate Miles (n11) 268. 
248 See Gus van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2007) [van Harten] 82-83. 
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investor protection that will be quite outside the realm of the protection of investors 
from arbitrary or negative State conduct to a shield against the influence of otherwise 
legitimate public welfare regulations.249  
Seeking to establish, nurture and support projects that meet sustainability 
requirements, States usually, in fact necessarily, differentiate among future projects 
and investments based on such developmental needs. This may subject the host State 
to investor claims of discriminatory treatment where the said regulation either 
prohibiting the investors from certain activities or denying their participation in 
profitable ventures was simply because it is only the domestic investment that meets 
sustainability requirements.250 And as such, differentiating between the domestic and 
foreign investors simply based on sustainable development concern will be viewed as 
a breach of the principle of national treatment. This, it is argued, will greatly limit the 
available regulatory space for States to actively drive their development/sustainability 
agenda without the fear of evident investor claims. It is submitted here that 
differentiation based on the State’s need for development and/or sustainability can be 
justified based on rational grounds of allowing developing States viable policy space 
to ‘develop domestic law and policy in the public interest’.251  
 
However, as Kate Miles and Cordonier Segger argued, host States measures leading 
to sustainable development cannot be realized without impacting on the interests of 
foreign investors, and this will, inevitably, lead to a ‘regulatory chill’.252 The 
regulatory chill theory argument posit that the possibility of investor claims against 
                                                
249 (n11) 268-272. 
250 (n11) 
251 (n11) 
252 Kate Miles (n11) 271, Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, ‘From Protest to Proposal: Options for an 
Americas Investment Regime?’, in Beyond the Barricades: The Americas Trade and Sustainable 
Development Agenda, Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Maria Leichner Reynal (eds), (Ashgate: 
Publishing Limited, 2005) 146 at 155. 
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host States implementing such sustainable measures will prevent effective public 
welfare regulation and constrain sustainable development concerns.253 The host States 
fear here is understandable as most of them, being relatively poor, cannot contend 
with the potential for enormous damages award and arbitral proceedings costs.254 All 
these will have important implications in realizing the sustainable development 
objectives of developing States.255 
One important objective can be discerned from the above preliminary survey, i.e. the 
recognition of the need for sustainability of development activities. The Brundtland 
Report, modern investment treaty texts’ and academic commentaries reviewed above 
all shared that objective. It is only when economic policies are directed towards 
ensuring effective use and long-term sustainability of resources that they can say to be 
working towards meeting the core objectives of sustainable development. This could 
also be said to be the desired objective of international investment law.256 
5.9 Soft Law Instruments 
The further grounding of sustainable development in international investment law can 
be reviewed from several other soft law instruments, policy papers and reports. It has 
already been enshrined as a clear objective in more than fifty binding international 
treaties.257 The provisions of Agenda 21 of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, the World’s Plan of Action, pointed out the relevant 
sustainable development challenges linked to investment: 
                                                
253 Luke E. Peterson, ‘All Roads Lead Out of Rome: Divergent Paths of Dispute Settlement in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’, in International Investment for Sustainable Development: Balancing Rights and 
Rewards, Lyuba Zarsky (ed), (London: Earthscan, 2005) 123 [Peterson] 139. 
254 Kyla Tianhara, ‘What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes and the Protection 
of the Environment in Developing Countries’, Global Environmental Politics 6, no.4 (2006), 73 
{Tianhara} at 80, see 85-87. 
255 Kate Miles (n11) 272. 
256 (n11). 
257 (n34). 
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“Investment is critical to the ability of developing countries to achieve needed economic 
growth to improve the welfare of their populations and to meet their basic needs in a 
sustainable manner, all without deteriorating or depleting the resource base that underpins 
development. Sustainable development requires increased investment, for which domestic and 
external financial resources are needed. Foreign private investment and the return of flight 
capital, which depend on a healthy investment climate, are an important source of financial 
resources.” 258 
  
The language employed by Agenda 21 is clear: without the much needed investment 
and capital flow, developing nations cannot meet the basic needs of their teeming 
populations in a sustainable manner. 
 
Addressing the impact of the global financial crisis on the flow of FDIs, the G8 Heads 
of State, at their 2009 Summit on Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future, 
reiterated their commitment to capital flow and further investment to ensure 
sustainable growth. The Summit’s declaration states in part that: 
 
“The current financial crisis has affected capital flows, including FDIs, which represent an 
important source of financing and a driver for economic growth and integration. We stress 
the positive role of long-term investments. We will work to reverse the recent decline in 
FDIs by fostering an open, receptive climate for foreign investment, especially in 
emerging and developing countries.”259 
 
Furthermore, the International Conference on Financing for Development (ICFD), in 
what is popularly known as the Monterrey Consensus, states in paragraph one that: 
                                                
258 The Rio Earth Summit, (n17). 
259The G8 Declaration. 
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“Private international capital flows, particularly foreign direct investment, along with 
international financial stability, are vital complements to national and international 
development efforts. Foreign direct investment contributes toward financing sustained 
economic growth over the long term”.260  
 
Though the G8 Declaration and the Monterrey Consensus are political exhortations 
that may have no legal force, nevertheless they provide some context for the operation 
of foreign investment in local economies. The documents further recognised the 
importance of foreign investment in stimulating economic growth and therefore the 
need to protect and encourage foreign investment along that line. 
 
The 1994 Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
also considers sustainable development as a fundamental objective by ‘ allowing for 
the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to 
enhance the means of doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development’.261 In the 1998 Geneva 
Ministerial Declaration on the WTO, the Ministers state that ‘ We shall also continue 
to improve our efforts towards the objectives of sustained economic growth and 
sustainable development’.262  
                                                
260 Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development, available 
online at UN <www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf>. 
261 Preamble to the WTO Agreement, available at  <www.wto.org>. 
262 Para.4, Geneva Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc, WT/MIN (98)/DEC/1, May 1998. 
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5.10 Conclusion 
The above summarises the argument from which the concept of sustainable 
development could serve as useful analytical tool in the context of investment treaty 
arbitration. From the overview, scope and legal justification of the concept, it can be 
discerned that investment treaty arbitration will not stand alone in utilizing the 
concept and its associated principles in resolving investment disputes. This is 
particularly important when the current jurisprudence of investment treaty arbitration 
fell short of allowing developing States enough regulatory space to enact legislation 
that will ensure development in the social, environmental and economic spheres. 
Indeed, the suitability of the concept is much more compelling in the natural 
resources sector where resort to local content legislation are pervasive and generating 
a lot of concern among investors, host States and local/indigenous people. To date, no 
tribunal has dealt with a dispute in which national treatment standard need to be 
interpreted in situations where empowerment laws, whether in the language of local 
content or not, are developed by host States. However, the South African Black 
Economic Empowerment, BEE263 law and the Nigerian Local Content Act (NLCA)264 
are good examples of such empowerment laws. In a purported violation of South 
Africa’s investment treaty obligations, especially the national treatment provisions, 
the State enacted a law ordering mining companies to acquire 51% black partners and 
shareholders as a way of empowering the black community after apartheid.265 The 
main stay of the law is the provision of equitable employment opportunity for black 
                                                
263 Enacted under the Minerals & Petroleum Resources Act-MPRDA 53/2003, available online at 
<www.dti.gov.za/bee/complete.pdf > accessed 20 December 2016.  
264 The Act is known as the Nigerian Content or Local Content Act (NLCA) 2010. 
265 Peterson L.E, South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties, Implications for Development and 
Human Rights, in Dialogue on Globalisation, Occasional Papers, Geneva, IISD, Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, No,26, Nov 2006, p.16. Furthermore, though the dispute was never arbitrated and a settlement 
was reached reducing the stake to 26% to be achieved within a decade of the enactment, the substantive 
argument remains. Other developing countries have similar provisions in different sectors of the 
economy especially the energy and other natural resources sectors. Nigeria and Ghana have similar 
legislations. 
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South Africans and increase in their human development index.266 Perhaps another 
sustainable development measure that may potentially raise national treatment 
obligation questions is the compulsory licensing of patented drugs (e.g. Anti-HIV 
Drugs) that might infringe foreign investors’ intellectual property rights.267 It is in the 
context of such and similar dilemmas that the concept of sustainable development 
could be explored with a view to equipping tribunals with a systemic 
analytical/interpretative tool for resolving investment disputes.
                                                
266 NCA 2010, see a detailed discussion of the provisions of the law. 
267Sanders.A.K., ‘Compulsory Licensing and Public Health’, in Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 337, 
2004. 
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Chapter Six 
Synthesis: Making a Case for the Convergence of the Trade and 
Investment Regimes 
6.0 Introduction 
In any study that involves comparing two legal regimes with a view to developing a 
coherent interpretation for both of them, the fundamental thing will first be any 
lessons that could be learned by one regime from the other in an attempt to answer 
similar questions. Developing a common thread that will bring a coherent 
interpretation for both will then follow this. From the in-depth analysis of the regimes 
of investment law and the WTO in Chapters 3 and 4, some similarities and differences 
could be seen. The similarities in the shared history and import, and for the direction 
of the thesis, the differences in the way the two regimes interpret the non-
discrimination principle most importantly, provided the foundation based on which 
the concept of sustainable development was chosen to see to what extent it can serve 
as an interpretative tool for analysis in these regimes of international economic law. 
 
Notwithstanding that the above-mentioned chapters have reviewed the interpretation 
of non-discrimination in the two regimes and chapter five has operationalized the 
discussion in the context of sustainable development, this chapter will synthesise the 
arguments by showing how Article 31(3)(c) will be employed to do this. In doing this, 
the chapter will then conclude the findings against the research questions as set down 
in chapter one. The first research question tried to find out whether sustainable 
development can be used in order to achieve the convergence of the regimes of trade 
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and investment. This was partly answered in Chapter Five wherein the application of 
sustainable development by both investment and trade tribunals was established. 
More importantly, Chapter Five also addressed a significant part of the second 
research question (How can Sustainable Development help in reducing the 
inconsistent interpretations in these fields of international economic law?) 
 by reviewing some investment awards and WTO Panels and AB’s decisions wherein 
sustainable development concerns were raised or applied in the interpretation of the 
non-discrimination standards of NT, FET and MFN.  
 In Chapter Six, making a case for convergence using the sustainability argument 
further deepened this application. This Chapter will answer the most fundamental part 
of the research question by providing justification for the convergence of trade and 
investment regimes. Chapter Six will provide justification on how the provisions of 
Article 31(3)(c) will be used in the interpretation of treaties/non-discrimination 
principle using the concept of sustainable development. 
This chapter accomplishes the above under five headings. In all the headings, the 
central theme is about making a case for convergence of trade and investment by 
providing justifications for doing so, namely, one, justification based on the need of 
sustainable development interpretation, two, justification based on interpretive 
discrepancies, three, justification based on shared history and commonality of legal 
terrain, four justification based on movement between actors, and five, justification 
based on jurisdictional overlap and lack of legal reasoning in arbitral awards. 
6.1 (a) Making a Case for Convergence – Justification Based on Need for 
Sustainable Development Interpretation, Article 31(3)(c) Vienna Convention to 
the Rescue. 
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While it is acknowledged that there are several convergence bases for the WTO 
agreements and the international investment law regime, the rules against 
protectionism and discrimination ensuring equal treatment of foreign and domestic 
products remain the major converging points of the regimes of international trade and 
investment arbitration. It points to the fundamental philosophy and importance of the 
success of the objectives of both the WTO and the investment regime and convert 
these into genres of supporting equal conditions of competition and opportunities.1 
Non-discrimination has come out as a distinct feature of treaty based international 
economic law generally, employed to deal with inequalities in the realm of social and 
economic development. 2 The principle of non-discrimination is found in all the fields 
of international economic law from investment protection generally to the protection 
of intellectual property rights to liberalization of trade in goods and services. Though 
the tests embodied in the non-discrimination obligations in trade differ from that in 
investment, both regimes clearly have rules that regulate measures that differentiate 
directly – de jure and also prohibit indirect – de facto discriminatory measures. 
Although they apply different standards and even interpret same or different standards 
differently, the rationale underlying non-discrimination claims under trade and 
investment are very similar.3 The most common standards embodying the non-
discrimination principle in trade and investment, i.e the national treatment (NT) and 
the most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment have been treated in detail in chapters 
three and four. A good number of BITs also contain the Fair and Equitable Treatment 
(FET) standard, a clause that also explicitly prohibits discrimination; in fact non-
                                                
1 Anselm Kamperman Sanders, The Principle of National Treatment in International Economic Law: 
Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) 12. 
2 T. Cottier and M. Oesch, International Trade Regulation: Law and Policy in the WTO, the European 
Union and Switzerland (Berne/London: Stamfli Publishers/Cameron May, 2005), 346-381. 
3 Nicolas F. Diebold, ‘Standards of Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law’, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 832. 
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discrimination is one of the major elements of the FET.4 The non-discrimination 
principle maintains its superiority over all the standards treated because of the way it 
permeates these and other substantive standards of treatment in both trade and 
investment. 
The economic rationale binding the trade and investment regimes together uses the 
non-discrimination principle to protect any foreign market actor accessing the 
domestic market by ensuring the foreign actor enjoys equal, competitive limitations 
when compared to similar domestic actors.5 For all these, there seem to be no clear 
reasons for the application and/or interpretation of different protection standards to 
regulate these regimes of international economic law.6    
However, though various international tribunals have applied the non-discrimination 
obligations, the inconsistencies in the interpretation of the standards mirroring the 
principle have left parties feeling uncertain as to the consequences and implication of 
the application of the non-discrimination obligation.7 This may be as a result of the 
fact that no clear and agreed tool exists for the interpretation. In the next sub-head, the 
thesis will address, mainly by way of cross-reference, the features and application of 
the principle of non-discrimination in the treaty-based standards as discussed in 
chapters three and four. Though intermittent references will be made to all the 
relevant standards, the sub-head will, in this chapter, restrict the analysis to the 
standard of national treatment (NT) only, which remains the main domain of non-
discrimination in investment treaty arbitration.  
                                                
4 Patrick Dumberry, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, A Guide to NAFTA Case Law on 
Article 1105, (Wolters Kluwer 2013) 209, Andrew Newcombe and Luis Paradell, Law and Practice of 
Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment, (Kluwer 2009) 250, 288-289. 
5 This rationale could also be seen as the egalitarian or legal egalitarianism rationale.  
6 Nicolas Diebold (n3). 
7 Herein lies the essence of the Austinian Philosophy of legal positivism, showing law as it is and not 
as it ought to be, thereby subscribing to the notion of legal predictability. 
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Since the main aim of both trade and investment law is economic growth, it will serve 
both trade and investment arbitral tribunals well to make the issues of sustainable 
development, otherwise sustainable investment and trade to be the main focus in their 
interpretation of the non-discrimination principle as depicted in the standards of 
national treatment, fair and equitable treatment and most-favoured nation treatment. 
This position is achievable in the sense that sustainable development concerns remain 
the focus and interest of both States and investors in the areas of trade and investment. 
This can be done in a number of ways. 
First, States concluding any international investment agreements – IIAs need to have 
sustainable development in focus, a process that has already commenced in the new 
generation IIAs as in the recent UNCTAD Reports and will increasingly be the trend 
in the years to come in light of the UN 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) as a follow-up to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 2015.8 
This will then ensure that the State acts in the best interests of the State and also sees 
to it that investors operate within certain guiding principles that ensure that 
sustainability remain the watchword. Such IIAs will then definitely include relevant 
investment rules that will assist private investors to have a direct line access to 
arbitration without the necessity of going through any dispute settlement mechanisms 
set out in the relevant IIA. 
Secondly, host States negotiating future IIAs have better latitude to redesign their 
treaty outlook so as to take care of sustainable development concerns in the 
negotiation and design processes. Host States will do well to accommodate such areas 
of sustainable development goals as the environment, human rights and social 
                                                
8 See generally, Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable development, UNGA 
A/Res/70/1. 
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development that they have already committed themselves to under various enabling 
international instruments. 
The failure of the multilateralisation of investment at the Havana conference should 
not be the last word towards harmony between the two historically linked but 
currently contending regimes of international economic law. Presently, new treaties 
are being negotiated and designed with attention being focused mainly on the 
sustainable development goals they set out to achieve. These new treaties will, of 
course, offer investment tribunals tools of interpretation that are no different from 
what they are used to but are streamlined to ensure coherence, consistency and 
harmony of interpretation of the non-discrimination standard. This type of 
interpretation will only be possible because of the sustainable development objectives 
contained in the newly negotiated and designed treaties. This seems to have already 
started with the Morocco-Nigeria BIT9 signed recently. 
Further to the provisions of Article 31(3)(c), it is trite that judges, while interpreting 
any legal provisions can rely on or make reference to other existing rules as long as 
such are relevant. Here, it is submitted that sustainable development is aptly suited to 
serve as a useful interpretative tool, especially where it is already part of the treaty 
being interpreted either as a preamble or present as a substantive part of the treaty. It 
has the hermeneutical function to be effective both as a customary principle and as a 
conventional rule. Its functionality and flexibility as a notion affords the arbitrator a 
high degree of freedom on the way to apply it based on the choices that need to be 
made. Apart from the natural functionality and applicability of sustainable 
development as an interpretative tool, the concept is very much applicable outside 
conventional reference. This is so because Article 31(3)(c) clearly established that 
                                                
9 Morocco-Nigeria BIT (December 2016). 
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‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ 
must be taken into account in the interpretative process. This means that either as a 
principle of customary international law or as an extraneous conventional rule, the 
concept of sustainable development is applicable in treaty interpretation in as much as 
it is relevant for such an interpretation and is also applicable in the relations between 
the parties. In practice, this has however remained unclear, not straightforward and 
sometimes even problematic.  
So far, the above types of treaties have been taking root for some time. The prototype 
of the international sustainable development centre seems to have influenced the 
negotiation and design of the Norwegian BIT and the US 2004 models. The most 
recent and outlandish has been the Nigeria and Morocco BIT referred to earlier in this 
chapter. Its contents are far-reaching and extensive especially as sustainability of 
investment is concerned. These newly negotiated BITs, apart from incorporating 
sustainable development issues, also produce a more balanced investment treaty 
taking care of the investors through the protection of their investment and the host 
State through the recognition of their sovereignty in providing the regulatory 
framework for such investments to succeed. This represents a far cry from current 
BITs that States argued are imbalanced since their interpretation seems to give 
investment tribunals the necessary impetus to be more concerned about investment 
protection rather than host State development imperatives. 
Though existing IIAs must be arbitrated based on their present content and context, 
however, it is hereby submitted that arbitral tribunals still have the discretion to 
interpret in a sustainable development friendly way thereby ensuring the sustainability 
of the investment under consideration. The arena is not free from such cases that have 
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rendered this postulation not only hypothetical but also real. The Methanex tribunal 
decision is relevant here.  
Apart from the call for arbitral tribunals’ to interpret existing IIAs in a sustainable 
development friendly way, one cannot fail to notice the background provided by soft 
law instruments in this regard. A lot of these soft law instruments have been at the 
forefront of providing the foundation for the recognition of environmental, hence 
sustainable development concerns by drawing attention to their importance. Agenda 
21 is one of such soft laws, though despite it and several others, lots of room exists for 
improvement to see that current investment regulatory framework did promote 
sustainability. Now an informed analysis on how the Vienna Convention can be 
applied is apt here. 
The way IIAs are drafted, especially IIAs drafted in the form of BITs containing 
extensive and unclear terms, necessitates the need for their interpretation with a view 
to getting to the root of what their meaning entails. It is argued that the more 
imprecise the contents of a particular treaty, the more applicable or need for the 
application of the Vienna rules because of its inherent provisions to allow the 
incorporation of external provisions in order to aid interpretive procedure.10  
As detailed in Chapter Two, in any treaty, the logical starting point for any 
interpretative process has always been the meaning or meanings that can be attached 
to the terms of the treaty as words hardly possess only a singular meaning.11  Agreed, 
interpretation is not amendment and as such the import of the Vienna rules is to 
simply find out what the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in question that 
                                                
10 Generally, see Katharina Berner, ‘Reconciling Investment Protection and Sustainable Development: 
A Plea for an Interpretative U-Turn’, in Shifting Paradigms in International Investment Law: More 
Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly Diversified, Stefen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski (eds), 
(OUP 2016) 183. 
11 See Chapter Two; see also Richard Gardiner (Chapter Two) 164, also see G. Schwarzenberger, 
‘Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation, Articles 27-29 of the Vienna Draft Convention on the 
Law of Treaties’ Va J Intl L 13. 
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will most closely result in the parties’ intention is. It is following from this that the 
Vienna rules is further employed by an interpreter in resolving conflicts of norms in 
interpretation when he or she has to choose between two or more contending 
interpretations.12 It is not only in resolving contending interpretations that the rules 
are applied but following the argument that IIAs contain clauses that have multiple 
meanings; it is now accepted into reckoning that they possess inherent ability to 
harmonize investment/trade protection and issues of sustainable development 
concerns.13 For example, as explained under the discussion of the interpretation of the 
non-discrimination standard of FET in Chapter Three, the terms ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ 
are so fluid and unclear when interpreted literally. So Article 31 VCLT views 
interpretation as a ‘single combined operation’ rather than simply an exercise wherein 
other means of interpretation will necessarily be employed in case the literal rule fails 
to provide a clear meaning.14  
So as established in assembling the elements of Article 31 VCLT in Chapter Two, it 
is the object and purpose of a treaty and the context in which the treaty’s provisions 
appear that are most relevant in the interpretation of the treaty. They are fundamental 
in the reconciliation of investment/trade protection and sustainable development. 
However, the argument of employing the purpose of a treaty in its interpretation has 
not been without criticisms. Since IIAs are fundamentally about investment 
protection, some will argue that their object and purpose forbids rather than supports 
any deliberations of sustainable development concerns. However, this criticism seems 
to miss the point, since the object and purpose of a treaty are not necessarily always 
                                                
12 Though some arguments exists as to the desirability or workability of applying the Vienna rules in 
complex conflicts of norms situations. This will provide a ground for some recommendations in the 
thesis; it is outside the realm of this thesis to further the discussion here. Suffice it to state here that the 
rules do not provide a gateway for States from the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
13 Katharina Berner (n10) 185. 
14 See Chapter Two for a discussion on single combined operation in treaty interpretation. 
 230 
one-dimensional and if they are, that will not be enough to restrain the tribunal from 
applying sustainable development concerns in its interpretation.15 Suffice it to say, as 
explained earlier, a look at a treaty’s object and purpose necessarily entails taking the 
treaty as a whole from its preamble to the entire substantive provisions. This emphasis 
becomes necessary here because of the erroneous argument that it is the preamble that 
represents the entire content of the treaty and that the preamble usually mentions only 
investment protection. So both the preamble and substantive provisions are important 
in treaty interpretation; for example, where a particular treaty refers to ‘economic 
development’ in its preamble, the tribunal can interpret such broadly to include ‘long 
term sustainable development’ rather than a narrow interpretation that limits it to 
short term economic development.16 So a good reading of both the preamble and 
substantive provisions of a treaty and any other attachment therein will show that the 
treaty aims at more than investment protection. And assuming that a treaty’s aim is 
only for investment protection that is not to say that, as argued above, it cannot be 
interpreted by invoking sustainable development. That interpretation would be 
narrowing the treaty’s object and purpose, which is not what Article 31(3)(c) VCLT 
envisaged.17  
Article 31(3)(c) VCLT as a principle of systemic integration, is clearly suitable for 
not only integrating sustainable development into investment agreements, but also 
because of its broad application of the context in which the treaty occurs, it can safely 
                                                
15 Katharina Berner (n10) 185. 
16 Diane Desierto, ‘Development as an International Right: Investment in the New Trade-Based IIAs’ 
(2011) 3 Trade L & Dev 296, 320. 
17 For example in a situation where there is a conflict between a Host State and a foreign investor 
regarding the Host State’s action that was purely informed by sustainable development concerns, and 
there was ambiguity as to whether the relevant investment protection standard prohibits such action, 
here, a narrow object and purpose interpretation will portray the Host State’s action is not prohibited as 
the protection standard merely set out to protect against measures directly connected to the ‘narrow’ 
object and purpose – at least this was the unconventional reasoning in Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case 
No ARNB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability (14 January 2010), Katharina Berner (n10) 
186.  
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be used to interpret any provisions, especially the non-discrimination provisions as 
contained in the relative standards. This is so because the reference to ‘other rules’ 
under the article is beyond those rules applicable to the subject matter of the treaty but 
also includes all those rules that are relevant and will assist in the understanding of the 
relative terms of the treaty.18 So for example in a BIT, the arbitral tribunal, further to 
the provisions of Article 31(3)(c), may make reference to the provisions of another 
treaty binding between the parties before it or to the rules of customary international 
law in its findings.19 There is no doubt that other rules of international law applicable 
necessarily relate to the presence or appearance of the concept of sustainable 
development.20  
6.2 (b) Making a Case for Convergence – Justification based on interpretive 
discrepancies  
It is not an overstatement to say that the non-discrimination principle featured in all 
the standards discussed in chapters three and four, international investment 
agreements (IIAs), mainly the bilateral investment treaties (BITs), protect and ensure 
the liberalization of investment flow through some fundamental guarantees against 
discrimination and any unfair conduct by host states.   
The principle of non-discrimination is included in most modern IIAs using the 
nationality of the investor (covered by such standards as the national treatment and 
the most-favoured-nation treatment standards), and such absolute standards like the 
                                                
18 See Chapter Two for an analysis of other rules and the parties they apply to – State parties to the 
treaty under consideration. 
19 Chapter Two, the crystallisation of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT into a rule of customary international law 
has been well explained therein, though customary international rules application to interpretation in 
multilateral treaty using Article 31(3)(c) VCLT is not as easy to apply as under the BITs. 
20 As shown in Chapter Five, the tribunal may refer to or take account of a range of sustainable 
development environmental agreements like the 1992 Rio Convention on Biological Diversity, the 
1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, or even Human Rights treaties.   
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principle of ‘fair and equitable treatment’, and guarantees against expropriation.21 
Though these standards depict the availability of the principle of non-discrimination 
in the two major fields of international economic law, both the definition of the 
principle and its interpretation/application using those standards remain problematic. 
Since these investment norms are seen as instruments of ‘judicial integration’, the 
responsibility of the arbitral tribunal in the interpretation and application of the 
standards is of the utmost importance.22 Arbitral tribunals and WTO Panels and 
Appellate Bodies (ABs) have given different interpretations to the elements of 
‘likeness’, ‘less favourable treatment’ and ‘regulatory purpose’ leading to a varying 
understanding of the non-discrimination principle in international economic law.23 
Unfortunately, these varying and inconsistent interpretations occur despite the 
similarities in the fundamental economic philosophy in both trade and investment 
regimes. 
In order to assess the effect of these varying and inconsistent interpretations, raw 
literature abounds from the complex network of over 3,000 IIAs from which there 
were more than 380 investor-State disputes that have resulted in an interesting body 
of arbitral jurisprudence of over 180 decisions on both procedural and substantive 
aspects of international investment law.24 Following the analysis of some of these 
arbitral decisions in Chapter Three and Panels and AB decisions in Chapter Four, this 
thesis argues that there still exists a vast gap of inconsistency in the way in which 
arbitral tribunals interpret these standards of treatment, especially the national 
treatment standard, even in the same IIA, hence the need to look elsewhere for 
harmony in interpretation beyond the insistence of arbitral tribunals on investment 
                                                
21 See generally Federico Ortino, Non-Discrimination Treatment in Investment Disputes in Human 
Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration, (OUP 2009), 344. 
22 Federico Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberation of Trade (2004) 24-27. 
23 See Chapters Three and Four above; see also Nicolas Diebold, (n3). 
24 See Chapter Three, generally. 
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protection only to the detriment of the Host State’s other more fundamental concerns 
like sustainable development. 25 Ahead of showing how these tribunals, in the 
interpretation of investment agreements can utilize the concept of sustainable 
development, a synthesis of some cases where the inconsistencies were much 
pronounced may serve as a necessary foundation. 
Due to the nature of the national treatment provision as an ambiguous, relative right 
of the foreign investor, the argument centred on the extent the Host States are 
supposed to go in the protection of the foreign investors or their investment or the 
relative level of protection to be given.26 Cumulatively seen, the interpretation of 
these arbitral decisions depends on the examination of the facts and circumstances of 
each case.27 Effectively, this leaves lots of discretion for independent arbitrators 
interpreting the non-discrimination obligation in national treatment and opens a wide 
door to inconsistency and incoherence. 
International investment law is still considered to be in its developmental stage. The 
cases analysed in Chapter Three on the interpretation of the principle of non-
discrimination as contained in the national treatment standard in IIAs point to high 
levels of inconsistency in the interpretation of the meaning and function of the notion 
underlying the utility of this standard. No doubt, investment tribunals have differed in 
their comprehension of various aspects of the standard, from the nature of the 
relationship between parties to be compared, the relevance of discriminatory intent 
and the discriminatory measure and the policy objective establishing the different 
treatment under consideration. In reality, the tribunals failed in all the three 
                                                
25 See a detailed analysis of these inconsistent interpretations in chapter three, see also Federico Ortino, 
(n21), 345 on this particular point. 
26 See Jose E. Alvarez, ‘The Emerging Foreign Direct Investment Regime’, (2005) 99 Proceedings of 
the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 95. 
27 S.D. Myers Inc v. Canada, Chapter Two. 
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parameters usually applied in trying to understand these standards, necessarily paving 
the way for the need for a fresh look at interpretation here.  
The construction of the national treatment standard in investment treaties left it 
unlocked for regulatory measures to be evaluated at either the likeness or the   
justification stage. First, on the basis of likeness, two different arbitral tribunals seem 
to have taken diametrically opposing views. While the tribunal in Occidental took a 
much wider reading of the concept of likeness by comparing a foreign oil exporter 
with a domestic flower exporter, the tribunal in Methanex took a much narrower, 
stricter reading of likeness by comparing only identical investors. In Methanex, the 
UNCITRAL tribunal, in its attempt to understand ‘like circumstances’, was quite 
reluctant to employ the concept of direct competition relative to the companies under 
consideration under the guise that the NAFTA text did recognise or employ the phrase 
‘direct competition’.28 On the other hand, the ICSID tribunal in Occidental 
expansively applied ‘like circumstances’ to all domestic producers irrespective of the 
line of commercial activity they are engaged in. The Occidental arbitral decision and 
its reasoning is supported to the extent that the non-discrimination principle under 
international investment law, at least historically, has never been about competing 
business. 
The Occidental and Methanex tribunals have been both criticised and praised. 
Criticised for their failure to add some economic rigor to their analysis of the test for 
likeness just like the WTO did in its assessment of National Treatment; which also 
necessitates a look at the likeness comparator. What these tribunals did was simply to 
limit the tests to be based on equality of competitive opportunities. On the other hand, 
                                                
28 Methanex, para.33. 
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some others, for judiciously integrating a shared standard of competing products 
under the GATT into a spread out, celebrated the tribunals. 
The ICSID tribunal in Loewen v. United States argued in a way that no comparator in 
like circumstances exists that could be used to determine the violation of the principle 
of non-discrimination. On the other hand, an UNCITRAL tribunal, in Sergei Paushole 
v. Mongolia, argued that any test for discrimination to determine likeness will 
necessarily involve an assessment of the sector or sectors the investors operate, which 
in this case happened to be the Mongolian gold sector. It is noted here that the tribunal 
seems to be borrowing from the WTO notion of sector that is something squarely 
connected to competitive and substitutable products as developed under the 
jurisprudence of the trade regime.  
In the interpretation of the MFN standard, no less confusion exists in the way of 
arbitral tribunals dealing with interpretation. In MTD v Chile, the ICSID tribunal for 
example applied the MFN in a kind of a bizarre way by using it to bring an obligation 
to award permits to the investor, itself construed as an extension of the FET standard 
found in Chile’s BIT with Denmark. Another ICSID tribunal in the case of Maffezini, 
in quite an expansive and inclusionary reading, ordered that the broad definition of 
the MFN standard as contained in the Argentina-Spain BIT, apart from substantive 
rights, also involved dispute settlement procedures that allow foreign investors to 
resort to investor-State dispute settlement that has not been expressly provided by the 
relevant treaty in consideration but which had, however, been granted in another IIA 
to which the host State is a party. The Siemens v Argentina tribunal followed the line 
of thinking of the Maffezini tribunal. The Siemens v Argentina tribunal clearly 
allowed the claimants to apply the MFN standard in the relevant treaty to invoke the 
investor-State dispute settlement mechanism in another instrument for the simple 
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reason that there was no valid reason not to do so. However, the ICSID tribunal in 
Plasma Consortium v Bulgaria, in a strict, narrow reading of the MFN provision, 
ruled that whenever the IIA is silent on the extent of the MFN standard in respect to 
the coverage of procedural matters contained in other treaties, then the tribunals 
should not regard such an extension to be applicable. This is in stark contrast to the 
decision of the tribunal in Maffezini. It is easy to appreciate the tension in the two 
contrasting decisions. The expansive, inclusionary reading of Maffezini and the 
narrow, strict reading of Plasma clearly represent the argument of this thesis of the 
inconsistency in arbitral decision making which may variously appear to support the 
interests of investors or States depending on the composition of a given tribunal. 
Although the doctrine of jurisprudence constante is fast developing, no doctrine of 
stare decisis exists in the jurisprudence of investment arbitration, as such investment 
tribunals are in no way compelled to follow the decisions/reasoning of previous 
tribunals thereby setting a de facto precedent in contradistinction to applying the 
Vienna rules. They are absolutely free to make their own decisions, applying legal 
reasoning as they deem fit based on the arguments canvassed before them in relation 
to the applicable treaty. However, regarding legal reasoning, apart from the problems 
identified in various chapters29, the arbitral tribunals mostly, completely ignore the 
requirements of the Vienna rules of a ‘single combined operation’ in any of their 
interpretative processes/approaches.30    
From the above cases, it need not be said that investment arbitration lacks the 
necessary coherence and consistency to ensure the legitimate expectation of both 
States and investors. The system is flawed with these inconsistent decisions, 
incoherence and as such lack of predictability in arbitral decision making. The 
                                                
29 See especially chapters Three and Five for a discussion of faulty arbitral reasoning. 
30 As stated under 6.1 above, this point was discussed when analysing the substantive application of the 
Vienna Rules in Chapter Two. 
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argument of this thesis in answering the research question, how can Sustainable 
Development help in reducing the inconsistent interpretations in these fields of 
international economic law? is that both investment tribunals and WTO Panels and 
ABs would be better suited with a framework that will ensure that their decisions are 
predictable based on the enabling framework they work with, that their decisions are 
coherent, safeguarding the legitimate expectations of the parties and as such are 
probable. If these are to be achieved, sustainable development seems to be the best 
possible alternative. As noted in 6.1 above, arbitral tribunals can use sustainability 
issues as their framework for the interpretation of these applicable non-discrimination 
standards regardless of the type of BIT under consideration. 
6.3 (c) Making a Case for Convergence – Justification based on Legal Reasoning 
in Arbitral Awards 
Arbitrators rendering an award run a herculean task trying to please the parties before 
them, and at the same time, justify their decisions on the balance. This sub-head deals 
with arbitrators’ reasoning and what informed their awards. A lot of factors seem to 
be responsible for the attacks against arbitrators. Host States remain the major critics 
of these arbitral tribunals. These States argued that tribunals are biased against the 
State in the majority of awards, effectively stifling their regulator capacity, which in 
turn usually leads to a regulatory chill.31 The host States further accused the 
arbitrators of rendering awards that mainly have the interest of the investors not the 
host States at heart. This is said to do a lot with the background of the arbitrators and 
their relationship with the disputing parties. Here we are not talking of arbitrators’ 
bias due to corruption, their training, level of education, jurisdiction, culture and even 
                                                
31 Gus Van Harten, ‘Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication (Part Two): An Examination 
of Hypothesis of Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, (2016) 53 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 540. 
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origins are all at play, and the effects of all these have led to contending arguments on 
the quality of their decisions. 
There is the argument that arbitrators are mostly from the West; educated in the legal 
tradition there, acquired their skills there and mostly defend investors from the west. 
Though they are required to render awards based on the principle of utmost good 
faith, this has not always been the case. Some awards seem to be delivered mainly 
with the investors not the host States in mind.32 This is necessary as the investors, at 
whose pleasure they serve, mainly retain their services.33 Their argument before 
investment tribunals is towards a favourable interpretation of investment treaty 
standards so as to protect investment, stifle regulation and ensure hassle free 
repatriation of profits. So as investors become satisfied with the entire system of 
investment arbitration, more claims surely showed up and more arbitral panels 
established.34 
Secondly, since the majority of arbitrators are from the west and hence whenever they 
sit with others especially from the developing world, they tend to dominate the 
landscape by way of their intimidating presence and polished mannerisms against 
                                                
32 Filip De Ly et al, ‘Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration? Are Investors and Host 
States on a Level Playing Field?’, (2005) 6 J. World Investment & Trade 59 at 69, Ibironke T 
Odumosu, ‘The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World’, (2007) 8:2 
San Diego Int’I LJ 345, Olivia Chung, ‘The Lopsided International Law Regime and Its Effect on the 
Future of Investor-State Arbitration’ (2007) 47:4 Va J Int’I L 953, Ercus Stewart, ‘Arbitration in the 
Developing World’ (Paper delivered at the Cortina 2008 CPE Legal Conference, 7 January 2008) 
available online: <cpeconferences.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Paper-Stewart-Cortina08.pdf> at 
3, 8, Gus Van Harten, ‘Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication (Part Two): An 
Examination of Hypothesis of Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, (2016) 53 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 540. 
33 It is recognised that recent empirical studies have shown that in the majority ISDS, host States have 
won the case against foreign investors, balancing the above argument against arbitrators’ Western 
outlook and bias, see – Susan Franck, ‘Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration’: 
< http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract id=1406714>, see also Rachel L. Wellhausen, 
‘Recent Trend in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’, (2016) 7, Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement 128-129.  
34 See M. Sornarajah, ‘Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in International Law’, (2006) 10 
(19) Sing Y B Int’l L 32, M. Sornarajah, ‘The Climate of International Commercial Arbitration’, 
(1991) 8 (47) J Int’l Arb 47, for an incisive analysis of the arguments regarding arbitrators’ influence 
and biases in relation to who they represent and other germane issues.   
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their less exposed, less educated counterparts.35 Their outlook is western, their drive is 
the huge professional fees they charge, which makes them less willing to see the 
necessity of good faith only interpretation of treaties. The cultural background of 
these arbitrators also greatly involved their practice, necessitating tension with 
arbitrators from developing countries with a different training, skills and mindset. All 
things considered, foreign investors are not oblivious of the above attributes of some 
of the arbitrators and usually make their choice selectively, careful to drive the 
maximum benefit. 
However, counter arguments do exist to all of the above submissions. Reacting to the 
claim of bias against arbitrators’ background by developing States, Jan Paulsson 
posits that though historical anxiety exists about such arbitrators’ bias in investment-
related arbitration, “the dice are loaded no longer”36, he argued that it is high time 
developing States come to terms with “international arbitration as it is: a neutral 
means for the resolution of conflicts… to be mastered rather than complained 
about”.37 Susan Franck, who undertook numerous empirical researches on this 
subject, has shown that in reality, in the majority of Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS), host States have won the case against them.38 She argued that governments 
‘can and did win investment disputes’, with governments more likely to succeed in 
arbitration (57.7%) than foreign investors (38.5%), with the foreign investors only 
getting a fraction (about US$10 million) as against what their typical claims (about 
                                                
35 Some writers see this as a kind of arbitral terrorism or arbitral mafiosism. See generally Malcolm 
Langford et al, ‘The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration’, (2017) 20 Journal of 
International Economic Law 301-331. 
36 Jan Paulsson, ‘Third World Participation in International Investment Arbitration’ (1987) 2 (21) 
ICSID Rev. Foreign Investment L J 19. 
37 Jan Paulson, 33. 
38 Susan Franck, ‘Predicting Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2015) 65 Duke Law Journal.  
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US$343) are.39 Her conclusive argument was that no reliable evidence exists to show 
that “the outcome of investment treaty arbitration was not reliably associated with the 
development status of the respondent state, the development status of the presiding 
arbitrator, or some interaction between those two variables”.40 
6.4 (d) Making a Case for Convergence – Justification based on Shared 
History/Commonality of Legal Terrain – Convergence Factors 
Commonality of the legal terrain of both trade and investment is quite true despite the 
fact that there is the existing view that the separation of the two regimes seems to be 
airtight. From the trade angle, it is evident that foreign investment in the services 
sector is regulated extensively within the WTO against the vital role of that sector as a 
proportion of global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. The regime incorporate a 
number of shared micro norms notably their restrictions against State discrimination 
in the form of both NT and MFN. Both disciplines essentially guarantee competitive 
opportunity between foreign and domestic goods, services and investors. States 
parties are now paying attention to managing potential conflicts between investment 
treaty norms and WTO law and have even moved on to review their commitments by 
inserting flexibilities for State regulation vis-à-vis foreign investors and their 
investment. Interestingly, these States do this by drawing on the WTO model to guide 
these reform efforts. In a lot of FTAs, full WTO exceptions are simply incorporated 
into investment chapters by reference, for example in the Australia-ASEAN-New 
Zealand Free Trade Agreement.41 
                                                
39 Susan D. Franck, ‘Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2007) 86 N 
C L Rev 31, Susan Franck, ‘Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2009) 50 
(2) Harvard International Law Journal 447. 
40 Susan Franck, ‘Development Outcomes’, 487. 
41 AANZFTA (2009). 
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6.5 (e) Making a Case for Convergence – Justification based on Jurisdictional 
Overlap 
A measure can fall within the jurisdiction of both regimes and can even be 
adjudicated simultaneously. This entwined relationship between the two regimes can 
be seen in the Softwood lumber dispute between the US and Canada that triggered 
both WTO and NAFTA claims. The convergence between the two systems is further 
evident in the complex ‘Soft drinks’ dispute between Mexico and the US that 
triggered NT claims both by the US as a State party in the WTO and also by a scope 
of US investors under NAFTA Chapter 11. It should be noted that the fact that these 
proceedings have been completed does not stop the likelihood of overlapping 
litigation or parallel proceedings. 
Further to the above, the very prospect of the above parallel proceedings is driven by 
economic logic and reality, especially the manner in which cross-border trade and 
foreign investment is increasingly inter-dependent. 
6.6 (f) Making a Case for Convergence – Justification based on Movement of 
Actors 
One area that deserves attention considering the possibility of the convergence of the 
trade and investment regime is the movement of actors across the two fields of 
international economic law. It is an area that merits deep introspection especially by 
the critics to the idea of systematic convergence as is advocated in this thesis.  
The multilateral nature of international trade law as depicted in the WTO show the 
Panels and Appellate Board having a sophisticated dispute settlement mechanism 
usually populated by professionals experienced in trade disputes. It has been observed 
that these members at various times in their professional calling have straddled to the 
other side of the divide to offer their professional services based on their calling. 
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Members of the Appellate Board have had occasions to participate as arbitrators in 
investment disputes – a case in point is that of the late Justice Florentino Feliciano 
whose professional calling saw him not only chairing the Appellate Board of the 
WTO but also serving as a member of the Panel of Arbitrators and Panel of 
Conciliators at the ICSID, member of the Panel of Arbitrators at the International 
Centre of Commerce (ICC), rendering various decisions such as the Amco Asia 
Corporation v. Republic of Indonesia42, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases43 etc. Certain 
arbitrators have also had occasions to participate in WTO Panels and AB decision-
making processes. In both instances, it is argued that the two regimes relied on the 
relative knowledge, experience, expertise and pedigree of such experts, hence the 
need for their appointment to serve. Now the issue here is, why have confidence in the 
experts to adjudicate in disputes while denying the system that appoints them the 
necessary need to converge? It is submitted that having confidence in the system 
should be relative to having confidence in the professionals that serve the system. It is 
the system that develops them; given the status and enabling environment to succeed. 
It seems hypocritical for the systems to have confidence in their appointees but not in 
themselves. It is to the benefit of the systems that the two regimes of international 
economic law converge for the better. Arbitrators and trade adjudicators can share the 
platform together, the experiences acquired will serve each other and the lessons 
gained will go a long way towards stabilising the system, ensuring consistency, 
coherence and predictability. It is the shared history, commonality in legal terrain, 
jurisdictional overlap, interdependence between legal regimes of trade and investment 
in their cross-border relations and cross-fertilisation between trade and investment 
                                                
42 ICSID Case No.ARB/81/1, Annulment Proceedings 1985-1986; Award Rendered 16 May 1986 
(annulling prior ICSID decision). 
43 Australia/New Zealand v. Japan (2000). 
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that gives these actors the wherewithal to be able to navigate the contours of the two 
regimes.  
Necessarily, the arguments they proffer in their decision-making processes definitely 
always take care of the background of the dispute, any constituent jurisprudential 
underpinning, relevant documents and the submissions of the parties.  
The multilateral development of the trade law regime has a lot to offer the investment 
arbitration regime in terms of its jurisprudence, legal nature, exceptions and most 
importantly the dispute settlement mechanism – DSU of the WTO. It is evident no 
one is calling for a hardcore convergence or collapse of one regime into the other 
sweepingly, rather this is advocating a gradual, harmonious, sustainable development 
friendly interpretation of the investment/trade non-discrimination protection standards 
that are at the core of the substantive provisions of the two regimes. Achieving this is 
a sure way towards relative convergence. 
6.7 Conclusion  
As argued in the preceding chapters, especially in Chapters Three and Four, tribunals, 
in the interpretation of treaties and especially in the interpretation of the non-
discrimination standards, have been at best inconsistent, a situation more prevalent in 
the investment treaty arbitration. This is an area that may call for learning from the 
trade jurisprudence. The WTO, from the cases analysed in Chapter Four which, 
despite the system’s own manifest problems, showed a more advanced and settled 
jurisprudence with its dispute settlement mechanism and in Chapter Six, the cases 
showed how sustainable development was applied by the WTO and how Article 
31(3)(c) was employed in the interpretative processes, clearly sheathing the sword of 
criticism and providing potential learning curves for the investment regime. Hence the 
WTO can serve as a solution to the problems of the discrepancies and incoherence 
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that are visible in the interpretive process in the investment field. Now the case for 
sustainable development can then emanate from the WTO, which has already found 
sustainable development to be suitable and applicable. Though there is the argument 
that sustainable development is a pseudo lex specialis that is rooted in environmental 
law44 and as such unsuitable for application elsewhere, the discussion in Chapter Six 
with support from various judicial authorities and recent State action in the conclusion 
of modern treaties may have laid that to rest. The root and relevance of sustainable 
development in environmental disputes can be extrapolated to the entire fields of 
trade and investment. Sustainable development can serve as a tool for convergence 
rather than as a mechanism for resolving environmental related disputes only. 
Convergence clearly has a multiplier effect because if the two regimes, trade and 
investment are to converge, that will definitely reduce the manifest inconsistencies, 
incoherence and contradictory findings. The next chapter, Chapter Seven, will provide 
some conclusions.
                                                
44 Dire Tladi, Sustainable Development in International Law: An Analysis of Key Enviro-Economic 
Instruments (PULP 2007) for a comprehensive analysis of sustainable development as a lex specialis 
that has its root first and foremost in environmental law before its advancement to other areas, and 
other areas of legal practice. 
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Chapter Seven 
  Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion 
7.0 Summary 
This research has shown the effect of the existing bifurcation of the regimes of 
international economic law especially the fields of trade and investment law. The 
inconsistencies and incoherence in the interpretation of the relative standards of 
treatment covering the principle of non-discrimination for example have denied 
investors any certainty in predicting the outcome of awards and narrowed host States’ 
regulatory space. 
It was against the above background that the thesis framed the question how could 
sustainable development be used to achieve legal convergence between international 
trade law and international investment law? At the crux of the research questions was 
the concept of sustainable development, which was applied in the thesis as both an 
interpretative and a convergence tool. The concept, as argued throughout the thesis 
and especially in Chapter Six, can serve not only as a convergent tool but also as an 
interpretive lens that can be used by arbitral tribunals and WTO Panels and Appellate 
Board to interpret the principle of non-discrimination, which permeates all the 
standards of treatment. The thesis applied comparative legal analysis and deductive 
legal reasoning in analysing the jurisprudences of the WTO, PCIJ/ICJ, ECtHR, 
ITLOS and NAFTA regarding the interpretation of standards of treatment and 
harmonisation of contending legal regimes. 
The thesis has reacted to the incoherence in the interpretation of not only the principle 
of non-discrimination in the two main regimes of international economic law but also 
to the entire interpretation of treaties by appreciating the relevance of a uniform 
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framework for interpretation/analysis in the two fields. It identified the relevance of 
sustainable development not only as a ‘fabric of modern life’ but as a tool for 
sustainable justice between investors and host States. 
Placing the utility of sustainable development in context, the thesis analysed how the 
principle of Systemic Integration under Article 31(3)(c) can be used to apply 
sustainability concerns in not only interpretation of treaties and protection standards 
but also in the design and negotiation of future treaties.   
Finally, assuming that sustainable development concerns are not even part of the 
treaty under consideration and cannot be viewed as such for whatever reasons, the 
thesis pointed out that the tribunals have a role to play in seeing that it is not 
dispensed with completely in its interpretation. Sustainable development issues can 
still be raised before the tribunal. First, a tribunal can, suo moto, raise a sustainable 
development issue itself without either party doing so. Through the long held dictum 
of jura novit curia,1 the tribunal is adjudged to know the relevant and applicable law 
in any situation and at whichever stage. It is trite that the parties before a court of law 
need not necessarily raise questions of law but the court can examine such questions 
proprio moto such as raising issues of environmental concerns/agreement even if the 
parties before the court did not consider it right to do so.  
From our discussion in chapter two, the usefulness, relevance and applicability of the 
Vienna Convention in the interpretation of treaties, investment treaties in particular, 
has been examined in detail. The Convention is generally seen as relevant to integrate 
sustainable development concerns into emerging IIAs especially of the BIT types. 
This can be done either through an informed inquiry into whether the IIA in question 
                                                
1 On this, see the work of the ILA Committee on International Commercial Arbitration (1989-2000), 
http://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/committees.  
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falls under the purview of the Vienna Rules or whether an arbitral tribunal is 
necessarily authorized to apply the Vienna Rules to interpret a particular agreement.  
The provisions of Article 31(3)(c) can indeed be applied anytime a tribunal is or 
needs to take sustainable development concerns into account in its deliberations. 
As shown in different places in the thesis, several courts and tribunals have invoked 
this particular article. For example, the Appellate Board of the WTO, in the EC-
Biotech Products, held that Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention required 
‘consideration of the rules of international law which are applicable in the relations 
between all parties to the treaty which is being interpreted’. The WTO has been at the 
forefront of the strict application of the Vienna Convention in its interpretation, 
requiring all Panels and Appellate Boards to ensure that interpretation strictly 
followed the Convention. 
7.1 Recommendations 
Flowing from the discussion and conclusions reached in various chapters, especially 
from the findings in chapters five and six; the research hastens to narrow down to the 
following specific recommendations: 
- In order to ensure coherence, convergence and the legitimate expectations of 
the parties, the topmost priority ought to be the multilateralisation of 
investment rules (just like the jurisprudence of or together with trade rules) in 
order to form one single, reliable, easily applicable legal/economic/policy 
framework following the enabling foundation provided by sustainable 
development. The success or not of the TPP and TTIP agreements offering not 
only multilateralisation but a dispute system (for example an investment court 
advocated by the TTIP) with precedential value may provide enough materials 
for future research in this area. 
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- In the alternative, judges and arbitrators need to be more imaginative and 
visionary by churning out more reasoned awards that allow (not necessarily a 
seamless/wholesale borrowing as this is not necessarily possible from the 
reasons adduced in the Methanex case, but) a learning curve by one regime 
from the other, ensuring ‘sustainable justice’ in the process? This will allow 
sustainable development to be developed and achieved through judicial 
activism.  
-  As argued in the body of the thesis, before waiting for disputes to arise so that 
sustainable development will be used in interpretation, a far more pragmatic 
approach is for treaty drafters to ensure that new IIAs are drafted in a 
‘sustainable development’ friendly way as shown by the example in the 2016 
Nigeria-Morocco BIT. 
- Ab initio, a novel approach will be to incorporate social, economic and 
environmental factors relative to sustainable development and green all the 
standards of treatment in the negotiation/design of future investment treaties. 
- Investment tribunals will do well to apply sustainable development 
‘evolutionary interpretation’ in all treaty terms. 
The above recommendations have been discussed in different areas of the 
substantive work. 
7.2 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this thesis has made a modest contribution in developing a body of 
knowledge and has contributed to the discussion of a more coherent and harmonious 
way for the interpretation of treaties and the principle of non-discrimination through 
the lens of sustainable development. Furthermore, the thesis provides the guideline on 
how sustainable development can be used to ensure the convergence of the regimes of 
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trade and investment. It showed how the insights gained from studying the 
jurisprudence of the WTO and the ICJ helped in pointing to the utility of sustainable 
development as a veritable tool than can harmonise and eventually lead to the 
convergence of two contending regimes. This study serves as an academic attempt for 
the development of an intellectual lens that can assist policy makers in the negotiation 
and design of treaties that take sustainability into consideration and help tribunals in 
balancing the concerns of the legitimate expectation of investors and host States’ 
responsibilities to their populace.
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